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 PREFACE  
 
While working on the enriching course of Indian and Western poetics 
meandering through different concepts and schools—nascent and fully 
developed like alamkāra, guna-dosa, rīti, vakrokti, dhvani and rasa, as well as 
postulations made in the Greek philosophy, I saw that Indian culture of 
knowledge reached its zenith in Rājaśekhara (c 10 AD). His samgraha text 
Kāvyamimāmsā, constructed on the discoursal principles of mimāmsā 
tradition, involved a śāstraic rigour of organization, analysis and 
dissemination of knowledge on kāvya that formed my critique as an M. Phil. 
dissertation under able guidance of Professor Avadhesh Kumar Singh. This 
study lured me into the broader issues of literature as knowledge and 
knowledge of literature as conceived of sporadically in both the Indian and 
Western literary traditions. The present doctoral thesis, as it were, I 
acknowledge to be an extension of my work on Rājaśekhara that verily 
afforded the analytical modalities employed in the present thesis. 
This study concerning literature as knowledge may well be seen as a 
post hoc event after stirring up the history of ideas. Literary practice and its 
critical understanding have a prolonged and distinct past in both the Indian 
and Western knowledge cultures. The accounts of literary history in both the 
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counterparts amply exhibit how literature, as a seat of knowledge 
(vidyāsthāna) has availed with a systematic account of its nature and the 
methods for analysing it. This is, historically speaking, the first character of 
theory in literary discourse. The word ‘theory’ in literature, albeit, signifies 
today much more than this. The term theory indicates a general 
understanding of something in abstract and speculative terms arrived at after 
examining the function and constitution of the given phenomenon. 
Theorizing involves discovering complex relations of a systematic kind 
among numerous counterparts. A theoretical framework promises valid 
knowledge on its own premise of its subject irrespective of localities of 
historical time and varying instances of its subject in different knowledge 
cultures. However, the history of ideas shows that theorizing must follow the 
event. All good theoretical works in Indian and Western traditions have been 
preceded by a very buoyant time of creative practices of first order. Theory is 
then speculation on the basis of the evidence. 
The overarching term ‘literary theory’ encompasses within its fold 
‘critical theory’ and ‘literary theory’. The critical theory predicates on 
ideological positions and at times conceives of literature with redemptive 
powers. The literary theory, on the other hand, leads one to the domain of 
epistemology of knowledge and discoursal devices; metaphysics and 
cosmology of literature in Indian and Western knowledge systems, which are 
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the sole constituents in the present dissertation. In the philosophical traditions 
of India and the West, some concerns pertaining to ‘ability to know’, 
‘knowing’, ‘knowledge’, ‘knowables’, and ‘end of knowledge’ have been 
approached with diverse positions.  
The present study in its course aims to undertake the following: 
 To enquire into the Indian and Western traditions of epistemology 
and their consequent impact on literary concepts and theoretical 
principles in a comparative manner. 
 To analyze a systemic construction of taxonomic frameworks in 
Indian and the Western literary traditions. 
 To critique the aesthetic in Indian and Western conceptual 
frameworks. This would involve concerns such as defining the 
aesthetic, the art; chronological study of aesthetics, resistance to 
classification of the aesthetic, nature of aesthetic experience, 
sublime and beautiful, and similarities and dissimilarities between 
Indian and western concepts and categories of the aesthetic. 
 To consider the ontological status of literature in the respective 
knowledge traditions by focusing on the attacks on and defences of 
poetry. Further, to know how literary discourse distinguishes itself 
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from other verbal discourses such as science, sociology, history, 
philosophy among others. 
It is hoped that the present study, while operating from the premise of literary 
theory and not critical theory, would postulate and critique the necessary 
departures and interventions in the history of knowledge traditions of the 
West and India and thereby arrive at a wider perspective of the issue. 
I take this opportunity to end the prefatory note by acknowledging the 
contributions of all who made this study possible.  
I, first and foremost, express my truest gratitude to my guru 
Professor Avadhesh Kumar Singh, Director, School of Translation Studies, 
IGNOU, New Delhi, and my Supervisor, who initiated me into the world 
of academics. His perceptive and caring guidance has formed and 
sustained me as a research scholar and human being in this frustrating yet 
elating pursuit of the research. It is all my good fortune to be his student. 
I express my gratitude to Professor Kapil Kapoor, former Pro-vice 
Chancellor, JNU, New Delhi and Dr. Rajnish Mishra, Special Centre for 
Sanskrit Studies, JNU, who helped me with their critical insights and 
observations during my intermittent engagements with their research 
projects.  
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I am indeed thankful to Kamal Mehta, Professor and Head, Dept. of 
English & Comparative Literary Studies, Saurashtra University, Rajkot for 
his timely support and guidance in the whole process. My thanks are all 
due to the faculty of my alma mater, Department of English & CLS, 
Saurashtra University, Rajkot. I hereby thank Dr. Jaydeepsinh Dodiya, 
Senior Associate Professor. I extend my thanks to Dr. Ravisinh Zala, 
Associate Professor, who kept on encouraging me in the process and 
availed me with necessary books. I extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Sanjay 
Mukherjee, Associate Professor, who kindly assisted me with his pertinent 
observations and supplied me necessary critical resources and took pains 
to go through early drafts. I am also thankful to Rajendra Chotaliya, 
Professor and Head, Department of Sanskrit, Saurashtra University, 
Rajkot, for his valuable suggestions on structural divisions in the Indian 
context. I am thankful to the central library of Saurashtra University, 
Rajkot; Library of CCDC, Saurashtra University, Rajkot; Library of 
Bahauddin Arts College, Junagadh, with its rare collection on Indian 
epistemology; other institutes and different people for enabling me to 
access primary and secondary sources in the course of writing. I also thank 
Fr. Joseph CMI, Principal, Christ College and all my colleagues at Christ 
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College, Sr. Alphonsa, Mr. Paresh Joshi, Ms. Tisha Roy, Mr. Robin Thomas, 
and Sr. Daya for extending their moral support. 
I acknowledge my humble gratitude to my dear friends who 
variously assisted me in the process. I thank Bihag Joshi, Assistant  
Professor, Bahauddin Arts College, Junagadh, and Nawalkishor Sharma, 
Assistant Professor, Dept. of English, KSKV Kachchh University for their 
warm support. I also express my genuine thanks to Ms. Dhwani Vaishnav 
who has proved to be a very resourceful person at various stages of the 
study. I also thank Ms. Jagruti Bheda for her support in availing me with 
necessary books. 
This is a significant occasion for me to express gratitude to my 
father whose continuous encouragement and care enabled me to go 
through this extensive and enriching experience of the research. At this 
moment I also remember my late mother who would have been very 
happy to see the completion of work that had begun with her blessings. I 
express my special thanks to my wife Manisha Vyas whose loving care 
and insistence kept me focused in the course of the study. I am also 
thankful to my sister whose kind wishes blessed me through the thick and 
thin of the tenure. 
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Lastly, I am all bliss and gratitude in praying to the divine whose 
grace was behind every help without a moment and it did not, as I felt and 
perceived, desert me even for a moment. The present work, as it is, I 
submit to Him. 
Maulik Vyas 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Sarva karmākhilam Pārtha Jñāne parisamāptaye | 
(All action in its entirety, O Pārtha, attains its consummation in 
knowledge.) 
Bhagavadgītā IV. 33 
Knowledge is a possible alternative. Its construction cannot be said to come 
about in an organic way. One cannot attain to knowledge in spite of oneself. 
One has to choose to know which is always optional. This will to know, 
therefore, makes the act of knowing a subjective reality. Act of knowing is a 
willed activity and so alternative. It is alternative also because the act of 
knowing has, unlike ignorance, a definite beginning in the day to day life. The 
pursuit of knowledge for the removal of ignorance ever remains unending 
while rendering the very purpose as an alternative partly fulfilled. Here, two 
words ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’ are employed to specify few simple 
cognitional differences which effervesce due to language that cuts the ocean 
of reality. 
Since knowing as a process is a mental act and so also knowledge, it is 
almost a double bind to sever one from the other. It is albeit possible to argue 
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from a particular viewpoint of logic that the action and the effect are different 
entities; or from grammatical view that a verb and a noun denote different 
lexical nuances; or that action and mode of being are two different existential 
facts. These divisions, however, have certain verity about them. ‘Knowing’ is 
a stative verb, not a perceptible action, and yet a mental process. ‘Knowledge’ 
as a noun signifies a nomenclatural recognition of the fact of human 
understanding of any given. It is not a process. It is permissible to discuss 
knowledge of something at a given moment in history. It is also possible to 
use the phrase like ‘quantum of knowledge’. Other prevalent terms that 
collocate with ‘knowledge’ are to ‘constitute’ or to ‘construct’ signifying the 
act of generating. However, of these Latin terms, constituere suggests ‘to 
establish or appoint by setting up something together’ (con ‘together’ + 
statuere ‘set up’) whilst construere indicates ‘heap together, build by piling up 
something together’ (con ‘together’ + struere ‘build’). Both the words, 
interestingly enough, do not refer to the actual production but show 
arrangement of something which is already in existence. Ironically, even the 
action words in relation to ‘knowledge’ remain content with nominal 
description of what is rather than describing the original occurrence. That is, 
discussing origination of knowledge leads to an impasse. The questions then 
arise: which is the fact about origin of knowledge: creation or compilation? Is 
it that while musing about creation of knowledge its sense has already become 
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a hostage to the sense of compilation?  Is the process of constituting knowledge 
unsignifiable? The term ‘knowledge’ or any other auxiliary verbal association 
with that term thus happens to fulfil the purpose of being an alternative to 
ignorance in a partial manner only. It is but in the act of knowing that the said 
purpose is truly served.  
Moreover, there exist all the possible conventional usages such as to 
quantify, to measure or to calibrate knowledge but there is hardly any 
satisfactory verbal testimony to the actual production of knowledge. In order 
to ward off this undecidability, the processual action word ‘knowing’ is 
preferred here to its other alternatives in order to distinguish it from 
‘knowledge’.   
Given the fact that ‘knowledge’ refers to a static phenomenon, the pool 
of knowledge is thought of in terms of increase, development, expansion or 
growth. Without expansion or growth knowledge as a possible alternative 
will render itself unqualifiable as knowledge. Further, if growth or expansion 
is an attribute, then ‚no attribute is ever seen to come or go without making 
some change in the substance connected with it.‛1 To extrapolate the 
argument, it can be argued that act of knowing is more intrinsic to the fact of 
knowledge than the meaning of ‘knowledge’ itself.  
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Knowing or perceiving forms as much the core of human intelligence 
as knowledge of phenomenal forms and names do. Brhadāranyaka states, ‚This 
(universe) indeed consists of three things: name, form and action.‛2 It is in sync 
with this Upanisadic thought to call the whole universe with above triadic 
attributes a non-Self. This idea, similarly, echoes in Astāvakra Samhitā, 
‚Knowledge, knower and the knowable—these three do not exist in reality. I 
am that stainless Self in which this triad appears through non-Self.‛3 Here, the 
knowable accords with the name; knowledge with the form; and knower with the 
action. The word knowledge is specifically used here for all relative 
knowledge that depends on subject-object consciousness. These three factors 
of limited individual consciousness constitute perceptual reality of the 
phenomenal world. However, knowing the Self does not and cannot happen 
through this triad. The Self is called niranjana (spotless); free from 
identification with the universe, both internal and external. Any thought or 
action not helping in realisation of Brahman will be knowledge pertaining to 
non-Self, a principle of differentiated and dualistic reality. All our actions 
directed to enquiries into pluralistic phenomenal and psychological worlds of 
nature and human mind respectively are verily avidyā. Avidyā cannot and 
should not be translated as ‘ignorance’. It should, in fact, be known as such a 
form of knowledge that deals in non-Self. This strongly precludes that all the 
forms of knowledge such as philosophy, science, natural science, 
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mathematics, logic, linguistics, literature, fine arts, social science, polity, 
commerce, numerous skills among others commit themselves to the category 
of avidyā. However, each domain of knowledge, for being essentially of 
differentiated and dualistic reality, contests for its superiority over others 
whereof science and philosophy hold the so called prized place. Amongst 
such claims to validity of knowledge, it has always been difficult for literature 
to do likewise. More to it, literature uses language which is metaphoric and 
symbolic; fraught or ripened with polysemy which makes the case of literary 
discourse worse or better depending on the polemic position adopted. 
Apostles of literature in its defence have always vouchsafed that literature 
does not yield untruthful knowledge, for it has never laid its claim to validity. 
Some of them have gone to the extent calling it knowledge unto itself in the 
form of ‘l’art pour l’art’ (art for art’s sake). However, it remains to see that 
amongst all forms of knowledge of non-Self wherein no discipline is 
essentially a notch above the other, where all knowledge domains are always 
already alternative, not substitutive, literature like a citizen of underworld 
figures as the last amongst the equals. How come literature is that mythical 
apple which is a curse as it distanced humanity from divinity and a boon too 
as it made possible for human race to seek freedom? In both the Indian and 
Western traditions some such questions are addressed with exquisite critical 
finesse. 
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Philosophical Theories 
Verbal discourse is the means of constructing knowledge about human 
experience and understanding of the world. The numerous kinds of verbal 
discourse are testimony to intellectual endeavours in fathoming multitude of 
knowledge forms and systematizing thought in different disciplinary 
categories. These disciplinary categories constructing knowledge exist as 
mythology, philosophy, theology, and scientific, literary, social, economic, 
political discourses among others. These disciplinary categories often 
interchange formal attributes of one another and thereby create discoursal 
fluidity or ‘flood of genres’. In the context of Indian and Western knowledge 
traditions different metaphysical and linguistic/ literary realities gave vent to 
distinct conceptualization of verbal discourse, its taxonomy in general and 
literary discourse in particular. For instance, in all knowledge cultures 
attempts were made to cognize inward (human being) and outward (physical 
world) phenomena and subsequently knowledge was constructed out of 
observations.  Results of the observation depended on the significance given 
to inwardness or outwardness of enquiry. Greek world of thought right from 
Thales of about 7th c. BC to Aristotle aspired to know the essence (ousia) of 
universe in terms of natural elements and substances, where the observer was 
firmly placed to know the universal ‘Logos’, hence, Protagoras (c. 500 BC) 
declaring, ‚Man is the measure of all things.‛  
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On the other hand, in Indian context, philosophical concerns were not 
anthropocentric in the Western sense as it reckoned vital essence (atman) of 
man as much as of an ant or gnat.4 Indian philosophical disposition is not 
anthropomorphic. Man is part and parcel of the infinite existence and so are 
his activities. Man’s ‘ability to know’, ‘knowing’, ‘knowledge’, ‘knowables’, 
and ‘end of knowledge’ are some concerns as are approached with diverse 
positions of a few Darśanas. Literary discourse in India, like its Western 
counterpart, shows presence of its metaphysical and philosophical givens and 
grapples with issues such as fact (vyavahārika satya), truth (pārmārthika sata), 
and literary truth (prātibhāsika satya). In the Western context, these issues are 
particularly dwelled upon in aesthetics, which studies nature, perception and 
experience of the beautiful. The west enjoys a long and sustained tradition of 
aesthetics that pries into definition of the fine (Plato, Aristotle), nature of 
aesthetic experience (Longinus), stages of perception of beauty (Thomas 
Aquinas), subjectivity of aesthetic experience and taste (Immanuel Kant and 
other German Romantic philosophers), classification of the aesthetic and its 
problems (Kant, Croce, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida), appraisal of art in 
modern time (Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and other Marxist thinkers).  
The above line of thought leads one to the domain of epistemology of 
knowledge and discoursal devices; metaphysics and cosmology of literature 
in Indian and Western knowledge systems. The Western epistemology in the 
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Greek context chiefly concerns itself with the essence of the universe. The 6th 
c. BC philosopher Heraclitus can be said to have laid foundation of Greek 
metaphysics as he postulated firelike Logos (Universal Reason) as a divine 
force that produces the order and pattern discernible in the flux of nature. 
Plato later developed a rational take on the issue of substratum of the world 
and posited his system of Idea, concept of knowledge against wrong belief or 
opinion (doxa) and theory of recollection. Aristotle, however, checked Plato’s 
idealism when he observed that ‘there is nothing in the mind except what was 
first in the senses.’ He did not subscribe to Plato’s metaphysical Idea and 
studied the world and its cognition ontologically. In the Judeo-Christian 
civilization the Scholastics talked about the summum bonum and appropriated 
Hellenic rationality in their theological discourse. The 16th century onwards 
the major division comes to us in the form of rationalism and empiricism. 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz belong to the former school stressing reason 
as the fundamental means of knowledge and later Locke, Hume and Berkley 
stressed the primacy of sensation and experience in cognizing the reality. The 
empiricists rejected rationalism as Locke famously held, ‘reason must be our 
last judge and guide’. It was in Kant that the synthesis of the two diverse 
philosophical views comes in the form of synthetic a priori judgement. 
Indian epistemological systems such as Sāmkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśesika, 
Yoga, Mimāmsā, Advaita Vedānta, Śaivism, Cārvāka, Jaina and Buddhist 
16 
 
maintain their difference from each other as regards perception of 
phenomenal world and knowability of transcendental higher truth. Each 
system has distinct pramānavidyā (epistemology) which shall be discussed 
later. All of them, however, set off from the following criteria: Śabda (verbal 
testimony), Pratyaksa (self experience), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna 
(analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation) and Anupalabdi (non-presence). These 
Darśanas howsoever differ from one another in means of knowledge, act of 
knowing, knowables and nature of knowledge, they concur with the one end 
of knowledge which is the final release from the birth-cycle and experience of 
oneness with Brahman.  
Episteme of Word  
Examining literature as knowledge involves two possible readings: first, 
treating literature as knowledge in itself; second, considering literature as a 
means of knowing the mankind. In the history of literary criticism, both the 
positions have enjoyed distinction in the hands of able literary critics, thinkers 
and philosophers. In the Indian as well as Western contexts certain 
approaches which gave emphasis on textual, contextual, linguistic and 
literary aspects of verbal discourse largely treated literature as knowledge in 
itself. On the other hand, critical practice adhering to literary work as criticism 
of life, theoretical approaches such as psychoanalysis, Marxism and its 
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various forms, New Historicism, feminist and gender studies, cultural 
studies, and of late ecocriticism or ‘green studies’ developed on the 
speculation of literature as means to know the mankind and the coexisting 
surrounding realities, either natural or manmade. 
The question of literature as knowledge was acutely felt by those 
literary thinkers who concerned themselves with the first mode of 
speculation.  Philosophers and literary theorists delved deep into the issues of 
nature of language and its different lexical and semantic units responsible for 
signification. European and American models of structuralism respectively 
focused on the smaller unit, sign, and the larger unit, syntax. However, if all 
the domains of knowledge were constructs in language with the similar 
signifying process, then how were they to be essentially defined and 
differentiated? The New Critics, for instance, did distinguish between literary 
writing with the binaries of referential and the emotive; denotative and 
connotative; literal and literary usages of language. IA Richards, for instance, 
in his Science and Poetry (1926) averred that literary writing as a form of 
emotive language consists of ‘pseudostatements’ that are justified entirely by 
their effect in releasing or organizing our attitudes; the referential statements 
are, whereas, justified by their truth or their correspondence with the fact to 
which they point. In a way this and the subsequent critical observations 
echoed what was long back mentioned by Philip Sidney in his ‚Apology for 
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Poetry‛ (c. 1595) that a poet ‚nothing affirms, therefore never lyeth. For as I 
take it, to lye is to affirm that to be true which is false.‛ 
A British philosopher, J. L. Austin in 1950s likewise showed the 
function of language in terms of two functions of utterances: ‘constative’ and 
‘performative’. The constative utterances make a statement; it describes a 
situation, which can be either true or false, e.g., ‘It has rained’ or ‘George is a 
good man’. The performative utterances, on the other hand, perform the act of 
promising, commanding, or declaring. The performative utterances are not 
true or false. They can be either appropriate or inappropriate, or as Austin 
puts, ‘felicitous’ or ‘infelicitous’, depending on the circumstances. This 
division shows that language not only reports but performs actions too. Here, 
it should be noted that the literary utterance introduces an impasse or aporia. 
Like the performative, the literary utterance does not refer to pre-existent 
state of affairs and is not true or false. Besides this, the literary utterance also 
creates the state of affairs to which it refers through character and their 
actions. Jonathan Culler observes: 
The notion of literature as performative contributes to a defence of literature: 
literature is not frivolous pseudo-statements but takes its place among the 
acts of language that transform the world, bringing into being the things that 
they name. (Culler: 2000, 96) 
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Jacque Derrida reviewed Austin’s thesis and showed undecidability 
about it. Derrida proffers that performative utterance succeeds only if its 
formulation in a ‘codified’ manner has iterability (repeatability). That is, if a 
given formula uttered in a particular situation fails to conform to an iterable 
model, the intended message will not be identifiable. However, as regards the 
‘codified’ formulas, Austin differentiates non-serious, anomalous or 
exceptional particular instances from the serious utterances, for the above 
subvert the piety of the right utterance. Derrida observes this binary of the 
serious and the non-serious and suggests that it is the second derivative what 
he calls ‘general iterability’ should be considered as a law of language. It is 
‘general’, for a sign must be able to be reused in different sorts of 
circumstances, including the non-serious ones. The clear boundaries of the 
utterances as drawn by Austin seem to intermingle. 
Literary discourse presents a site of conflict between the constative and 
the performative. When a literary work claims to tell us about the world 
whereof if it succeeds, it does so by allowing into being characters and events 
they relate. The utterance would become both constative and the performative 
in that the only way to claim that language functions performatively to shape 
the world is through a constative utterance. The performative statement 
‘Make it new’ as a motto of avant-garde in literary history describes modernism 
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in the form of constative statement. This exhibits the interactional relation 
between what language does and what it says. 
The study of signification with its theoretical basis in linguistics first 
and in philosophy later, agreed upon the fact that language inheres in floating 
signifiers, rhetoricity and intertextuality where meanings indefinitely 
contest—do, undo and redo themselves while making signification highly 
indeterminate.  
In such a situation, examining nature and function of story became a 
prime concern of narratology. Narratology, later came of an age and became 
an independent discipline from structuralism, ever grappled with the issue as 
to how a story makes sense through its linguistic and compositional 
specificities.  
How does one know what a verbal discourse is about? This question 
equally intrigued literary critics, grammarians and philosophers. The question 
becomes more specific in the literary context when the ‘verbal discourse’ is 
replaced with ‘story’. Here, ‘story’ stands for a generic concept whose 
meaning lies in its narrative construct. It is here required to specify the use of 
the term ‘story’ because this term when defined against ‘plot’ suggests an 
ordered rendition of event or idea which is chronological, coherent and 
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summarily collected from memory. Peter Widdowson traces the root of the 
word story: 
It is worth noting that the words ‘history’ and ‘story’ in English both derive 
from the Greek historia: ‘learning by inquiry’—from histor: ‘a person who 
knows or sees’—so that, in its origin, ‘story’ implies a form of knowledge, a way 
of knowing. (Widdowson: 1999, 133) 
Even the Latin origin of word narrative narrare/narratum ‘to tell or relate’ 
comes from the ancient word gnarus, which was in turn derived from Sanskrit 
root gna ‘to know’. Jonathan Culler similarly considers as to what drives a 
reader towards stories. He links pleasure of narrative to desire—a desire to 
know he calls ‘epistemophilia’.5 One likes to know secrets, to know the end to 
know the truth. However, as regards cognitional veracity of narrative, Culler 
posits questions: is narrative a fundamental form of knowledge? Or is it a 
rhetorical structure that distorts as much as it reveals? Is narrative a source of 
knowledge or illusion? Although Culler confesses the difficulty involved and 
logical regression inherent in answers to these questions, he comes to point 
out that one ‚must move back and forth between awareness of narrative as a 
rhetorical structure that produces the illusion of perspicacity and a study of 
narrative as the principal kind of sense-making at our disposal.‛ (93) It is 
worth noting here that narratological enquiries treat knowledge of the form of 
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story with greater sophistication and dexterity than knowledge through 
stories. 
The story suggests knowledge of its subject matter as well as of itself. 
The meaning of story therefore resides in the matter that it has and the 
manner in which it unfolds. In the 20th century, New Critics and Russian 
Formalists also included ‘form’ as a necessary structural component in the act 
of understanding of a literary piece. It follows that the understanding of any 
literary account rests on ‘the what’ and ‘the how’ of a narrative. Here it will be 
timely to note that the question of ‘the why’ in the process of signification 
stands singled out. The what and the how are directed to the narrative; the 
formal attributes of narrative. Whereas ‘the why’ on the one hand will lead its 
examiner to the storyteller; the subjective viewpoint and therefore a 
contingent assessment of intention of the storyteller, it will on the other hand 
lead to the perspectivalism—expectation of and effect on the listener of that 
story. The formalistic reading shuns ‘the why’ in its exegesis as it fosters 
relativism. Contrariwise, reader response theories and poststructuralist 
readings hail relativism for its limitless possibilities of signification. 
The above question may be further ramified by seeing the act of 
signification of story in the dyad of mimesis and diegesis. That is, how would 
one understand story in narration and story in dramatic representation? 
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Narration relies solely on verbal signs. Both telling and showing happens 
through words and thus language exhausts its signifying power through the 
help of its grammar, rhetoric and literary devices. The drama relies mainly on 
action. This action is further subdivided into, 
 Articulation (text) 
 Acting (motion) 
 Apparel (visual sign) 
 Emotion (sentiments) 
Sanskrit literary criticism accepted these fourfold classification of 
action as primary signifiers of drama, for knowledge of it leads to instruction 
and/or delight. A viewer then constructs his knowledge about a drama with 
the help of expressed thoughts or simple communication, acts or deeds, social 
standing of dramatis personae, evocation of sentiments and indicated location 
and stage instruction.  
Poetry, Truth and Logic  
There is nothing more classically polemical than the fascinated hostility in the 
relation between poetry and truth. Plato’s view of poetry established literary 
creativity as degraded imitation that distorts the Reality of eternal Ideas and it 
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stirs emotion in a way that is harmful for society. Plato’s main theses may be 
summarized thus: 
1. Poetry, like other forms of arts, is thrice removed from the Reality. 
2. While dealing in appearances, artists pose as if they were the 
repository of all knowledge. 
3. Poetry infects human nature by appealing to its inferior irrational 
part. 
4. Gods are often portrayed with weak human dispositions. 
The validity of these contentions for Plato rests on the artist’s inability 
to discriminate between knowledge, ignorance and representation. The artist 
has neither the direct experience of nor the correct opinion about the thing 
represented. It is mere ignorance to pass off wrong opinion as knowledge. 
Plato therefore says, ‚So the artist has neither knowledge nor correct opinion 
about the goodness or badness of the things he represents‛. (Republic X, 602 a) 
As a staunch rationalist, he puts clincher to any possibility of accepting even 
an iota of legitimacy of poetic representation. He remarks: 
Measuring, counting, and weighing have happily been discovered to help us 
out of these difficulties, and to ensure that we should not be guided by 
apparent differences of sizes, quantity and heaviness, but by calculations of 
number, measurement, and weight. (Republic X, 602 d) 
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The Greek worldview had—later Judeo-Christian as well—put 
premium on the rational self acting as the scale to fathom the universe. It was 
Nietzsche who in the 19th c. disproved this inviolable faith in reason and 
objurgated Plato for his excessive rationalist Apollonian stand against lively 
instinctual Dionysian one. Tout court, Plato found it impossible to reconcile 
between what was vyavahārīka satya (phenomenal reality) and prātibhāsika 
satya (apparent reality). 
Aristotle indirectly counters Plato by affirming poetry as a legitimate 
branch of study. He sees poetry as a source of universal knowledge of human 
behavior; unlike history which would produce knowledge of specific 
situations, poetry would describe the characters who might be any humans. 
Plato’s claim of poetry as degraded imitation is thus answered in terms of 
‘representation’ to be offered in three ways. Aristotle states: 
(i) Since a poet represents, just like a painter or some other maker of images, 
at any moment he is necessarily representing one of three things, either, (a) 
things as they were or are, or (b) things as people say and think, or (c) things 
as they should be.           
Further he says: 
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(ii) These things are expressed in diction in which there are exotic names, 
metaphors and many modifications of diction; we grant these to poets.  
     (Poetics, 1460b, 25) 
Aristotle thus grants the poets certain liberty in terms of the use of 
language and the representation of the content. He admits of impossible 
incidents provided that they are believably narrativized which should be 
preferred to possible ones that are unbelievable. Aristotle supports his 
argument with a reference to The Odyssey where seemingly improbable 
incident is rendered believable. In this incident Penelope fails to recognize her 
husband Odysseus, who presented himself incognito to her after twenty 
years. In it Penelope falsely infers from the disguised Odysseus’s accurate 
description of some clothes, that his tale of being Cretan who met her 
husband Odysseus is true. (The Odyssey 19. 165-250) The purpose of broaching 
up this particular case here is to point out Aristotle’s use of logic for a literary 
discussion: 
Homer above all has taught other [poets] to tell untruths in the right way, 
that is [by] a false inference. For if, whenever p exists or comes to be, q exists 
or comes to be, people suppose that if the latter (q) exists, the former (p) also 
exists or comes to be. But this [supposition] is untrue. For this reason, if the 
former (p) is untrue, but it follows from its existence that something else (q) 
exists or comes to be, [the poet] should add it [i.e. q]. Because we know that 
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this (q) is true, our soul falsely infers that the former (p) exists too. An 
example of this is the passage in the ‚Bath-scene‛. (Poetics, 1457b, 21) 
Aristotle predicates his point solely on the issue of ‘false inference’. 
Inference is one of the means of knowledge and is an important part of logical 
deduction. Aristotle has been quite clear about the distinction between 
poetics, rhetoric, and logic which is, to him, a science. Although these 
disciplines have distinct generic identity, they are called for as and when a 
need arises to check the veracity of literary statement. 
Rhetoric is not poetics nor is logic any of the two. However, each is 
equally not brashly dismissive of one another. This complementarity of 
disciplines may be explained by extrapolating Aristotle’s causal categories for 
natural objects in terms of material, formal, efficient and final. If one applies 
this causal categories to poetry, then the material cause of the poem would be 
its raw material—language; the formal cause, the shape of the resulting 
object—the poem; its efficient cause, what makes it—the poet; and the final 
cause, the end use—its effect on the audience, emotionally, socially or 
politically. In his Poetics, Aristotle lightly touches upon the effect on the 
audience in his discussion of catharsis which is essentially a part of rhetoric. 
The medieval and Renaissance traditions understood rhetoric as the study of 
figure of speech, but Aristotle construed it as the ability to see the available 
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means of persuasion. In the book 1 of Rhetoric he differentiated three elements 
of persuasion in public which bear no less significance in the process of 
literary signification, its reception and interpretation by a reader: 1) the 
arguments a speaker uses (what the author says); 2) the ēthos or character of 
the speaker (‘author function’ of Foucault); and 3) the disposition of the 
audience (reader of interpretive theories). The literary meaning is significantly 
affected by all these three factors whereof consideration of disciplines other 
than literary is a requisite. 
In Indian poetics the nexus between the poetical and the logical was 
first co-opted by Bhāmaha in the fifth ‘Pariccheda’ of his Kāvyālamkāra. 
Bhāmaha positively asserts that every human experience, actual or imaginary, 
is worthy of literary treatment. That is, any subject matter, scientific or 
imaginative, can be appropriated for literary purpose. So the poet’s 
responsibility is great.6 Having drawn limitlessness of what may be fit for 
poetic usage, Bhāmaha posits that the process of sense-making in literature is 
characteristically different from what the positive sciences follow. He states, 
‚The logic that applies to poetry is different in nature<‛7 However, that 
poetry which deals in technical aspects of philosophy will indeed invite 
logical examination.8  As regards rigorous application of principles of Nyāya 
(system of logic) to poetic thesis, there is certain preferment in that it is a 
befitting exercise when the technical subject matter is rendered poetically. 
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This idea may be further clarified with Bhāmaha’s classification of poetry on 
the basis of subject matter. He subdivides poetry as 1) devādi carita vrtta 
(historical accounts of gods, legends and kings), 2) utpādya vastu (fictitious 
account), 3) kalāśrita vastu (content based on fine arts), and 4) śāstrāśrita vastu 
(subject matter based on grammar and technical sciences). (KL, 1.17) The first 
two are lokāśraya (subject to customs and beliefs prevalent in the given 
culture) whilst the last two are subject to their respective disciplines. Of these, 
it is the last one that is śāstrāśraya which judiciously allows its scrutiny with 
the help of tenets of logic. For instance, hymns and poetical compositions of 
Ādi Śankarācārya’s advaita and Aśvaghosa’s Buddhism might well be 
sounded out on the basis of tenets of Nyāya. To state further, a śāstragarbha 
kāvya enjoins principles and theories of a scientific subject as logic, 
mathematics, grammar, etc. in a versified mnemonic manner. The words and 
their meanings are so employed as can produce in the learner interest for the 
subject and delight of its study. On the other hand, the words and their 
meanings in a literary work coexist to produce unalloyed and intense emotive 
delight to its beholder. In this sense, even a text on logic like Tarkasamgraha is 
called kāvya and epic like the Rāmāyana is called kāvya too. It is this 
fundamental difference between śāstrāśraya and lokāśraya composition which 
is, however, summarily coalesced in Bhāmaha’s noted definition: Śabdārthau 
sahitau kāvyam (Coexistence of word and meaning constitute kāvya.) (KL, 1.16). 
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Bhāmaha in yet another way elicits the signifying mechanism of 
literary act as distinct from scientific ones, particularly logic. He considers 
both in his fifth ‘Pariccheda’, for both types of writing admit of pratijñā 
(proposition), hetu (reason) and drstānta (illustration). These three components 
are, in fact, limbs of anumāna (inference) in logic. Anumāna as a pramāna 
(means of valid cognition) consists of five members of syllogism: pratijñā 
(proposition), hetu (reason), udāharana (example), upanaya (application) and 
nigamana (conclusion). Unlike pratyaksa pramāna (direct perception), anumāna 
is an indirect perception. The other indirect means of cognition is upamāna 
(analogy) which is often figuratively used in literary compositions. 
There is no form of intelligible thesis as would not involve at least 
three components viz. proposition, reason and example. However, the 
cognitive deductive process applied to reason is more appropriate for 
scientific subjects than it is for literary. The reason in logic establishes the 
existence of the sādhya (intended reference) through the method of anvaya 
(agreement) and/or vyatireka (difference). For example, the statement: there is 
fire on the hill can be explained as follows: 
1. Pratijñā (proposition): ‘there is fire on the hill’ 
2. Hetu (reason): ‘because there is smoke on the hill’ 
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3. Udāharana (example): ‘where there is smoke there is fire, as in 
kitchen’ 
The function of reason is to ascertain the oneness of what is proposed as 
pratijñā and what is truth as sādhya through the laws of kārana (cause) and 
kārya (effect). Bhāmaha, however, shows that in poetry, unlike positive 
sciences, hetu (reason) in poetry does not invariably have to adopt anvaya-
vyatireka (methods of agreement and difference) in relation to sādhana (means) 
and sādhya (end). In other words, signification in a literary composition need 
not obligatorily rely on the actual cause-effect realities observed in the 
phenomenal world. This viewpoint of Bhāmaha shall be taken up at length 
later in the course of the study. 
Rājaśekhara (c. 10 AD) in his Kāvyamimāmsā considers Udbhata’s basic 
categories of meaning. All the written and oral compositions can be classified 
into two semantic categories: vicāritasustha artha (reflective meaning), and 
avicārita ramaniya artha (charming, not subject to reflection). The former 
meaning attends to the faculty of reason and logic which may be proved 
correct or incorrect in sync with the laws of cause and effect in the universe. 
Contrariwise, avicārita ramaniya artha is imaginative, hypothetical or apparent. 
This type of meaning pleases the listener or reader and draws ones attention 
to its charm more than to its logical elucidation. Although technical or 
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historiographical writings at times involve such usages, it is essentially 
literary discourse that is characterized by such a type of meaning. Rājaśekhara 
in this manner distinguishes scientific or technical subject matter from the 
literary on the basis of their diverse nature of meaning whose judicious 
reading would necessitate distinct exegetical modalities. 
Literature as an Order 
Whereas narratological perspective affords one an inside perspective, literary 
discourse as such can also be conceived of as a canon among other forms of 
writings. Literature itself is the great generic category of written activity. With 
all the general notions about literature, the understanding of it as a creative 
practice is based on the ground of beauty of form and/or emotional effect. As 
an ontological phenomenon, literature itself is a generic category in the 
domain of knowledge with zillions of subgeneric classes intralinked to one 
another and at times interlinked to domains of knowledge other than literary. 
This is the issue of taxonomy. Taxonomy or the system of classification is a 
prerequisite for accumulating, sustaining and distributing knowledge. In the 
Western tradition the first instance of building taxonomy is found in 
Aristotle’s Poetics. However, the earliest attempt at a detailed, systematic 
disciplinary classification of the domains of knowledge was made by a 10th 
century Indian poetician, poet, and playwright, Rājaśekhara in his 
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Kāvyamimāmsā. He devotes one whole chapter ‘Śāstranirdeśa’ to the 
classification of domains of knowledge as were approved of in his time. 
In the present time there are numerous models of literary taxonomy. 
Those critics who extensively deal in taxonomic matters have found that in 
every age literary classifications need revisions, for literary genres like species 
form new relations amongst them, inherit attributes from other forms and at 
times mutate; they evolve and become obsolete or even extinct. In this 
manner, a study of change in taxonomic contents can also become a fit 
material for studying the discipline of literature with historical and 
comparative perspectives. The taxonomic particulars have thus certain 
epistemic functions. Considering literature as knowledge also involves the 
issue of its partitive and holistic analysis. Also, there are certain contesting 
voices in the Western tradition that resist the very idea of classification for 
arts including literature. Therefore, to find out and study such generic 
plenitude in the Indian and Western contexts with historical and comparative 
perspectives thus becomes an ontological study providing with evidences that 
can aid epistemological purposes in the present study. 
Literary discourse as knowledge, in fact, necessarily involves 
meandering through the following areas, for their philosophical givens have 
tellingly affected knowledge through and about literature. 
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 Indian and Western traditions of epistemology and their consequent 
impact on literary concepts and theoretical principles in a 
comparative manner. 
 The chronological development of critical discourse on and 
departures in literature in both the Indian and Western traditions. 
 The ontological status of literature in the respective knowledge 
traditions along with the attacks on and defences of poetry. Further, 
the fact as to how literary discourse distinguishes itself from other 
verbal discourses such as science, sociology, history, philosophy 
among others. 
 The aesthetic in Indian and Western conceptual frameworks. This 
would involve concerns such as defining the aesthetic, the art; 
chronological study of aesthetics, resistance to classification of the 
aesthetic, nature of aesthetic experience, sublime and beautiful, 
poetic genius, and similarities and dissimilarities between Indian 
and Western concepts and categories of the aesthetic. 
 Literary taxonomy as conceived of in the Indian and Western critical 
traditions along with the criteria valued in the respective traditions. 
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Notes:  
                                                 
1 Brhadāranyaka Upanisad (c. 1000 BC) I. iv. 7, p. 83 
2 Trayam vā idam—nāma, rūpam karma< (Brhadāranyaka Upanisad I. vi. 2, p. 172) 
3 Jñānam jñeyam tathā jnātā tritayam nāsti vāstavam | 
 Ajñānādbhāti yatredam so’hamasmi niranjanah ‖ (Astāvakra Samhitā 2.15) 
4 Esa atma samah plusina samo sakena samo, 
Nagena sama abhistribhir lokaih…samo’nena sarvena. 
The atman (the vital essence in man) is the same as in the ant, the gnat, the elephant, 
in the three worlds, and same in the whole universe (Brhadāranyaka Upanisad I. iii. 22) 
5 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford UP, 
2000) p.91.  
6
 Na sa śabdo na tad vācyam na sa nyāyo na sā kalā | 
  Jāyate yanna kāvyāngamaho bhāro mahān kaveh ‖  (Kāvyālamkāra, 5.4) 
7 Aparam vaksyate nyāyalaksanam kāvyasamśrayam | 
 Idam tu śāstragarbbhesu kāvyebhihitam yathā ‖           (Kāvyālamkāra, 5.30) 
8  Atha nityāvinābhāvi drstam jagati kāranam | 
   Kāranacenna tannityam nityancet kāranam tat ‖            (Kāvyālamkāra, 5.31) 
(In this world the cause is considered eternal and inherent. (But it is not right to do 
so) For if it were a cause it could not be eternal and if it were eternal it could not be a 
cause.) Bhāmaha suggests that if poetry consists of such a statement, then it 
verification must come from logic, for if the cause is construed as eternal, the effect 
cannot come into being. And once the effect comes into being, the cause no more 
exists. This proves that cause cannot be eternal. In this way Nyāya would be of use to 
ascertain the right meaning. 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
Epistemology of Knowledge in Indian and Western 
Knowledge Systems  
 
 
If one observes the movement of human consciousness, it will be noticed that 
human consciousness has twofold movement: outward and inward. 
Consciousness that flows outward knows the phenomena external to the 
knowing self. This is an objective consciousness; one is conscious of 
something, be it phenomenal, psychological or emotional. It has the classic 
subject-object dualism. Most of our philosophical and scientific enquiries are 
examples of this outward going consciousness. The inward going 
consciousness, on the other hand, is not of or about something. In the absence 
of the object even the subject is blurred. In other words, the knower and the 
known are but one in the act of knowing, or that there is neither the knower 
nor the known but only the act of knowing. This inward movement of 
consciousness, often likened to a lamp that also illumines itself apart from 
other objects, is claimed to be the realm of spirituality. 
No wonder that history of consciousness is full of the instances of 
progresses and excesses in both these mutually excluding movements of 
consciousness. Each different civilization prized one way of knowing over the 
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other. Although there is no tradition only inward or only outward in its 
outlook or interest, there is surely but a priority assigned to either of the two. 
PT Raju observes that Indian philosophical traditions overemphasized 
matters related to spirit that consequently ignored material and even ethical 
values. On the contrary, Western philosophical traditions in their zest for the 
rational and objective search weighed the material highly over the spiritual.1 
I 
Western Epistemology 
The history of Western epistemology begins with the early Greeks who 
viewed natural elements as the building blocks of the universe. The Western 
philosophy, however, must be seen in the historical phases of the Greek, the 
Roman, the Judeo-Christian and the modern, for each new phase ushered in a 
new metaphysics and ethics. 
The Greek philosophy flourished between 600 and 200 BC. It can be 
said that the intuitive hypotheses of the ancient Greeks prefigured many 
theories of the modern science, and many of the moral ideas of pagan Greek 
philosophers have been assimilated into Christian moral doctrine. The whole 
Western philosophy has a long and varied history of development which may 
be traced as follows under different eponymic and ideational heads: 
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 Greek Philosophy 
1. The Ionian School: Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes 
2. The Pythagorean School 
3. The Heracletan School 
4. The Eleatic School: Parmenides (c. 5th BC) 
5. The Pluralists: Empedocles and Anaxagoras (c. 5th BC) 
6. The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus (c. 4th BC) 
7. The Sophists: Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno, Hippias among others 
8. Socratic Philosophy 
9. Platonic Philosophy 
10. Aristotelian Philosophy 
 Greco-Roman & Judaic  
11. Epicureanism: Epicurus founded his school in Athens in 306 BC. 
12. Stoicism: Zeno of Citium (310 BC), Epictetus (1st AD), and Marcus 
Aurelius (2nd AD)  
13. Scepticism 
14. Neo-Platonism 
 Medieval Philosophy 
15. Augustinian Philosophy 
16. Scholasticism 
17. Post-Aquinas Philosophy 
 Modern Philosophy 
18. René Descartes  
19. Thomas Hobbes 
20. Baruch Spinoza 
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21. John Locke 
 Idealism & Skepticism 
22. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
23. George Berkley 
24. David Hume 
25. Immanuel Kant 
 19th century Philosophy 
26. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
27. Arthur Schopenhauer  
28. Friedrich Nietzsche 
29. Søren Kierkegaard 
30. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill 
31. Marxism 
32. Pragmatism 
 20th century Philosophy 
33. Phenomenology 
34. Existentialism 
35. Analytic Philosophy 
36. Postmodern Philosophy 
37. Feminist Philosophy 
38. Environmental Philosophy 
39. Contemporary Philosophy 
40. Applied Ethics 
From among the above mentioned, however, it will be in the fitness of things 
to pursue those philosophical positions as were majorly concerned with 
40 
 
ontology of natural phenomena; means of knowledge and validity of their 
knowledge, and causal theories, for these considerations form the core of 
epistemology. 
I.1 Greek Philosophy 
Greece is the cradle of Western philosophy. Thales of Miletus (c. 625 BC - c. 
547 BC), who is also regarded as the first Western philosopher, began Ionian 
school of natural philosophy. His interests pertained to astronomy, physics 
and meteorology. In contrast to the previous mythic view of the world, he 
proposed to explain the element underlying all creation. His one fundamental 
substance underlying all natural phenomena was water because he thought 
evaporation and condensation to be universal processes. Anaximander (c. 610 
BC- c. 546 BC ), a disciple of Thales, saw the basic principle of the world as 
apeiron, ‚the unlimited‛ or ‚the boundless‛ which is an intangible, invisible, 
infinite substance. Apeiron is the primal principle from which a vortex had 
created the earth and all things subsequently emerged. This substance, he 
maintained, is eternal and indestructible. The substances, such as warmth, 
cold, earth, air, and fire, continuously evolved out of the ceaseless motion of 
vortex, generating in turn the various objects and organisms that make up the 
recognizable world. The third important Ionian philosopher of the 6th century 
BC, Anaximenes (c. 585 BC- c. 546 BC), revisited Thales’s postulation that the 
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primary substance is something familiar and material. However, the primary 
substance this time was air, not water. To him the element of air was 
responsible for the changes things undergo which could be explained in terms 
of rarefaction (thinning) and condensation of air. In this way Anaximenes was 
the first philosopher to explain differences in quality in terms of differences in 
size or quantity, a method fundamental to physical science. 
The Ionian school made a paradigm shift by radically altering the 
mythological position to the scientific explanation of natural phenomena. And 
today howsoever elementary their findings might seem; it discovered 
important scientific principles of the permanence of substance, the natural 
evolution of the world, and the reduction of quality to quantity.  
Pythagoras founded his school in southern Italy around 530 BC at 
Croton. In contrast to the Ionian school, his philosophy was rather religious 
and mystical. His views allowed not only the ancient Orphic mystical view of 
the world but also the developing in sciences through mathematics. 
Consequently, his philosophy combined ethical, supernatural and 
mathematical beliefs along with ascetic code of conduct such as observing 
silence, obedience, dispossession, vegetarianism and simplicity in dress. Such 
a way of life was necessary, for Pythagoras upheld the existence of soul that 
migrates into a succession of different kinds of animals before coming into a 
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human life. It is noted by Diodorus Siculus in his Bibliotheca Historica X vi 1-3 
that Pythagoras had claimed reminiscences of his past life as a Trojan warrior 
named Euphorbus who was killed by Menelaus.  In a way Pythagoras became 
the first person in the West to systematise his thoughts on metempsychosis.  
He offered that the highest purpose of humans should be to purify their soul 
by nourishing intellectual virtues, refraining from sensual indulgence, and 
practicing special religious rituals.  
Pythagoras emphasized the study of mathematics as a means to 
understanding all relationships in the natural world. The Pythagoreans 
studied science along with mathematics and maintained that all things are 
made up of numbers and geometrical figures. The Pythagoreans also 
discovered the mathematical laws of musical pitch and inferred that planetary 
motions produce a ‘music of the spheres,’ as a result they developed a 
‘therapy through music' to bring humanity in harmony with the celestial 
spheres. Their contributions to mathematics, musical theory and astronomy 
have been crucial to the later thinkers, especially Plato whose philosophy was 
much influenced by these mystical Pythagoreans. 
In the post-Pythagorean Hellenic philosophy, the great debate between 
Heraclitus and Parmenides and subsequent relativism of Sophists arrested the 
scene with urgency which later prepared a background for the disciples of 
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Socrates. Heraclitus (540?-480? BC) proposed the element of fire as the 
primordial source of the world. In quite a metaphysical sense, he used Logos 
(Gk. ‘word’ or ‘reason’), a ‘Firelike’ Logos, which as a divine force brings 
about order and change in forms. He called it ‘Logos’, for he believed that it is 
similar to human reason and that his own thought partook of the divine 
Logos.2 His major thesis is that the world is in a constant state of flux. It is fire, 
the primal substance that creates the phenomena of the sensible world 
through condensation and refraction. The nature of reality for Heraclitus is, 
thus, change. Metaphysically speaking, he added the concept of ‘becoming’ to 
the previously held concept of ‘being’ in regard of the question as to how the 
world exists. His thesis, famously known in his words, runs thus, ‘You cannot 
enter the same river twice.’  
Parmenides of Elea in 5th c. BC squarely refuted Heraclitus on the 
ontological relation between stability and change in phenomena and their 
perception. Parmenides believed that the universe and all forms existing 
therein are an unchanging, indivisible, spherical entity. Moreover, any 
reference to change or diversity is self-contradictory. He claimed that nothing 
can be truly asserted except that ‘being is’, because in his view all that exists 
has neither beginning nor end and therefore is not subject to change over 
time. This was so because Parmenides had posited an abstract idea of 
‘Absolute Being’. In his work in verse form viz. On Nature, he asserted the 
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existence of Absolute Being on the ground that its non-existence is 
inconceivable precisely for the reason that Absolute Being is dissociated from 
every limitation under which human beings think. Further, plurality of and 
differences in phenomena observed and experienced by human beings are 
empirical errors as we perceive only the apparent in the world. So the diverse 
and changing forms have no real existence. In this way, the reality or True 
Being is not known to the senses but is to be found only in reason. This belief 
makes him a precursor of the idealism of Plato. Parmenides maintained that 
Being cannot arise from Nonbeing and that Being neither arises nor it passes 
away. Here, it is evident that in Heraclitus and Parmenides oppositions, for 
the first time, the classic opposition of empiricism and rationalism was taking 
shape which was to become a biaxial force for the western philosophy 
centuries later. 
The empirical-rationalist conflict between Heraclitus and Parmenides 
found a response in the Sophists, who were philosophers from many different 
societies outside Greece and travelled about from city to city in the fifth 
century B.C. to Athens. The Sophists later came to be known as teachers of 
rhetoric, the art of making persuasive public speeches. The Sophists argued 
that since reason produced such conflicting claims as those of Heraclitus and 
Parmenides, one must doubt the power of reason to lead to truth. In this way 
the Sophists became the first exponents of scepticism adopting a philosophic 
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position of doubting the possibility of any true knowledge. Protagoras, the 
most known of the Sophists, claimed that since there is no way of determining 
the truth about reality, reality must be said to have whatever qualities as are 
claimed for it. This was the coup de grâce to all preceding Greek endeavours to 
discover the true nature of reality. More so, they argued that all moral and 
political principles are relative to the group which believes them. And none is 
absolutely true, for the laws constructed by human beings are not natural and 
unchangeable but are merely the outcome of custom and convention. 
Therefore, the logic behoves one to commensurate with the fact that one is 
under no obligation to obey rules as such. 
Socrates and Plato found that the scepticism of the Sophists, in practice, 
fostered moral relativism, which in turn weaned them from a philosophic 
responsibility of right discrimination and a definitive enquiry into any given 
issue. This non-committal relativism was sufficient to hazard Greek 
institutions of law, social customs and human virtues. Plato jettisoned all the 
positions of the Sophists as he defended reason and argued that reason can 
provide true knowledge of reality and moral principles, and that all human 
beings are guided by this knowledge and act rationally upon it. Plato thus 
entered an already contested realm of Greek philosophy where he was 
compelled to respond to the empirical-rationalist conflict with aporetic 
relativism. 
46 
 
Firstly, Plato sought to synthesize Heraclitus and Parmenides in his 
system of philosophy, for none could come out of their idée fixe and see 
beyond it to pry into the nature of reality. Reality, to Plato, is not of one 
nature; it is not monistic. That is, reality is neither singularly characterized by 
flux nor permanence. Reality must be seen to be twofold, or dualistic, in its 
nature. Here, Plato comes to offer a dualistic metaphysics. Since metaphysics 
asks the question, ‘what is the nature of reality?’, Plato construed it to be as 
twofold; the reality of two kinds. First, there is the realty of physical objects in 
space and time, which are objects of the senses and which are in flux, 
growing, decaying, changing, as Heraclitus’s river. Heraclitus was right about 
only one kind of reality which was material or physical. The second kind of 
reality is the reality of ideas, concepts, forms, or essences, which are objects of 
thought, like the idea of a circle, and they are not to be experienced in space 
and time. The idea or essence of a circle, which includes the property that it 
comprises 360 degree, is universally true, unchanging and immutable. In his 
view, there is a realm of eternally true and unchanging ideas such as this, 
which reason can know. It was this truth that Parmenides claimed, that reality 
is permanent and unchanging, but it is true only of one aspect of reality. Plato 
illustrates his concept of ‘Idea’ in his famous allegory of the cave at the 
beginning of Book VII of the Republic. However, Plato’s theory of knowledge 
is explicitly laid down from section 509 to the end of Book VI in his Republic. 
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Here, his epistemic model also attempts to reply the Sophists’ relativism by 
distinguishing opinion or belief from true or valid knowledge. 
Plato held that imagining or conjecture occupies the lowest position in 
epistemology as its objects yield the lowest degree of truth. At this level the 
mental activity is minimal, for instance, as in shadows, after-images, and 
reflections. Other examples of imagining are optical illusions, dream-images, 
and fantasies. What is implied here is that awareness of images is lowest form 
of knowledge, since images are only shadows of the actual objects known by 
perception, which is a higher level of knowledge. This, in fact, refers to artists, 
whose paintings and sculptures are only images, copies of actual human 
beings and other real objects. For Plato, painters, sculptors, poets, playwrights 
are only the makers of images, fabrications, illusions; they are purveyors of 
the make-believe. The real problem Plato found with the artists is that they 
can easily stimulate, influence and control the passions of the public by their 
persuasive imagery. More so, he viewed politicians as skilful image makers, 
for the art of rhetoric, which the Sophists taught, was in its intent and effect a 
gross art of manipulation of public discretion that used clever and false 
images. 
Higher than imagining, but still lowly in true epistemic value, is belief 
(doxa) which is the perception of actual objects. At this level, what occurs is 
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the recognition of things in this material world. Pragmatically, it is here that 
one classifies and organizes the perceived objects. However, knowledge born 
of belief is incapable of grasping the abstract concept of the objects perceived. 
Thus, belief which has its source in the sensory perception is insecure for 
want of abstract truth and principle that remain universal and unchanging. 
This notwithstanding, the sense perception is still ‘true opinion’ as it does 
recognize the actual objects providing a basis for classifications and 
predictions. Therefore, this form of knowledge is to be distinguished from the 
level of imagining that attests only images and shadows, and for which 
reason it is to be called ‘false opinion’.  
Plato offers that it is this level on which an ordinary mind; a man-on-
street with common sense operates. The ambit of such consciousness remains 
always confined in daily communication to the concrete things—the man or 
woman, the city, the scandal, gossip. 
Plato’s philosophic misgivings about the epistemic value of literary or 
art works, therefore, rest on these two counts: 1. Arts employ lowest mode of 
knowledge, i.e., false opinion based on imagining or conjecture, and 2. Objects 
of imitation are mere shadows, illusions. To Plato, This poses serious problem 
of truth validity in the creative practice on pure epistemological grounds. 
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Plato’s thesis so far becomes clear. In his conceptual framework, the 
objects of perception are concrete, whilst the objects of intellect are abstract. 
The objects of perception are particular things; the objects of intellect are 
general or universal concepts. Besides, the phenomena of perception are 
changeable, in process, in Heraclitean flux; the entities of intellect are 
unchanging, in Parmenedian eternal immutability. 
Such unchanging eternal true knowledge Plato calls the Form. The 
forms, ideas or abstract concepts are primary and invariable truth in the 
universe. Concepts are the means by which the universe is rendered 
knowable. For instance, a simple statement, ‘there is a coin’ uses the concept 
of a monitory unit. But if there were no objective, universal and undeviating 
set of qualities that the concept of coin designates, and if everyone had a just 
personal opinion as to the qualities which the concept coin refers to, 
communication would be impossible. Hence, the objective, universal and 
immutable qualities which define our concepts such as citizen, virtue, 
heroism are what is meant by a form, which Plato sometimes also called 
essence (ousia) as they constitute the essential qualities of the objects whether 
gross or subtle. The forms are real, independently existing entities; they are 
eternal, immutable and intelligible to reason alone. Plato metaphorically 
explains the forms or ideas as ‘substance’ and their visible manifestations in 
concrete objects as ‘shadow’. The ‘shadow-substance’ relation of the visible 
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world to the forms of the intelligible world posits the concrete objects as 
imperfect ‘copies’ of the form. This is the first function of the forms rendering 
the actual world of things knowable to human reason as the objects of 
mathematics, sciences, and philosophy. The second function, however, is to 
evaluate and criticize all these objects. 
The evaluative and critical function of the forms or ideas is established 
for the reason that the forms afford standards or ideals by which the 
evaluation of all phenomena is made possible. Since the whole phenomenal 
world is subject to flux: birth, growth, decay, and that only the pure, abstract 
concepts last, Plato effectively put to use the evaluative or normative function 
of the forms with regard to the ethical and political forms of goodness and 
justice. It was contrapuntal to the Sophists’ take on the relative concept of 
justice, which is, to Plato, like all other forms, eternal and immutable. 
In the Platonic schema, knowledge born of the forms correlated with 
their ‘shadowy’ counterparts is still not the highest kind of knowledge. This 
knowledge constitutes the domain of scientific and mathematical truth, which 
though not relative and changeable, has certain deficiencies. Mathematical or 
scientific perception is still tied to the visible world by its use of diagrams in 
the proofs of geometry. Secondly, this knowledge is limited, for it remains 
hypothetical or conditioned as it does not examine or prove its own 
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assumptions. A third limitation is that the various mathematical forms are not 
coordinated; their relation to one another or to other forms remains 
unexamined. Natural science, like mathematics, provides knowledge of forms 
of the perceptible viz. natural elements, animals, heavenly bodies, etc. Here, 
both mathematics and science are limited for the following reasons: 1) both 
rest on unexamined principle of hypothesis, 2) both are tied to particulars, 
examples of the visible world, and 3) both are fragmentary, partitive because 
they fail to show the coordination of the forms which are their objects of 
study. 
The highest and fourth level of knowledge, in view of Plato, is Reason. 
On this level the dialectic method is used as a cognitive tool. Dialectic is the 
crowning science of all sciences, and ‚no other study could rightly be put 
above this.‛ (Republic, 534c) The philosopher while aiming at knowledge of 
the forms involves himself in reason through the use of dialectic as his 
method by which he can analyze the essences or forms of all things in the 
universe and so as to establish their relationship to one another. The 
philosopher, here, takes care of the inadequacies encountered at the third 
level, and he (a) proffers true first principle for mathematics and the sciences, 
(b) shuns use of diagrams or particular things from the visible world, and (3) 
harmoniously correlates the forms with dialectic and unifies fragmentary, 
isolated, unrelated sciences and mathematics into one totality.  
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The Platonic enquiry into the highest reality, the supreme form, leads 
one to the Idea of the Good, which is the ultimate aim of the soul. The idea of 
the good is fons et origo of intelligibility, truth and goodness to all the other 
forms, and it alone suffices their coordination and unity. All the plurality of 
forms attain to their metaphysical oneness in the idea of the Good. 
The Idea of the Good Plato compares to the sun. The way light of the 
sun illumines the concrete things of the world, the Idea of the Good in like 
manner makes the forms intelligible and acts as the source of their being and 
goodness. In fact, the Idea of Good is, to Plato, the ‘universal author’ of all 
things beautiful and right, and the source of truth and reason in the other. In 
his view, the Good is not essence but it far exceeds in dignity and power. This 
whole design of gradation in epistemic domains in Plato is aptly put into a 
diagram by T.Z. Lavine as follows: 
Plato’s Divided Line3 
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Later in the discussion on Plato’s critique of the fine or beautiful, it 
shall be noticed as to how defining the essence of the beautiful is confounded 
with the truthful and the good, for despite their distinct conceptuality, Plato 
holds them in a kind of mutual agreement in that their attributes overlap and 
partake of one another. Consequently, he comes up with the finest of possible 
working definition for the beautiful: ‘What is fine is hard’ *to define+. (Hippias 
Major, 304e9) This metaphysical Idea of the Good is the source of all truthful 
and beautiful. It is also the source of the moral purpose in human life. It was 
this Platonic epistemic system with its Summum Bonnum which was 
thoroughly appropriated by Christian scholarship that assimilated it into its 
theological, ethical, and aesthetic cerebrations.  
When the Platonic epistemology favoured the abstract, the universal, 
the essence or the Forms, the Aristotelian epistemology favoured the concrete, 
the particular; the changing things of nature and human life. Aristotle was 
more concerned with the ideals which are realizable by kinds of things within 
their particular circumstances than with ideals of excellence which are 
separate from and transcendent of the actualities of nature and human life. In 
other words, Aristotle finds the universal in particular things, and called it the 
essence of things, whereas Plato finds that the universal exists apart from the 
particular, and is related to it as its prototype or exemplar. The empirical 
temperament of Aristotle led him to believe that language is quite capable of 
54 
 
expressing the essence or truth of things. This truth concerns the sensible 
world, and the human cognition begins with the actual perception of the 
phenomena which can logically ascertain the validity of cognition and further 
classify and systematize it. This conviction led Aristotle to construct a system 
for deduction of which Plato was vaguely aware of but he never understood 
its logical implication. Plato thought that deduction would simply follow 
from premises, so he emphasized on having good premises and was 
convinced that the conclusion would follow. Aristotle, hence, used analytical 
deductive logic in all his intellectual pursuits. It would, therefore, be pertinent 
to look into Aristotle's method of arriving at conclusion for the valid 
cognition. 
In Aristotelian epistemology, knowledge involves ‘statements’ (that 
something is so), and ‘reasons’ (statements why something is so). The wise 
people have knowledge of the cause of things, which allow them to use 
various arts for various practical purposes; moreover, one can also teach 
others how and why things are the way they are. Aristotle sets out to explain 
the nature of statements—how they are put together out of simpler units 
called ‘terms’, and how statements can be ‘related’ to one another so that it is 
possible to give the reason. Besides, he is intent upon finding as to what 
makes statements true or false. These tasks make up the logic, or as Aristotle 
called it the ‘analytic’.   
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While discussing terms, the basic elements that combine to form 
statements, Aristotle is also discussing the actual perceptible world. The 
terms, in his view, can be classified according to the kinds of things they 
involve. This suggests that things can be seen to be prevailing in a number of 
different ways. The terms are correlated with the different ways things can be. 
These kinds, known as Categories or Praedicamenta, are put this way: 
Every uncombined term indicates substance or quantity or quality or 
relationship to something or place or time or posture or state or doing of 
something or the undergoing of something. (Categories 4) 
This may be tabulated as follows: 
No. Categories Functionality  Example  
1 Substance (ousia) Essence or substance Man or horse 
2 Quantity (poson) How much/many 2 ft. Long, 1 kg. 
3 Quality (poion) Of what kind White or literate 
4 Relation (pros ti) Towards something Double, half, or greater 
5 Place (pou) Where  In the Lyceum, in the 
market place 
6 Time (pote) When   Yesterday or last year 
7 Position (keisthai) Posture, attitude  to lie, stand, sitting down 
8 State (echein) Condition, to have or 
be 
Having books with, being 
on armour 
9 Action (poiein) To make or do Cutting, burning 
10 Affection (pasehein) To suffer or undergo Being cut, being burnt 
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This notwithstanding, Aristotle does not insist that this is a 
comprehensive and correct catalogue. However, it is obvious from the above 
list that these categories are very general concepts, expressing various ways in 
which being is manifested. 
Aristotle states: 
None of these terms is used on its own in statement, but it is through their 
combination with one another that a statement comes into being. For every 
statement is held to be true or false, whereas no uncombined term—such as 
‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’ or ‘conquers’—is either of these. (Categories 4) 
Neither term ‘black’ nor ‘cow’ is true or false by itself. But ‘That house 
is black’ must be one or the other. Terms combine to make statements. 
However, not all the statements are ‘true’ or ‘false’. Aristotle, for instance, 
says that a prayer is a sentence, but it is neither true nor false. (On 
Interpretation 4). Statements which are subjected to the truth validity say 
something about something. One can then analyze statements in two ways: 1. 
the part indicating what one is talking about called ‘Subject’, and 2. the part 
indicating what one is saying about called ‘Predicate’. In every statement 
some term plays the role of subject and another term the role of predicate. 
Aristotle shortened these parts as S and P respectively. 
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Here Aristotle observed some anomaly in this pattern, for not every 
term can play both roles. It was of great importance to him because it allowed 
him to draw the fundamental distinction on which his whole view of reality is 
based. The term that stands apart is Substance. He realized that terms 
designating substances can play the role only of subject, never of predicate. 
They take only S part in statements, not the P part. He avers: 
What is most properly, primarily, and most strictly spoken of as a substance 
is what is neither asserted of nor present in a subject—a particular man, for 
instance, or a particular horse. (Categories 5) 
For example the term ‘Socrates’ that indicates one particular man. And 
it cannot take the P place in a statement. One can say things about Socrates—
that he is wise or snub-nosed—one cannot use the term ‘Socrates’ to say 
something about a subject. It will be wrong to say, ‘Snub-nosed is Socrates’, 
except as a fancy and poetic expression. It is possible to say metaphorically, 
‘He is Socrates of our society’, which puts the substance ‘Socrates’ in the P 
role. According to Aristotle, it is not spatial position in the sentence that 
counts, but the logical position terms in combination with others. In a similar 
way, Socrates cannot be ‚present in‛ a subject, in the way colour red can be 
present in a rose. 
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What Aristotle is trying to show is the way things are; all in different 
ways. Some things have being as qualities, some as relations; some as places 
and so on. However, among all these, there is one basic way in which a thing 
can be which is being an individual substance, a thing, such as Socrates. All 
other ways of being are contingent on this. They are all characteristics of these 
basic substances, which he calls Primary substance. 
The mistrust for Platonic Forms in Aristotle has its root in such 
empiricist ontology and deductive analytic. He suggests here that the 
particular or the individual entities such as this man, this horse, etc. are more 
fully substances than anything else. These are not shadows of abstract Forms, 
as Plato held; they are the most real things there are. And everything else is 
real only in relation to them. This notwithstanding, Aristotle’s system of 
deriving unambiguous conclusion is not fully secure. The reason lies in the 
deductive reasoning only which is a logical process. In this method a 
conclusion is drawn from a set of premises that contain no more information 
than the premises taken collectively. Consider this syllogism: All dogs are 
animals; this is a dog; therefore, this is an animal. The truth of the conclusion is 
dependent only on the method. In like manner: All men are apes; this is a man; 
therefore, this is an ape: The conclusion is logically true, although the premise is 
absurd. Inductive reasoning, on the other hand, is a logical process in which a 
conclusion is proposed that contains more information than the observations 
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or experience on which it is based. For instance: Every crow ever seen was black; 
all crows are black: The truth of the conclusion is verifiable only in terms of 
future experience and certainty is attainable only if all possible instances have 
been examined. In the example, there is no certainty that a white crow will 
not be found tomorrow, although past experience would make such an 
occurrence seem unlikely. Thus, in the analytic, deriving conclusion is always 
logically possible in sync with the method adopted without empirical 
verification of its validity. 
Tout court, the wise person of Aristotle is the one who knows—both 
what is and why it is. Such knowledge is expressed in statements. Statements 
are made of terms put together in certain definite ways. All of them are 
already or can be reformulated to be subject-predicate statements, in which 
something is said about something, and such statements can be either true or 
false. The ultimate subjects of statements are primary substances. 
The enquiry into the nature of particular substances led Aristotle 
further away from Platonic metaphysics as he found Plato’s theory of Forms 
problematic. His main contentions seem to be as follows: 1) the abstract Forms 
fail to provide any explanation of the existence and changes of concrete things 
as can be seen through the above Categories, and 2) theory of Forms offers a 
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dualism between the realm of intelligible Ideas and the world of sensible 
things, and the theory fails to relate them.  
Aristotle’s posit is that the Idea or the essence of a substance is to be 
found only in a particular thing, not apart from it because this way only can 
one overcome Platonic dualism and relate the intelligible with the sensible. 
He in the process affords the conceptual categories viz. ‘matter’ and ‘form’; 
‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’. Matter is the physical stuff of the particular 
substance; form whereas is the shape given to the matter. And both matter 
and substance inhere in a substance. The form is the purpose or end which 
the matter serves: the pot is the purpose or end which the matter of clay 
serves. Both matter and form are linked to the principles of potentiality and 
actuality respectively. For instance, the matter clay has the potentiality to be 
shaped so as to attain the actuality of a form. In like manner organisms are the 
actualization of the potentiality of inorganic substances and are themselves 
the potentiality of the rational soul. Aristotle’s this theory in philosophy is 
also known as hylomorphism, that is, the theory that every material object is a 
composite of matter (hyle) and form (morph); matter is the potentiality of a 
thing, form its actuality. 
However, the relation between matter and form and their successive 
modifications observed in the world prepare the ground for Aristotle’s theory 
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of reasons. Each thing or event, he thought, has more than one ‚reason‛ that 
helps to explain what, why, and where it is. Earlier Greek thinkers had tended 
to assume that only one sort of cause can be really explanatory; Aristotle 
proposed four. The word Aristotle uses, aition (a responsible, explanatory 
factor) is, in fact, not synonymous with the word cause in its modern sense. 
However, in normal usage it is often referred to as Aristotle’s theory of 
causation. 
Aristotle’s causal theory primarily accounts for man-made artifacts and 
then for natural phenomena. Natural things due to their organicity possess an 
immanent ‘movement’ of growth, change and decay, which is absent in 
artifacts. He draws the distinction as follows: 
Of the things that exist, some exist by nature, others through other causes. 
Those that exist by nature include animals and their parts, plants, and simple 
bodies like earth, fire, air, and water—for of these and suchlike things we do 
say that they exist by nature. All these obviously differ from things that have 
not come together by nature; for each of them has in itself a source of 
movement and rest. This movement is in some cases movement from place to 
place; in others it takes the forms of growth and decay, in still others of 
qualitative change. But a bed or a garment or any other such kind of thing has 
no natural impulse for change—at least, not insofar as it belongs to its own 
peculiar category and is the product of art. (Physics 2.1) 
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It is here that the classic divide between Nature (physis) and Art (tēchne) 
is for the first time conceived of. Art products do not have in themselves ‘a 
source of movement and rest’. However, an artifact like bed may move from 
place to place if someone moves it; or it may decay due to some external force 
applied to it or by dint of a property of the natural substance it is made of. On 
the other hand, natural things change in time because of what they are. 
Nature is the locus of change, whilst art is marked by stasis. (Later on some 
poets such as Tennyson, Browning, and Yeats among others harped on this 
binary and praised the unchangeability of art over the changing nature.)  
Aristotle in order to explain the flux in substances affecting matter and 
form constructs four ‘becauses’; ‘reasons’ or ‘causes’. 
1. Material cause: the material of which the house is built 
2. Formal cause: the house to be built, the form to be actualized 
3. Efficient cause: the instruments—work and tools, which produce the 
house as their effect 
4. Final cause: the purpose for which the house is built 
This causation is more agreeably suited to man-made world as the last cause 
talks about the purposive intention behind some work. In case of nature, 
Aristotle offers two arguments. Firstly, chances or accidents observed in 
natural process only prove an order or regularity. He states, ‚All natural 
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objects either always or usually come into being in a given way, and that is 
not the case with anything that comes to be by chance.‛ (Physics, 2.8) So roses 
come from roses and not from grains of wheat. Secondly, art either completes 
nature or ‘imitates’ nature. But there is purpose in art, so there must be 
purpose in nature as well. This apart, in metaphysical sense, the final cause 
becomes the ‘unmoved mover’ of the universe. Thus, it is seen here that 
Aristotle's hylomorphism understood with the analytic make him an 
ontological thinker.   
Later in history after the political decline of the Greeks and Roman in 
the West, the period of Middle Ages, giving way to Semitism, was full of 
turns and twists in its political, intellectual and social domains. In 395 AD 
Roman Empire was divided in two—a Western Empire with Rome as its 
capital; and an Eastern Empire with Constantinople as its centre. In 529 AD 
Church closed Plato's Academy in Athens. Here the first Christian 
Benedictine order is formed, which banned Greek philosophy. Now 
monasteries had the monopoly of education, reflection, etc. in the year of 1453 
Turks conquered Constantinople and ushered in a new cultural influence 
over European continent. This prolonged time of about 1000 years of Middle 
Ages is now thought of as a germination time. In this age the first convent 
schools were opened up. Around c. 1200 first universities were founded. It 
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may be said that the European continent was divided into three cultural 
zones:  
1) Western Europe (Rome as capital)→Latinized Christian culture, 2) 
Eastern Europe (Constantinople as capital)→Greek culture (So, a 
Greek name Byzantine to Constantinople. After Turks advent called 
Istanbul), and 3) North Africa, Middle East→Arabic speaking 
Muslim culture, first taking Spain under its influence. After 
Muhammad's death in 632 AD both Middle East and North Africa 
were won over to Islam. Shortly, Spain became part of Islamic 
culture. Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Bagdad were important centres. 
Arabs also won Alexandria. So, much of Greek science was inherited 
by the Arabs. In Middle Ages, Arabs were predominant in science, 
mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, and medicine. 
Soon after Thomas Aquinas, philosophy and science broke away more 
and more from the theology of the Church. Thus the basis was created for two 
powerful upheavals in the 15th and 16th centuries, namely, the Renaissance 
and the Reformation. The Renaissance became a rich cultural development 
that began in the late 14th c. in Northern Italy. Here, the art and cultural of 
antiquity were resuscitated that were forgotten in the dark middle ages. 'Go 
to the source' was the motto. It was said, 'horses are born, but human beings 
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are not born—they are formed.’ Major discoveries of the time viz. the 
compass, firearms and the printing press changed geographical, political and 
intellectual realities of the West. The Renaissance middle class began to break 
away from the feudal lords and power of the Church. As this was happening, 
Greek culture was being rediscovered through a closer contact with the Arabs 
in Spain and the Byzantine culture in the east. A new perception of mankind 
emerged in this time. The humanism of Renaissance centralized man and his 
worth, in striking contrast to the biased medieval emphasis on the sinful 
nature of man. Italian philosopher and theologian Marsilio Ficino, who 
translated Plato into Latin, synthesized Greek wisdom with Semitic faith:  
"Know thyself, O divine lineage in mortal guise", whilst Pico della Mirandola 
considered it worth to write Oration on the Dignity of Man. Renaissance 
humanism was to an ever greater extent characterized by individualism. We 
are not only human beings, but unique individuals. This idea leads to the 
unrestrained worship of genius—a renaissance man embracing all aspects of 
life, art and science. It is here that interest in human anatomy also developed. 
However, there was one difference. The Greek humanist point of view had 
emphasized the importance of tranquility, moderation, and restraint. The 
Renaissance humanism indulged in the reveling experience of the world here 
and now. As if the whole world was their arena to be explored. Art, 
architecture, literature, music, philosophy, and science flourished as never 
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before. It was Renaissance humanists' duty to restore it. So, St. Peter's Church 
turned into one most glaring, flamboyant and whacking site of the confluence 
of art, sculpture and theosophical knowledge.  
I.2 Rationalism 
In the 17th c. Essais Philosophiques (Philosophical Essays) (1637), Meditationes de 
Prima Philosophia (Meditations of the First Philosophy) (1641) and Principia 
Philosophiae (The Principles of Philosophy) (1644) by René Descartes ushered in 
rational skepticism. His contribution lied in applying mathematics as a 
method in the study of philosophy and invented analytical geometry. 
Mathematics, he believed, would clear up the confusions and uncertainties of 
philosophy, as it involved ‚intuition‛ (understanding of self-evident 
principles such as axioms of geometry or arithmetic equations viz. 3+2=5), and 
‚deduction‛ (logical reasoning or inference from self-evident propositions). 
Descartes hoped that the philosophy based on ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ 
would remain certain and infallible as geometry. For any ascertainment of 
truth, he, therefore, laid down three pre-requisites: 
1. The belief must be clear, distinct and beyond doubt, self-evident to 
reason. 
2. Its certainty must not be dependent on any other belief. 
3. It must be about something which exists. 
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The next question that arose was, ‘where can one find such 
indisputable belief?’. His methodological skepticism led him to contest beliefs 
produced by sense perception, natural science, and exaggeratingly so, even 
mathematical beliefs. It was at this juncture Descartes lighted upon his 
famous thesis. He says that I doubt all my beliefs, including those of 
mathematics, there is still one belief that cannot be doubted: every time I 
doubt, I must exist to doubt. Thus, he concludes: je pense, donc je suis or cogito 
ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). This cogito ergo sum is truth every time one 
thinks or denies it, and it remains valid attested by his three pre-requisites for 
the indisputable truth.  
The whole philosophy of Descartes is based on the absolute truth that 
when one is conscious of thinking, one knows that one exist. In his theory of 
knowledge, the one truth that is incontrovertible and ever valid is that of 
one’s own existence as a conscious subject. Therefore, Cartesian cogito 
introduced subjectivism into modern philosophy. 
Subjectivism holds that one can know with certainty only one’s own 
mind and its content. The implication is that the knowledge of other minds 
and material objects can be proved only by inference from what one knows 
with certainty; the existence of one’s subjective consciousness and one’s 
thoughts or ideas. Therefore, the existence of everything else other than one’s 
68 
 
own mind becomes questionable. This theory further perpetrates the divide 
between mind and matter. Because existence of anything else being 
questionable other than one’s own thoughts, the subjective consciousness and 
its contents thereby exist separately from the physical world of nature and 
social world of human beings. The radical skepticism of Descartes threw the 
succeeding Western epistemology into a whirlwind: can one know anything 
at all beyond the contents of one’s own mind? 
Cartesian thesis, therefore, comes to establish the dualism of mind and 
matter. It bears in it the seeds of epiphenomenalism. The theory of 
epiphenomenalism expounds the relationship between mental and physical 
realms. According to it, the mental qualities are causally dependent on the 
physical states, but they do not in turn affect the physical world. In other 
words, the mental realm is completely a product of the physical and is never 
the cause of the physical. This mode of thinking was later observed in the 
philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, TH Huxley, and George Santayana.  
I.3 Empiricism 
History of modern Western philosophy hereafter registers the distinction 
between Continental Rationalism which clubbed together French Descartes, 
Dutch Spinoza and German Leibniz, and British Empiricism that included 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume. It would not be a tall claim to make that theory-
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of-knowledge in philosophical thought is attempted exclusively in Essays 
Concerning Human Understanding of John Locke in 1690. Locke did not believe 
in intuition theories of innate conceptions and proposed his ‘tabula rasa’ 
theory, that is, the mind is a white paper and it produces materials for reason 
and knowledge from experience. As an empiricist, Locke almost revives the 
classical formulation of Aristotle intending a dig against Descartes, ‘there is 
nothing in mind except what was first in the senses.’  
In his work, Locke tries to clarify two questions: first, from where one 
gets ideas, and second, whether one can rely on sensory cognition.  
As regards the first question Locke recognizes two basic sources of 
cognition viz. sense organs and thoughts on which basis he divides the 
faculty of human experience into two kinds: Sensation and Reflection. 
1. Simple sensations: experience of external objects through senses 
such as taste, smell, feel, hearing and seeing forms the first and 
great source of ideas. He calls it ‘simple sensations’. 
2. Reflection: experience of internal thoughts such as thinking, 
reasoning, believing, doubting, etc. Locke calls this source 
‘reflection’. 
Locke further classifies ideas as either ‘simple’ or ‘complex’. A simple 
idea is one that, ‚being in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one 
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uniform appearance, or conception in the mind‛.4 Simple ideas are the 
element of all human thinking. The simple ideas help carry the following 
operations: 1. Distinguish (one from another), 2. Compare and contrast, 3. 
Juxtapose 4. Name or identify, and 5. Frame abstract ideas. 
Complex ideas can be classified under three heads: 1. Modes, 2. 
Relations, and 3. Substances. The modes are our ideas of space, time and 
infinity which are built by adding simple ideas to simple ideas. The relations 
include causation observed between things. And the substances offer 
modified modes.  
In Aristotle's scheme, substance is what can exist on its own which 
depends on nothing. Traditionally, substances are conceived of as knowables; 
they are knowable in terms of their forms, particularly their essential form. 
However, Locke’s process of gaining ideas through ‘experience’ and 
‘reflection’ makes the knowability of substance suspicious, for it being a 
complex idea in Locke it is an aggregate and not essence, therefore dependent 
and derived. This requires a further elucidation given below. 
To Locke, substance is: something—we know not what! It means, 
although we know there are substances, but we do not know what they are. A 
common experience would have one believe that certain simple ideas always 
seem to appear together: a yellow colour, for instance, together with quality of 
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matter—solid, smooth, heavy, etc—in which it is found. And it is difficult to 
conceive matter separately from its qualities. So we invent a name for that 
thing—that support, that substratum, the substance—and call it ‘gold’. Gold 
is not yellowness, nor heaviness; nor is it just admixture of all those qualities 
together. Gold is a thing that has all those qualities, but what it is, in itself, one 
has no idea. Locke’s this take on substance drastically differed him from 
Aristotelian empiricism. 
Moreover, Locke suggests that our idea of substance is made up of our 
idea of the substance’s power. By ‚Power‛, he means something like a 
disposition to affect other things, given the suitable circumstances. A magnet, 
for example, has the ‘power’ to attract iron filings. Similarly, gold has the 
power to produce yellow sensation when perceived in proper light. 
Substances, then, are unknown in themselves but can be known to exist as the 
causes of the ideas they produce in us. 
To answer the second question as to whether or not the world really is 
the way we perceive it, one may rather look at Locke’s enquiry into the 
qualities of matter whereof he simultaneously affirms and doubts absolute 
validity of sense perception. Here, Locke’s thesis involves an undoing: on the 
one hand, he believes that knowledge that cannot be traced back to a simple 
sensation is therefore false knowledge and must consequently be rejected. On 
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the other hand, simple sensations of colour, fragrance, taste, etc. produce 
different effects on the perceiver and the real inherent qualities of the matter 
remain unknown. 
To wit, Locke, while searching for the valid sense perception, talks 
about qualities of matter and divides them into two: 1. Primary qualities: they 
are extension, weight, motion, number, etc. which belong to the external 
objects apart from any human involvement, and 2. Secondary qualities: they 
are sensations like taste, smell, sound, sight, feeling which do not reproduce 
the real qualities that are inherent in the things themselves. They reproduce 
only the effect of the outer reality on our senses. 
So even if knowledge is traced to simple sensations that are formed of 
secondary qualities and therefore untenable, knowledge is rendered relative 
and unstable. The undoing of absolute knowledge thus comes to pre-exist the 
moment Locke’s enquiry for valid cognition sets itself out. 
It was thus Locke’s purpose to pry into the determinate origins of 
cognition, the certainty and the extent of our knowledge. His thesis is 
epitomized as follows, ‚We can have knowledge no further than we have 
ideas‛.5 
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George Berkeley as a philosopher as well as a devout bishop developed 
his philosophical theory to answer skepticism and atheism raging in the wake 
of empiricist thought. He felt that philosophies and sciences of his time posed 
a threat to the Christian way of life and faith in God as Creator. Berkeley 
claimed that skepticism is a consequence of separation of experience or 
sensation from things. Once this has been permitted, there is no other way but 
through ideas to know about things. To overcome this separation, a person 
must recognize that the ‘being’ of sensible things consists in their being 
perceived. Whatever is perceived is real, and the only things that can be 
known to exist are those that are perceived.  
In Locke’s view, material substances do exist independently of our 
perception of them with their qualities of their own. However, their true 
nature of substance remains unknowable: ‘something—we know not what’. 
Berkeley asks: how does this differ from skepticism? To Locke, the rose is not 
really red; in reality, it is an uncoloured extended substance with a power to 
produce a sensation of red in us, and likewise nor is sugar sweet, nor fire hot. 
Berkeley thought Locke’s views led directly to the errors of skepticism 
and the evils of atheism. To counter them, he offered two principles that 
characterize ‘commonsense realism’: 1. Things exist independently of our 
perceiving that they do, and 2. Things have the qualities they seem to have, 
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‘the rose we see is really red’. This proved to be a clever ploy which allowed 
metaphysical presence of the God in his empirical theory, for he 
simultaneously speaks of an independent material world as well as 
impossibility to (re)cognize the external object other than through its idea. 
Berkeley questioned Locke’s faith in the existence of material world as 
a reality by using empirical logic. He said the only things that exist are those 
we perceive. But we do not (cannot) perceive ‘material’ or ‘matter’. To assume 
that what we perceive has its own underlying ‘substance’ is jumping to 
conclusions. And one has absolutely no experience on which to base such a 
claim. The question then lingers, do things exist only when perceived? In 
Berkeley’s view things exist apart from the human mind and perception but 
there must be a mind in which all the ideas exist, an infinite omnipresent 
spirit, namely, God, that perceives everything. Berkeley believed in a ‘spirit’ 
in that all our ideas have a cause beyond our consciousness and this cause is 
not of a material nature; it is spiritual. It was his claim that the existence of 
God is far clearly perceived than the existence of man. 
It was when reason ruled supreme in the 18th century; David Hume 
appeared on the scene as the wrecker of the Age of Enlightenment. Hume’s 
breakthrough was his find in Francis Hutcheson, a Scottish moral philosopher 
at the University of Glasgow, who had argued that moral principles are not 
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based on the Bible, as Christianity confirms, nor are they based on reason, as 
Socrates and Plato had argued. To Hutcheson, moral convictions rest only on 
our feelings, our sentiments of approval and disapproval. 
Hume extrapolated this view that moral beliefs are neither divine nor 
rational but only expressions of our feelings and applied it to all human 
beliefs including those scientific. If it were so, then all the advancements of 
the great new sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry and physiology—all 
wonders of the Age of Enlightenment would bite the dust. 
Hume began to move toward the shocking thought that the best 
philosophic and moral knowledge as well as scientific laws are nothing but 
sense perceptions which our feelings lead us to believe. Therefore it is 
dubious that one can have any knowledge; one has only sense perceptions 
and feelings. This was the most radical and extreme skepticism in the then 
Western philosophy. Lavine in his analogy suggestively likens Hume to the 
mythical David slaying the Goliath of all science, philosophy and theology.6 
David Hume worked out his wrecking thesis in his Treatise of Human 
Nature in 1737 wherein he expressed that his purpose was to study the science 
of man and to explain the principles of human nature. In his work, Hume 
asks few basic questions concerning all human knowledge: 1. ‘How do you 
know? What is the origin of this knowledge?’ and 2. ‘What are the limits of 
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human knowledge?’. His empirical skepticism relentlessly pushed these 
questions to show that one has no knowledge, but only beliefs which one feels 
are true. 
At the outset, Hume shattered the classical doctrine of Two Kinds of 
Knowledge viz. sense perception and reason. The first kind is the lower level 
ordinary knowledge of the sensible world which Plato called ‘true opinion’ 
and Descartes called the confused ideas of the senses. The second or the 
superior level of knowledge has reason as its source—as approved of both by 
Plato and Descartes. Plato’s metaphysic is based on his theory of forms; 
Descartes’s metaphysics is based on his dualistic theory of mental and 
physical substances. It was this divide which had formed an unreal hierarchy 
in epistemology with a bias favouring the latter. To Hume, this epistemic 
division was rash arrogance and superstitious credulity of past thinkers, for 
one would never know the causes of sense perception, nor can reason ever 
find out the nature, the purpose, or the plan of the world. Hume, thus, 
regarded metaphysics as a pretentious nonsense.  
In his epistemology, Hume proposed two means of knowledge viz. 
‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’ which supply the contents of consciousness in 
general. 
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The direct sense perception of external reality in terms of immediate 
sensation—touch, hearing, smell, taste, and seeing is what he called 
‘impression’. ‘Ideas’ are faint images of impressions as in thinking about or 
recalling one’s impressions. Impressions leave stronger and lasting mark on 
consciousness than ideas which are only images of the received impressions. 
Looking at the way impressions and ideas correspond to one another, 
Hume makes a distinction between simple and complex impressions and the 
simple and complex ideas. Every simple idea has a simple impression which 
resembles it; and every simple impression, a correspondent idea. For 
example, perceiving yellow colour has a simple impression and recollection of 
this yellow colour is a simple idea. Complex ideas are, on the other hand, 
compounds made of diverse independent units of impressions which are not 
in fact related, but which nonetheless are associated in human imagination. 
For example ideas of ‘angels’—men with wings; Pegasus—a winged horse; 
New Jerusalem or Heaven with golden roads, pearly gates, etc. In the last 
complex idea the city of New Jerusalem with minute detailing need not 
correspond to any complex impression of some real city—opposite of what 
Descartes forwarded that any distinct idea is itself reality—however, this 
complex idea can be further broken down into simple ideas of gold, road, 
gate, pearl and so on. Many of such complex ideas in the world, however, do 
exist which, in Hume’s view, are brought about by the three laws operative in 
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the act of associating diverse perceptions; they are ‘resemblance’, ‘contiguity’ 
and ‘cause and effect’ wherein the last is the most tellingly present.  
Here as an empiricist, Hume made two important points. First, one 
cannot imagine or know anything which one has not had a prior impression 
of in sensory experience. This was a coup de grâce to theosophical and 
rationalist justification of the existence of the God and the idea of self which 
are but complex ideas. Second, Hume saw impressions and ideas in a causal 
relation whereof one never has an impression of the cause and yet one forms 
a complex idea of the effect—such as in the form of imagining, conjecture, 
reasoning, deduction, expectation, etc. which makes up the whole physical 
science. For example, having looked at a wound, one would reason or imagine 
that wound causing the effect of pain. 
The implications of this seemingly simple theory of the law of 
association of cause and effect are far serious and destructive as they nullify 
the claim that one can have a scientific knowledge at all such as that certain 
causes produce certain effects. 
I.4 Humean Theory of Causation  
Hume claims that anything one can say about external reality, about matters 
of fact, must be based on the cause-effect relationship. That is all the human 
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reasoning about matters of fact in science is based on the causal laws of 
nature. But the question is, ‘from what impression does the idea of cause 
arise?’ The answer he comes to is because after repeated experiences of the 
sensory impressions of relations between objects, the complex idea of cause 
arises in the mind. This repeated experiences he calls ‘constant conjunctions’ 
that form a habit. If it is so, then scientific facts turn out to be ideas that are 
associated by the law of association of idea. In this way, the definition of 
cause in Humean scheme would be as follows: ‘a cause is an object in constant 
spatial and temporal conjunction with another such that the experience of the 
one compels the mind to expect the other.’7 The scientific knowledge is, then, 
nothing but the laws of human psychology associated together as cause and 
effect. That is, the idea of necessary connection between causes and effects is 
not in the objects one observes, but only in the mind. 
It would be opportune to have an example. Take for instance a cricket 
ball pitched to a batsman; a hitting bat and the ball moving to a different 
direction. In usual way one would say that the striking of the bat caused the 
ball to move in a different direction because we experience here that one 
event comes after the other in contiguity of space and time. What Hume 
would say is that one experiences the first and the following actions, but one 
cannot experience the cause of the second action. One perceives only the 
simple impression of second action; however, we connect the second to the 
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first one with the law of association and see them as cause and effect, which 
are complex ideas. Perceiving the rolling ball in a different direction as an 
effect of hitting is, in reality, a human expectation which we have formed after 
seeing many such instances. Hume points out that the expectation of one 
thing following another does not lie in the things themselves, but in our mind. 
And expectations are associated with habit that is always experienced. What 
if the ball sticks to the bat after being hit hard? One would call it unnatural or 
miraculous because it was not expected nor confirmed by habit. So when one 
speaks of the ‘laws of nature’ or ‘cause and effect’, one is actually speaking of 
what one expects. The laws of nature are neither logical nor illogical, they 
simply are. The expectation that the cricket ball will move when struck by the 
bat is therefore not innate in the physical world but it resides in human mind. 
In other words, since the idea of necessary connection between causes and 
effects does not come from sensory impressions that idea must be subjective 
and produced by the psychological laws of association of ideas. Hume’s 
epistemology here comes close to Buddhist Kshanavāda (moment to moment 
perception) and says that we associate a series of small simple impressions 
and make them into one complex idea. In this manner, Descartes’s cogito or 
self is also a complex idea which is formed of number of individual past 
impressions and seen as one continuum of self and therefore cogito is simply 
an abused reasoning. Hume thus very well extrapolated Hutcheson’s find 
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about subjectivity of moral philosophy and applied it to all objective scientific 
knowledge shattering all pride and hope of the Enlightenment in the power of 
scientific reasoning, and he showed that physics is nothing but our own 
psychology, that all the scientific laws are based on our feelings. 
I.5 Kantian Synthesis  
It was Hume’s (negative) influence on Kant that kept him engaged for so long 
until his first major work Critique of Pure Reason (1781) came out by then he 
was already fifty-seven. Kant set himself to solve ‘Hume’s problem’: whether 
the concept of cause is really objectively vacuous, a fiction that can be reduced 
to a merely subjective and instinctive habit of human nature. Immanuel Kant, 
the greatest champion of the Enlightenment, admits that Hume is right in 
pointing out experience as the basic source of reason. However, he doubts 
whether Hume has correctly understood experience. For Hume all knowledge 
of matters of fact beyond perception and memory is founded on the relation 
of cause and effect. And causes are just our projections of personal feelings 
onto a supposed objective world. This Kant demurred with because he is 
convinced that in Newtonian science one does have rationally justified 
knowledge. And if Hume’s examination of reason forces one to deny that one 
has this knowledge, something must be wrong with Hume’s analysis. 
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On the other hand was absolutist rationalism of Leibniz for Kant to 
tackle. Leibniz believed that the understanding contains within itself certain 
innate principles, which it knows intuitively to be true, and which form the 
axioms from which a complete description of the world can be derived. These 
principles are necessarily true and do not depend on experience for their 
confirmation. Further, the reality has the distinction of substance and 
property. The fundamental objects in the world are substances. These, Leibniz 
thought, must be self-dependent, unlike the properties which inhere in them: 
for instance, a substance can exist without thinking, but no thinking can exist 
without a substance. He called such substances ‘monads’, and his model for 
the monad was the individual soul, the thinking substance, as this had been 
described by Descartes. In Leibniz’s scheme there is no individual point of 
view or perspective of the real world made of monads which are self-existent. 
Reality is accessible to reason alone, since only reason can rise above the 
individual point of view and participate in the vision of ultimate necessities, 
which is also God’s vision. Hence reason must operate through innate ideas. 
Kant saw that on the one hand was the dogmatic absolutist rationalism, 
and on the other hand was the skeptical relativistic empiricism and both were 
guilty of excesses. Kant, therefore, fashioned upon himself the task of 
synthesizing both rationalism and empiricism in his philosophy. He realized 
that neither experiences nor reasons are alone able to provide knowledge. The 
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first provides content without form, the second form without content. 
Knowledge is possible only in their synthesis, for it bears the mark of both 
experience and reason. An objective knowledge of the world transcends 
individual point of view and makes legitimate claims about and independent 
world. Nevertheless, it is impossible to know the world ‘as it is in itself’, 
independent of all perspective. Objects do not depend for their existence on 
an individual’s perceiving them; but their nature is determined by the fact 
that they can be perceived. Objects are not Leibnizian ‘monads’, knowable 
only to the perspectiveless position of ‘pure reason’; nor are they Humean 
‘impressions’, features of individual’s experience. They are objective, but their 
character is given by the point of view through which they can be known. In 
fact, Kant tries to show that, properly understood, the idea of ‘experience’ 
already carries the objective reference which Hume denied. Experience 
contains within itself the features of space, time and causality. Hence in 
describing one’s own experience one is referring to an ordered perspective on an 
independent world. This finding Kant called ‘Copernican Revolution’ that he 
introduced to the Western philosophy. This novel concept of objectivity is 
also called ‘transcendental idealism’ of Kant.  
The manner in which Kant executes his philosophy, he calls it ‘critique’ 
and not ‘criticizing’. Critique is the attempt to get behind knowledge claims 
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and ask as to what makes them possible. In his three Critiques, Kant is 
concerned with possibilities of human knowledge in following terms: 
 How is mathematics possible? 
 How is natural science possible? 
 How is metaphysics possible? 
 How is aesthetic perception possible? 
 How is morality possible? 
I.5.a Kant’s Theory of Knowledge  
Kant differentiated between the modes of thinking that would form 
judgements, for all human claims to knowledge exist in the form of 
judgements. The Humean system of thought had involved two sets of 
questions: 1) the epistemological question: does knowledge rest on experience 
or not?, and 2) the semantic question: how do meanings of words one uses 
express that knowledge relate to each other? Kant probes into this dyad and 
turns them fourfold: 
1. Epistemological Mode: 
1.a. Empirical: a judgement is ‘empirical’ (a posteriori) when 
corresponding experience determines its truth or falsity. For instance, 
‚J.F. Kennedy was assassinated‛ cannot be known independently of 
experience. 
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1.b.  A priori: a judgement is a priori when it can be known to be true 
without any reference to experience: ‚2 + 2 = 4‛ as in mathematics. 
2. Semantic Mode: 
2.a. Analytic:   an analytic judgement is one in which the predicate is 
contained in the subject. Example: ‚Black houses are houses,‛ or 
‚Every father has a child‛. The truth of this type of proposition is 
evident, for to state the reverse would be self-contradictory. Such 
propositions are called analytic because truth is discovered by the 
analysis of the concept itself. If an analytic judgement is true, it is 
necessarily true. The opposite of an analytic judgement is not possible. 
2.b. Synthetic:  a synthetic judgement does more than simply analyse or 
explicate a concept. Examples: ‚The house is black,‛ ‚Every event has a 
cause‛, etc. Here, according as Humean posit, the concept having a 
cause is not part of the concept being an event. One can imagine that 
an event might simply occur without any cause. That is, the opposite of 
synthetic judgements is always possible. And most of our common 
propositions that result from day-to-day experience of the world are 
synthetic. 
These two modes of thinking can be further ramified with interlocking of 
their sub-variants such as: 
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1. Analytic a priori: ‚Black houses are houses‛. Here understanding of 
the subject also clarifies its predicate. It is a priori because one does 
not have to analyze experience of black house to know that it is a 
house, for all that is required is to understand the meanings of 
‘black’ and ‘house’. 
2. Analytic a posterior: this class is non-existent because if the test for 
analyticity is examining a judgement’s denial for contradiction, it is 
clear that it does not require examining experience. Every analytic 
judgement therefore must be a priori. 
3. Synthetic a posterior: most of our day-to-day judgements about 
experience—scientific and common sense alike—belong to this 
class. For instance, ‚Water always boils at 100◦ C at sea level.‛ 
4. Synthetic a priori: this is complex and controversial class of 
judgements. If the validity of such a judgement is to be known, 
then one must be able to know it independent of experience. That 
is, such judgement is true in any case irrespective of one’s 
experience. And yet it is not true because it is analytic; its denial 
expresses a logical possibility. The complexity is, because it is 
synthetic, its opposite is, logically speaking, possible. And because 
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it is a priori—and therefore analytic—its experience is not 
necessary as it should be non-contradictory. 
Kant says that it is possible to make a synthetic a priori judgement. It is his 
Copernican revolution, which the traditional philosophy had found 
impossible. Its assumption is that objects are realities independent of our 
knowing them; our thoughts about them would be one thing, the objects 
something quite different. However, objects are objects only because they are 
structured in certain ways by the mind in the very act of knowing them. Kant 
supplies examples in various cases of synthetic a priori as follows: 1) all the 
judgements of mathematics and geometry, 2) in natural sciences, ‘Every event 
has a cause’, 3) in metaphysics, ‘There is a God’, and 4) in morality, ‘We 
should not treat others merely as means to our own ends’. In fact, through 
this, Kant wants to understand how mathematics, natural science, 
metaphysics, and ethics are possible. In the foundations of all these 
disciplines, it must be implicit that there are some judgements that do not 
arise out of experience but prescribe how the objects of experience must be. 
Kant calls a priori judgements ‚Pure‛ as they are not contaminated by 
experience and hence the title of his work, ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. 
In describing how a priori synthetic type of judgment is possible, Kant 
regarded the objects of the material world as fundamentally unknowable; 
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from the point of view of reason, they serve merely as the raw material from 
which sensations are formed. Objects of themselves have no existence, and 
space and time exist only as part of the mind, as ‚intuitions‛ by which 
perceptions are measured and judged. Here, an intuition is not something 
mysterious or occult; it simply means the presentation of some sensible object 
to the mind. ‘Time’ and ‘space’ as intuitions are not there outside to be 
discovered, they are a form of the mind providing a ‘structure’ into which all 
determinate perceptions must fit. That is, when one touches an apple, one 
senses colour, texture, weight and so on as well as one fits that experience into 
structures of pure intuition of space and time. The perception of the 
phenomenon called apple is a part of this structure. Part of perception is 
constituted by the intuition of space, which one does not abstract from the 
experience, but bring to the experience.  
The above explanation makes an interesting case. One cannot 
experience the apple as it is in itself. ‘Things in themselves’ Kant called 
noumena, and he believed that they are unknowable to human beings. It is so 
because part of what it is to be an apple is to be in space; and space is an 
aspect of our experience that comes from the experiencer. So one knows the 
apple as it appears (phenomenon) to him, not the apple as it is in itself 
(noumenon). This would imply that although there is a structuring principle 
for all our experience that can be objectively known, the experience of the 
89 
 
external reality would invariably render itself subjective by conforming to 
these structures of mind. So after tasting the apple, the statement ‘the apple is 
sweet’ would be not much wrong, however, more appropriate it would be to 
say, ‘the apple is sweet to me’. 
According to Kant, pure geometry and mathematics are possible 
because their objects—space and time—are contingent on mind; space and 
time are pure forms of sensible intuition. More so, he showed that both these 
disciplines essentially involve judgements that are synthetic (as they are 
constructive) and a priori (as they are necessary and universal). 
Since experience is always in time and space as well as of external 
objects, it is experience of the appearance of things. Such experience is always 
already both subjective and objective. There is just no way to know things as 
they are in themselves. Descartes, contrariwise, had thought that one can 
know things in themselves in a confused and inadequate way that can be 
continually improved. But Kant showed that one cannot know them at all. 
Though one does experience objects, one can know a priori just what one 
himself, as a rational mind, necessarily supplies in experiencing those objects. 
 
 
90 
 
I.5.b The Categories (a priori forms of thought)  
As regards the question, how natural science is possible, Kant affords a 
distinction between two aspects or powers of mind. He calls them ‘sensibility’ 
and ‘understanding’. The first is a passive power, the ability to receive 
impressions; the second whereas is an active power, the power to think 
objects by constructing a representation of them using concepts. ‚Through the 
first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought....Intuition 
and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge. Both 
may be either pure or empirical.‛8 Kant’s thesis can be put as follows: 
 
 
Intuitions (from 
Sensibility) 
Pure Empirical 
Space/Time Sensations of sight, 
touch, smell, etc. 
Concepts [Ideas] 
(from 
Understanding) 
Straight, Cause, 
Substance, God, 
and the Soul 
Water, the moon, 
unicorn, etc. 
 
This shows a pairing: just as there are empirical intuitions, there are 
empirical concepts; and so are pure intuitions, and pure concepts. Together 
they give a structure and organization to human experience and make it 
possible for one to experience objects and not just chaos of impressions. It is 
Representations  [Contents] 
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this rich source of structure in human experience, this transcendental 
organizing power that Kant wants to uncover through his critique of reason. 
The question that follows is: what concepts does one have that apply to 
objects but are not derived from that? This question arises, for any a priori, by 
the rule, is a necessary pure concept that one brings to one’s understanding of 
sensible world. Such a priori concepts one uses necessarily in thinking of an 
object. Kant shows a set of such concepts and calls them ‚Categories‛ because 
they are to supply the most general characteristics of things: the 
characteristics it takes to qualify as a thing or object all. After a prolonged and 
systematic contemplation, he arrived at twelve most basic and abstract 
categories of thought and type of propositions corresponding to their 
categories. They are tabulated as follows: 
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NO. CATEGORIES  JUDGEMENTS 
A Quantity   
1 Unity  Universal  
2 Plurality  Particular  
3 Totality  Singular  
B Quality   
4 Reality Affirmative 
5 Negation Negative 
6 Limitation Infinite 
C Relation   
7 Inherence & Subsistence  Categorical  
8 Causality & Dependence Hypothetical 
9 Community Disjunctive  
D Modality   
10 Possibility—Impossibility Problematic 
11 Existence—Non-existence Assertoric  
12 Necessity—Contingent Apodictic  
 
One can notice here that Kant, similar to that of Aristotle’s enquiry, 
wants to discover the characteristics of being qua being. Aristotle also had 
given a set of categories, displaying the most general way in which anything 
can exist. Kant develops his schematization quite on the lines of Aristotelian 
model. However, there exists a great perspectival difference between the two. 
Kant looks at the language in which one talks about objects. Kant’s 
‚categories‛, which are universal and necessary features of objects, originate 
in the structure of thinking about those objects. They do not apply to being as 
such (as is the case with Aristotelian categories), but to being as it is knowable 
by rational minds as appearances. And without the application of these a 
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priori concepts, there can be no objective world. Categories are mere ‘forms of 
thought’. In order to give us knowledge, they must be used along with 
sensible intuitions. For instance, x2 gives a concept but without the content it 
means nothing. But (2)2 or (3)2 respectively gives knowledge of 4 and 9. Thus 
his famous dictum runs: ‚Thoughts without content are empty, and Intuitions 
without concepts are blind‛.9  
I.5.c Causation :  a priori  Synthetic Principle  
Kant hereafter had to face Hume’s wrecking theory of causation. Hume had 
argued that our idea of cause is not an empirical idea as it is not deduced 
from our experience. Just because it contains the notion of a necessary 
connection between cause and effect, Hume concludes that the idea is a 
fiction, a kind of illusion produced in us by habit. So it is unempirical to claim 
to know that objects are related to each other by cause and effect. But Kant 
asks what if the concept of causation (like the concept of substance) is a 
necessary aspect of any object? If nothing would be objective for us without 
appearing in a context of causal relations, one could know that every event 
has a cause. This shall avoid Hume’s radical scepticism. 
Kant pursues this matter in a slightly different way. He distinguishes 
between judgements that refer only to our perceptions and those which are 
objective judgements. It may be one’s perception to have seen one thing 
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following another in succession of time and contiguity of space. But once the 
idea is affirmed, one is committed to there being a rule that it must be so. For 
example, the necessary follow-up emergence of Y at the occurrence of X 
subjects this event to a rule that just makes the event objective. Because there 
is a necessary order in succession of events in that it is not derived from sheer 
fancy, dream or imagination, it must be objective. So if one knows that every 
event has a cause, one knows it because part of the very idea of an objective 
world is that events in it are structured by rules of succession one does not 
control. 
Kant thus sums up that the principle that every event has a cause is 
synthetic, for the concept of causation is not included in the concept of an 
event but is added to it. And Hume is right that the causal principal cannot be 
known a posterior from experience. But one knows that the principle applies 
universally and necessarily to all experience. The principle that every event 
has a cause is, then, one of the synthetic a priori judgements. Such purely 
rational, nonempirical principles, Kant believed, remain at the root of both 
commonsense knowledge and Newtonian science. Kant hereby proves how 
the natural science is possible because nature itself is partially constituted by 
the concepts and principles that a rational mind must use in understanding it. 
One knows a priori that nature is made up of substances with properties, 
though only through experience can one know which substance has what 
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property. One knows a priori that the world is causally ordered whole, 
though only through experience can one know which particular event causes 
what other events. Science is possible only because it is knowledge of an 
objective world that is contingent on our minds. Natural science is possible 
only on the basis of Kant’s Copernican revolution. 
It would be opportune here to summarily reiterate the whole thesis of 
Kant thus: first of all, he sets himself to uncover the limits of rational 
knowledge and thinks to accomplish that by a critique of reason. Knowledge, 
to him, is a product of a priori concepts and principles supplied by reason on 
the one hand and of intuitive material supplied by sensibility on the other. Its 
domain is phenomena, the realm of possible experience. Beyond this are 
noumena (things-in-themselves), which are perhaps thinkable but certainly 
unknowable by human beings. Knowledge, to Kant, has definite limits; and 
one can know what these are. These ideas can be visually described as 
follows: 
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                                       conceivable perhaps 
 
 
 
Kant in his First Critique spells out the science of appearances. It is absolutely 
about this phenomenal world we live in. In practice, his philosophy grapples 
with the following questions: Do things-in-themselves occupy space? Are 
they located in time whereof one event really succeeds another? Are there 
things (substances) at all? Does one event really cause another? And Kant’s 
answer is: there is no telling! All human knowledge is solely about the way 
things appear to them.  
 
 Reason Sensibility 
A priori concepts & 
principles 
(Independent of 
experience) 
 
 
Intuitive material 
(Dependent on 
experience) 
Knowledge 
(a priori synthetic) 
 
Unknowable Noumenal World  
Things-in-themselves 
 
Phenomenal World  
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Having said this, it does not follow that human knowledge is in any 
way illusory. It is not like a dream or a fancy or mere imagination. The 
distinction between illusion and reality is made within this objective world of 
appearance, not between this world and something supernatural. Dreams and 
illusions are just sequences that cannot be ordered by the regularity of causal 
law; that is why lack objectivity and are taken to be purely subjective 
phenomena. One is not capable of knowing anything more real than the 
world confined to space and time of our experience, structured as it is by the 
categories of the pure understanding. 
Kant is the last major philosopher in the West who, due to his sheer 
faith in the power of reason, gives an elaborate justification of the possibility 
of knowledge and its theory, the substratum of which was, uncontrovertibly, 
Newton's classical mechanics. Later thinkers did not approve of Kantian 
epistemology on philosophical grounds. However, it would still not be unfit 
to question his rationale on scientific grounds, for his very base of classical 
mechanics has been rendered outmoded and inadequate by the modern 
quantum field theory or, as popularly known, particle physics. 
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I.6 A View from an ‘Overman’  
Later Nietzsche and Wittgenstein doubted Kantian theory of knowledge. 
Nietzsche held Kant’s famous ‘categories’ as fallacies. He said that the concept 
of substance is ‚indispensable for logic, although in strictest sense nothing 
real corresponds to it...‛10 Nietzsche also rejected Kant’s a priori concept of 
causality and held that in truth one is just confronted by a continuum out 
which couple of pieces are isolated and termed as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. More 
so, in his view, there is no noumenal world of things-in-themselves. Nietzsche 
offered that human beings expand their knowledge through errors and 
subsequent lessons. He writes:  
The four errors—Man has been educated by his errors. First, he always saw 
himself only incompletely; second, he endowed himself with fictitious 
attributes; third, he placed himself in a false order of rank in relation to 
animals and nature; fourth, he invented ever new tables of goods and always 
accepted them for a time as eternal and unconditional.11 
Nietzsche, in fact, was anticipating a philosophical movement in late 
twentieth century called ‘evolutionary epistemology’. The idea is that human 
beings are natural parts of the natural world and human capacities for 
knowing this world have been developed by natural-selection compulsions 
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over time immemorial. This philosophical position is observed in modern 
thinkers such as Donald Campbell and Willard Quine. 
I.7 Language Philosophy 
Wittgenstein laid out his analytic philosophy and ordinary language 
philosophy in his works Tractus Logico-Philsophicus and Philosophical 
Investigations. Throughout his life Wittgenstein consistently viewed 
philosophy as linguistic or conceptual analysis. In the Tractatus he argued that 
philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. In the Philosophical 
Investigations, however, he maintained that philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. He believed that 
philosophy is not meant for providing knowledge about the supersensible; its 
real task is the clarification of statements. The most abiding moral and 
spiritual concern for him was the question how to live. But very little can be 
ever said about it. So Wittgenstein felt that the most important thing then one 
could possibly do is to get clear about what one cannot say. He therefore got 
interested in the logic of language wherein logic is the science of the possible. 
Both mathematics and logic are empirically or factually empty, providing no 
knowledge of nature at all. But they offer a framework in which one can move 
from one true factual statement to another as they allow inferences. 
Wittgenstein with this conviction searched in the logic of language that would 
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help clear the philosophical clutter. In the past, Plato, Aristotle, Hume and 
Kant thought that they are revealing or discovering truth. But to Wittgenstein, 
all their claims are ‘just gassing’ (in modern parlance ‘bullshit’); nonsensical. 
Their theories are pseudoanswers to pseudoquestions. And such theories 
arose because these philosophers did not understand the logic of language. 
To Wittgenstein, Kant’s pure intuitions, the categories, a priori 
synthetic propositions are all impossible. The structure of the world is not 
conditioned by the structure of the rational mind, for the structure of reality is 
just the logic; and logic consists of empty tautologies which neither has nor 
require a source. Kant’s world necessitates a structure-giver because its basic 
principles happen to be synthetic. For Wittgenstein, logic is analytic. It 
requires no source other than itself as it has no content in need of explanation.  
Recalling previous examples of the analytic type shall be helpful here: ‘Black 
houses are houses’; ‘Every father has a child’. This shows that propositions of 
logic are but tautologies, and every valid form of inference can be expressed 
in a proposition of logic. This means that all possible logical relations between 
propositions can be known a priori. And in knowing them one knows the 
logical structure of the world—logical space that he calls ‘the scaffolding of 
the world’. This logical structure of the world is not a fact in the world, nor 
does it give a fact about the world or about rational minds. This is how 
Wittgenstein countervails and discards all past claims to theory of knowledge. 
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I.8 Darwinist Deconstruction 
In the 20th century all the central themes of the Enlightenment were severely 
criticized and protested in the wake of postmodernist approaches that 
emerged in various discourses. Postmodernism is suspicious of all claims to 
absolute knowledge, truth, objectivity, rationality, universality, and criteria 
that propose to be more than local. The philosophical methods and their 
results expounded in Descartes, Hume, and Kant were looked upon with 
doubts. All metaphysical pretensions of philosophy in order to grasp some 
absolute reality beyond appearance were assertively debunked. The 
postmodern—enlightenment split was in many ways a reenactment of the 
Sophist—Socratic wrangle in ancient Greece. Of numerous heterogeneous 
postmodernist posits, Richard Rorty’s take on use of language, representation 
and reality is unfailingly notable as it lucidly deconstructs classical image of 
mind as mirror on the premise of Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
Rorty exemplifies most of the diffusive themes of postmodernism in a 
way befitting an admiring successor like him of the legacy of Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger and above all John Dewey—a primus inter pares to Rorty. He felt 
that the consequences of Darwinian thought on human life were not 
sufficiently understood. In his view, human beings should alter their self-
image so as to make it consistent with the Darwinian claim that humans differ 
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from other animals in the complexity of behaviour only, for humans are 
exceptionally clever. Rorty wants mankind to grow up whereby they no 
longer worship anything, where nothing is treated with haloed image, where 
everything—language, conscience, community, etc.—is recognized as a 
product of time and chance. 
As regards right knowledge, Rorty enquires into the nature of ‘true’. 
Earlier, the rationalists had offered a dyad of being true and being justified. 
When one says that a belief is justified but not true, Rorty suggests that in this 
case the term ‘true’ is used in a cautionary way. For in the further enquiry 
what appeared justified may prove to be not true. The contrast between 
merely justified and true is like the one of possible future and actual present. 
A possible future is the justified belief one now thinks is true is shown to be 
untrue by further justification. 
In fact, Rorty’s negation of correspondence between truth claim and 
some independent reality with a nature of its own must be seen in the larger 
perspective of his qualms about the notion of representation. Rorty would 
never accept the Platonic distinction between knowledge (episteme) and 
opinion (doxa), since Plato assumes knowledge must be assisted by reasons 
(justifications) and also be true. Knowledge, for Rorty in this situation, turns 
out to be well-justified opinion. 
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Representational theory of knowledge held its sway in Descartes, 
Locke and their followers. In this view, ideas in the mind can represent or 
misrepresent the objects external to mind. Modern epistemology tried to 
supply a criterion for distinguishing correct from incorrect ideas. The 
philosophers assured that if the suitable methods are used, one can be 
confident that the ideas will not misrepresent the reality. This idea of mind 
mirroring images of external reality had reigned supreme in all philosophical 
thoughts. Such a debate comprised musings on representation, truth, 
knowledge, objectivity, universal validity, essential nature, appearance versus 
reality and rationality. Rorty wants to outplay these talks but in tandem with 
the Darwinian pragmatism. To him, words are tools and beliefs are habits of 
action. Tools and habits are not the sort of things that represent; they are not 
appraised as true or false, but as useful or not useful. So when someone says, 
‘I am hungry’, he is not exteriorizing the private consciousness, nor does it 
report events going on inside a person’s consciousness or as often called 
‘Cartesian Theatre’. It simply indicates one’s future action. The words are just 
tools that coordinate one’s behaviour with others around. Therefore, in 
Rorty’s view, words and beliefs abide by no representational relationship to 
the world at all, but just a casual one. Language is a set of tools for coping 
with the environment, tools that other animals either do not possess or have 
them precious little. These tools are shaped in part by human purposes and in 
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part by causal interactions with the world. The communities use language 
tools to relate the world to their behavioural urges. In the process beliefs are 
formed and people use beliefs as their reliable guides. The whole point of 
representation is only a sham. Rorty emphatically puts: 
Language is not a medium of representation. Rather, it is an exchange of 
marks and noises, carried out in order to achieve specific purposes. It cannot 
fail to represent accurately, for it never represents at all.12 
The implication is, be it science, religion, philosophy or history, no 
vocabulary has any metaphysical mooring; there is nothing outside a 
language by which to judge it. Like any tool, language can be changed or even 
improved. If some part of vocabulary has lost its usefulness, one can invent 
new ways of speaking. 
Insofar as the use of language is concerned, Rorty says, it is the poets 
who invent new vocabularies. But not all poets contribute, but those who are 
‘strong poets’ (the term he took from Harold Bloom). The strong poets affect 
language as they employ new metaphors, and redescriptions replacing the 
old. At times revolutionary scientists and philosophers too perform this poetic 
task who expand human imagination instead of giving dry arguments. The 
case in point here may be elicited from quantum physics wherein a literary 
neologism came to define a very important scientific breakthrough. In 1964 
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American physicists Murray Gell-Mann and George Zweig independently 
developed a theory of particle physics that proposed ‘Quarks’ as the building 
blocks of protons and neutrons. Gell-Mann borrowed a nonsensical word 
quark from James Joyce’s novel Finnegans Wake (1939), which contains the 
phrase ‚three quarks for Muster Mark.‛ The two physicists needed only two 
types of quarks to describe the proton and neutron accurately: the up quark 
and the down quark. During the same time, other physicists also had 
discovered new elementary particles, including kaons which they called 
strange. The explanation of these particles required a third type of quark, so 
physicists named it the strange quark. In Rorty's sense, Gell-Mann was 
performing a poetic task by coining a novel tool of expression for a new find. 
By virtue of this logic, it could be said, Plato’s real contribution lies not in 
what he said, but in the dialogic and dramatic ways he said. 
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II 
Indian Epistemology 
 
 
Every civilization in the world has an historical distinction on the basis of its 
knowledge culture that lays down logical system of construction, 
preservation and dissemination of knowledge through different discourses. In 
yet another gesture of signifying 'culture', it is submitted that culture is 
manifest human efforts in thought and action perpetuated in the form of 
convention, of both loka (lowbrow) and śista (elite), surviving in different 
forms of intellectual and emotive practices. In Indian culture, philosophical 
mooring has a deep penetration into almost all human activity—be it kāvya or 
śāstra. The term ‘culture’ was derived via French culturer from Latin colerer 
that meant 'to cultivate'.  In the 20th c., Raymond Williams contended that the 
term culture primarily meant the cultivation of crops and animals and it was 
late in the 19th century that the term came to suggest arts: literature, ballet, 
painting, and theatre. By dint of this extension of meaning, it implies that 
cultivation is associated with betterment, taming, and making civilized. 
Culture is an all inclusive term and Williams avowed, "culture is ordinary". 
What he suggests here is that culture is a living reality of all and not just a 
prerogative of a few. In the West, culture is thought of under the theoretical 
categories of folk, elite, popular, and mass. With a little difference, such 
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formulation of categories parallels in Indian tradition with loka and śista, 
wherein unlike the West, they are not conceived of in adversarial relationship. 
The folklore (lokavidyā) has its wellspring of inspiration in śruti, āgama-s and 
śāstra-s. The daily language used by a common Indian even today with 
number of technical śāstraic terms is a proof that loka and shista traditions 
have always co-existed in Indian culture, which is indisputably a culture of 
knowledge. More so, there is no religious faith in India which is in the want of 
its own darśana of cosmogony, calculation of time, duality or non-duality, 
means of knowledge, and knowability of the Absolute Brahman. These 
darśana-s while dealing with the metaphysics in a rational way seek to employ 
logical exposition of their thesis. Nyāya and Vaiśesika systems are not only 
such logical and scientific darśana-s in empirical sense, but their tools of logic 
and methods have been extrapolated by other darśana-s. Hence, there is no 
logical incongruity in theorizing a category of ‘knowledge culture’. 
II.a Antiquity of Darśana-s 
Historical aspect of Indian knowledge culture is always on contesting 
terrains, for Indian world view had never put premium on particulars of 
individual identity so long as the truth prevails. Therefore, most of the 
historical conjectures are based on indirect references or quotations found 
other works. In the Mahābhārata some sūtra-s on the history of Indian darśana-s 
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can be found in its ‘Śāntiparva’. It mentions five darśana-s namely Sāmkhya, 
Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Veda and Pāśupata. This suggests that by the time of the 
Mahābhārata these darśana-s had already come into full existence. Apart from 
these āstika darśana-s, there is also a mention of nāstika darśana, viz., Cārvāka. 
Around 4th c. BC Bauddha darśana came to the fore. Buddha had 
emphasized a great deal on right conduct. In Śrimad Bhāgavata, Rsabhdeva is 
referred to as one avatāra, whom the Jainas consider as their first tirthankara. 
He propounded syādavāda. 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika rose during the reigns of the Mauryas. The Imperial 
Mauryas ruled from 322-183 B.C.E. Pūrva and Uttar Mimāmsā developed after 
sometime. The chronology of these darśana-s can be broadly arrived at by 
looking at the pramāna theories of each darśana as the latter ones tend to 
incorporate the pramāna-s of their predecessors and thereby modify their 
epistemological systems. Although it is difficult to trace the exact history of all 
the systems in the absence of actual temporal marks, the tradition of Indian 
knowledge culture may be seen in terms of four major temporal divisions. 
 Vedic period 
 Mahākāvya period 
 Sūtra period 
 Vyākhyā period 
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The Vedic sūkta-s, brāhmana-s, āranyaka-s and upanisada-s have been the fons et 
origo of many subsequent darśana-s. The major Vedic tenets were rta ('truth' or 
'moral order'), the three qualities sattva, rajas and tamas that formed prakrti 
(nature), and karma and the hereafter. The Vedas constitute the basic 
metaphysics that, in one or the other way, underlie all Indian epistemological 
systems. JN Mohanty observes:  
The Vedas had already decided, famously in the Nāsadiya Sukta, that at the 
beginning of things there must have been being and nonbeing (for something 
cannot come out of nothing); now this primeval being was said to be the same 
as the spirit within. The highest wisdom was intuitively realizing this identity 
of subject and object (tat tvam asi). (1) 
During the Mahākāvya period, the aupanisadika philosophy developed 
into various darśana-s of Bauddha, Jaina, Śaiva among others. Each darśana 
unfolded itself in its immediate socio-religious context of dogmatic beliefs 
and practices and thereby brought about spiritual rejuvenation and social 
reformation. Cārvāka darśana is also much visible in this period. 
Sūtrakāla is a period when most of the above darśana-s were 
systematically compiled in the form of texts. Tenets of Sāmkhya, Yoga, 
Nyāya, Vaiśesika, Mimāmsā, Vedānta, etc. were organized by their 
promulgators and thus source texts of each system were prepared. Thus came 
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into existence Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra (2nd c. C.E.), Kapila’s Sāmkhyasūtra, 
Patañjali’s Yogasūtra (200 B.C.E.), Jaimini’s Mimāmsāsūtra (200 B.C.E), 
Bādarāyana’s Vedāntasūtra or Brahmasūtra (200 B.C.E.), Umāsvātti’s 
Tattvārthadhigamasūtra in Jaina darśana among others. 
Since the antiquity, the development in śāstra literature continued even 
during the Mogul reign. Vyākhyākāla furthered the tradition. Here, on the 
source texts of different darśana-s, various types of commentaries were 
composed such as bhāsya, vārttika, pañjikā, and tikā. Some of the noted 
commentators are Kumārilbhatta, Vātsyāyana, Praśastapāda, Śamkara, 
Vācaspati, Udayana, Rāmānuja, Jayantabhatta, Vijñanabhiksu among others. 
Authors and commentators on Buddhist logic are Dignāga (400 AD), 
Dharmapāla (600-635 AD), Dharmakīrti (635-650 AD), Vinītadeva (700 AD), 
Śāntaraksita (749 AD), Dharmottara (847 AD), Moksākara Gupta (1100 AD) 
among others. In Jaina logic mainly they are Siddhasena Divākara (480-550 
AD), Samanta Bhadra (6th c. AD), Akala'nka (c. 750 AD), Vidyānanda (c. 800 
AD) Mallisenasuri (1292 AD), Yaśovijayagani (1608-1688) among others. They 
analyzed and extended meanings of sūtra texts. In the study of each darśana, 
these commentaries are as important as the source texts. These commentaries 
are credited with developing dialectic modalities in the Indian knowledge 
system.   
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II.1 A View of Darśanas  
The term jnāna is variously used in the sense of 'knowledge' and 'cognition' in 
the contexts of śāstra (science), ānviksiki (philosophy) and darśana 
(demonstrations). The process of evaluation begins with observation. The 
Sanskrit term for observation is iksā. The contemplation of observation is 
anviksā (anu+iksā). Ānviksiki then stands for introspective evaluation of the 
observed world.  However, earlier ānviksiki was indicative of ātmavidyā or 
brahmavidyā which would have the Vedas as its base: "Ānviksiki cātmavidyā" 
(Manusmrti). Subsequently, ānviksiki took to explication of Vedic tenets with 
logical reasoning and postulation which turned it into 'nyāyavidyā'. Ānviksiki 
as a logical speculation comes close to the western counterpart of philosophy. 
It also came to be known as 'pramānavidyā' or 'tarka'. The pramāna theories in 
India have developed especially in the wake of certain skeptical positions of 
Jaina and Buddhist darśana-s. Sanjay, a pre-Buddhist thinker, raised some 
questions on religious, ethical and eschatological beliefs. Nāgārjuna, a 
Buddhist philosopher of about 2nd c. AD, during the times of Kuśāna dynasty 
promulgated Mahāyāna Buddhism. He questioned the very core of 
traditionalists as regards the distinction between means of true cognition and 
objects of such cognition. His scepticism can be thought of as deconstruction 
of metaphysical and epistemological givens of both the Hindus (Śāmkhya, 
Nyāya, Vaiśesika) and the early Buddhists. His rich dialectical arguments 
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showed that metaphysics and epistemology are inalienably linked. To him, all 
dualistic metaphysical ideas such as part and whole, stasis and kinesis, 
permanence and transience presuppose each other and each of such binary 
involves self-undoing. More so, Nāgārjuna was also conscious enough to 
speculate that if his position was valid, then his own philosophy would also 
not be exception to such self-undoing. His works mainly focused on the 
critique of Śunyavāda and on pramānavidyā (epistemology). In such a context 
Nyāya and Vaiśesika darśana-s provided with their modalities and some of 
which were also incorporated by other darśana-s. The Buddhist pramānavidyā 
stands singled out in the tradition of ānviksiki, for certain novel tenets of the 
Buddha such as anātmavāda, ksanabhangvāda, apohavāda, avayaviasattāvāda, 
patītyasamutpādavāda among others have noticeably reoriented the course of 
epistemological system whose repercussions were felt in pramānavidyā of all 
darśana-s subsequently. 
Epistemology, which might as well be called 'jnānamimāmsā', thus 
encompasses in its purview methods of knowing, scope of enquiry and 
validity of knowledge. Nyāya-Vaiśesika can together offer an epistemological 
model in Indian knowledge culture among other such systems such as 
Sāmkhya, Yoga, Mimāmsā, Vedānta, Śaivism, Pāncarātra (Vaishnav), Śākta, 
Jaina, Buddhist, and Cārvāka. To this cluster Vyākarana darśana (Grammarical 
philosophy) can also be incorporated as it posits the Absolute in the form of 
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śabdabrahma.13  In fact, it must be admitted that Indian epistemology is a 
heterogeneous category, for each darśana enquires the Absolute Brahman with 
different perspectives and each of them have distinctive exposition of 
cosmogony, time calculation, means of knowledge, and knowability of the 
Absolute. However, in a broader sense there seems a general consensus 
among all as regards the distinction of the cognizable objects, the subject that 
cognizes and the means or instruments of cognizance. So far as the means of 
cognition are concerned, each darśana accepted a specific number of means of 
cognition which varies from one to six. For instance, the materialists allow 
only sense perception (pratyaksa) as the crucial and most reliable means of 
cognition, the Buddhists14 and the Vaiśesika darśana-s accept inference 
(anumana) as well, the Sāmkhya accepts verbal testimony (śabda) in addition to 
these two, the Nyāya adds to them analogy (upamāna), the Mimāmsā and the 
Vedānta while accepting all of the above add two more viz. postulation 
(arthāpatti) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). These means of cognition 
accepted by each system of thought are not arbitrary, for they are supplied 
with reasons based on specific ontology and metaphysics of given darśana. 
Moreover, such cognition sought through the means has to be validated by 
satisfactory rational criteria of the given system. Apart from the difference in 
the count of means of cognition, these darśana-s are also at variance with each 
other in enumerating total padārtha-s15 or fundamental categories. They are: 
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Nyāya → 16 padārtha-s 
Vaiśesika → 6 (+1) padārtha-s 
Sāmkhya → 25 tattva-s  
Vedānta → 2 (cita and acita) 
Rāmānuja → 3 (cita, acita and Iśvara) 
Mimāmsā (Old Prābhākaras) → 8 padārtha-s [dravya, guna, karma, sāmānya, 
viśesa, pārtantrya (dependence), śakti (power), niyoga (duty)] 
Mimāmsā (New Prābhākaras) → 9 padārtha-s [dravya, guna, karma, sāmānya, 
viśesa, samavāya, śakti, sankhyā (number), and sādraśya (similarity)] 
Jainaism → 8 tattva-s [jīva (individual soul), ajīva (non-soul), āśrava 
(defilement), sambara (prevention), nirjara (destruction), bandha (bondage), 
moksa (liberation), and paryāya (changing status)] 
Śaivism → 36 tattva-s16.  
The beauty of these systems is that contention posed to any system 
must be held from the viewpoint of the given system in question. For 
instance, Vedāntins cannot just dismiss the materialists but have to argue 
them out on the locus held by materialists. If sense perception alone is valid 
cognition to the Materialists, it can be asked: 'how can one perceive that sense 
perception is the only valid means?' Here, it is part of the philosophical 
debate that the contested view should be first established on its tenet; the 
contesting view counter-argues with its logic, exemplifies the case, nullifies 
the opponent view and thereby establishes its conclusion.  
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One unique mode of Indian dialectic is present in Jaina philosophy that 
allows all possible viewpoints (naya-s) simultaneously. Its theory of logic does 
not adhere to exclusivist 'this' or 'that' or two-valued logic. The reason is 
because Jaina ontology accepts infinite aspects of substance or matter (ananta 
dharmātmakam vastu) and no one philosophical mentation can conclusively 
define its nature. This made their logical positions relativistic in nature. 
Indian knowledge culture thus offers philosophical debate in its most non-
imposing and democratic form. Jainism offers Saptabhangi naya (sevenfold 
predication) according to which every judgement, its negation and the 
conjunction of the two, are appropriate. Every judgement is to be prefixed by 
the term syāt (may be) as follows: 
 Syāt asti (It may be so) 
 Syāt nāsti (It may not be so) 
 Syāt asti nāsti (It may or may not be so) 
 Syāt avaktavyam (It may be indescribable) 
 Syāt asti avaktavyam (It may be so and also may be indescribable) 
 Syāt nāsti avaktavyam (It may not be so and also be indescribable) 
 Syāt asti nāsti avaktavyam (It may be so, may not be so and also may 
be indescribable) 
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These seven predications suggest that there must be a position from which 
something is true and one from which it is false, another from which it is both 
and yet another from which  it is inexpressible. Indian knowledge culture 
thus offers philosophical debate in its most non-imposing and democratic 
form. 
In the Nyāya-Vaiśesika epistemology the term jñāna stands for 
'cognition', and pramā for 'knowledge'. Jñāna is applicable to all cognitive 
states irrespective of true and false cognition, such as doubt (samśaya) and 
mere imaginative thinking (kalpnā). Pramā, on the other hand, suggests true 
cognition. The abstract noun satya (truth) in the form of objective to be 
established turns into prameya. The instrumental causes of true cognition, 
which then become means of valid knowledge, are called pramāna-s. Hence, a 
pramāna theory is that which logically speculates and theorizes about causal 
modes that help cognize (phenomena) in valid manner and legitimates truth 
claims of cognition sought by the instrumental causes. The whole constitution 
of Nyāya can be said to be for one purpose of examining any siddhānta 
(principle) on the basis of pramāna (means of cognition) and tarka (logical 
exposition). Vātsyāyana succinctly puts it, ‚pramānairarthapariksanam nyāya.‛ 
Although Nyāya darśana adheres to the principle of ātman, it gives much 
emphasis on the logical tools and dialectics. Consequently, Nyāya modalities 
were also assimilated by other darśana-s that rejected ātmavādi darśana-s. As a 
117 
 
result, Nyāya modalities come to exist in different systems as in Old Nyāya, 
New Nyāya, Bauddhanyāya, Jainanyāya, Paurastyanyāya, and 
Paścātyanyāya. 
II.2 Causal Doctrines in Indian Epistemology  
In pramānavāda (epistemological theories), in fact, the difference observed in 
different systems of darśana-s may be ascribed to one reason of difference they 
hold in their philosophies of cause and effect. These positions are as follows: 
 Parināmavāda of Sāmkhya (doctrine of transformation) 
 Ārambhavāda of Nyāya-Vaiśesika (doctrine of new origin) 
 Anekānta and Syādavāda of Jainism17 (doctrine of pluralism; 
relativism) 
 Pratityasamutpāda of Buddhism (doctrine of dependent origination) 
 Vivartavāda of Vedānta (doctrine of appearance) 
 Ajadakāranavāda of Kāśmira Śaivism (doctrine of subtle or divine 
causality) 
On the basis of their take on the relation between cause and effect, their 
positions are referred to as either satkārtavāda, which observes sameness in 
cause and effect or asatkāryavāda, which observes difference in cause and 
effect. Sāmkhya’s parināmavāda accepts only one timeless cause of all 
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manifestation which is sat (Absolute existence). It does not see cause and 
effect as separate independent entities but as one whole extension wherein 
cause continues to exist in effect in different form with attributive changes in 
all times. It is unlike the Semitic primordial ‘existencelessness’ before the 
Creation wherein something comes out of nothing. Hence, Sāmkhya opts for 
satkāryavāda. 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika is bahutattvavādi (inclusive of many tattva-s or 
elemental categories). Their position is called ārambhavāda, which subscribes 
to the theory of origin or beginning. They accept eternal basic causes different 
from one another. And each cause is distinct from its effect. In the process of 
beginning of any action, constant (nitya) or inconstant (anitya) cause resides in 
the action in the form o non-effect. They accept the momentary presence of 
absence or non-existence before the Creation. This position is asatakāryavāda. 
Bauddha darśana posits four ārya satya-s (Noble Truths): 1. Sarvam 
dukkham (all life is suffering), 2. Dukkha samudayah (there is a cause of 
suffering), 3. Dukkha nirodha (suffering can be removed), 4. Dukkha 
nirodhagāminī pratipada (there’s a way to remove suffering). The practical way 
to ward off suffering involves the eightfold path. The pratītyasamutpāda theory 
of the Buddhists holds cause and effect as separate independent entities. It 
squarely negates postulation of constant or inconstant cause that yields effect. 
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To this view, asat always already exists, and to enquire into the origin or the 
root of creation is a futile exercise. This position is also asatkāryavāda. The 
second ārya satya states that there is a cause of suffering, which is due to trsnā 
(desire) and avidyā is in the root of all desires. This chain of cause and effect is 
posited in the series of twelve interdependent causes. Each cause is 
antecedent to its successive one. These twelve causes are known as dvādaśa 
nidāna or pratītyasamutpāda; they are: avidyā (non-knowledge), samskāra 
(traces), vijñāna (consciousness), nāma-rūpa (name & form), sadāyatana (gates 
of senses), sparśa (sense contact), vedanā (feeling), trsnā (desire), upādāna 
(clinging), bhava (becoming), jāti (birth), jarā-marana (ageing & dying). The 
seeker of truth knows in his contemplation knows it in reverse order. 
 Jarā-marana: the chief suffering of human life is ageing and dying. 
Its cause is jāti. 
 Jāti: It is ‘taking birth’ as male or female. 
 Bhava: the cause of jāti is bhava or desire to be. 
 Upādāna: it is aversion and attachment to the sense objects of the 
world which causes bhava. 
 Trsnā: desire is the cause of clinging to the world. Trsnā is of three 
types: kāma trsnā, bhava trsnā, and vibhava trsnā. 
 Vedanā: vedanā or feeling is the cause of trsnā.  
 Sparśa: sense contact with sense objects is the cause of feeling. 
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 Sadāyatana: the cause of sense contact is gates of senses. The six 
senses are eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin, and mind. 
 Nāma-rūpa: name and form which together is a principle of 
differentiation is the cause of sadāyatana. 
 Vijñāna: existence of name and form is due to vijñāna or 
consciousness. 
 Samskāra: the cause of vijñāna is samskāra. It is traces or consequents 
of karma of past life. This causes consciousness in the mind of 
embryonic body. 
 Avidyā: avidyā causes samskāra. Non-knowledge is all sort 
knowledge of this phenomenal, relative world. It causes to believe 
transient as permanent; apparent as truth; anātma as ātma. 
The vivarta theory of Vedānta accepts only one Absolute. Unlike 
Sāmkhya, Vedānta does not posit the eternal one cause of the creation and of 
subsequent all manifestations. To this view, the ever shifting phenomenal 
existence is unreal and fictitious which is veiled and projected so by the 
power of māya, which is the principle of measurability and relativity. 
Asatkāryavāda of Nyāya comes close to Śunyavāda of Buddhism, and 
satkāryavāda or parināmavāda of Sāmkhya bears resemblance with vivartavāda 
of Vedānta. 
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Jaina’s anekānta and syāda vāda opt for non-adherence to the 
categorization of sat or asat kārya vāda-s, as it simultaneously accepts 
acceptance, rejection and combination of sat and asatkāryavāda. 
Kaśmira Śaivism is variously known as Kāśaida, Śivādvayavāda, 
Iśvarādvayavāda, Pratyabhijñā, Sadardhakrama Vijñāna, Rahasya Sampradāya or 
Trika18. It is different from Śaivism of South which is dualistic. In this all 
inclusive non-dualistic darśana Brahman is both prakāśa (light; jñāna) and 
vimarśa (self-consciousness of the Supreme; kriyā). According to 
Iśvarādvayavāda, Brahman is both jñātrtva (knowledge), and kartrtva (activity). 
Parama Śiva because of its immanent śakti (active or kinetic principle) has the 
power to act (kartrtva) on its own which is its svātantrya (Free Will). The 
Supreme thus engages itself in the pañcakrtya (fivefold act) of srtsti (emanation 
or projection), sthiti (maintenance), samhāra (withdrawal), vilaya (concealment 
of the real nature) and anugraha (grace). These five acts take place ad infinitum 
and even when It fashions upon Itself jivabhāva (empirical ego). In fact, Śaiva 
darśana begins with jñāna and orients itself to kriyā. This darśana emphasizes 
meditation on pañcakrtya (fivefold acts) and the practice of vikalpa-ksaya 
(dissolution of all diverse ideation). In the process, the seeker becomes eligible 
to receive anugraha or śaktipāta (grace) from the sadaguru. Ultimately, the 
seeker aims at unmīlan samādhi wherein one, even with open eyes, sees the 
external world as Universal Consciousness or Śiva. This darśana according as 
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the seeker’s aptitude and requirement suggests remedial steps for either jñāna 
or kriyā in the form of śāmbhavopāya, śāktopāya with meditation practices, and 
ānvopāya. Śaivism is thus quite mystical in its approach. 
II.2.1 Kāśaida's Critique of Causal Doctrines 
Kāśmira Śaivism or Kāśaida divides theories of cause-effect of other darśna-s 
mainly into two categories: Jadakāranavāda (gross causal doctrines) and 
Ajadakāranavāda (subtle or divine causal doctrine). In its view whether it is 
satkāryavāda of Sāmkhya or asatkāryavāda of Nyāya-Vaiśesika, all of them are 
jadakāranavādi. 
It requires here to look into the metaphysical background of Kāśaida's 
causal doctrine as to why does it classify other causal doctrines as 
jadakāranavādi. In its view, there is nothing like jadatva or grossness. Every 
single object or entity is cetana (animate) and of Śivā. In this darśana doership-
doing itself is the principle of cause—effect. In all worldly or non-worldly 
acts, Kāśaida emphasizes the Free Will. In the making of the pot, the will of 
the potter should be the cause. More so, it is further argued, it is not even the 
potter's will, for he is just an aggregate of organs of action, perception, mana, 
buddhi, etc., but it is the Free Will of the Divine that gets form through the 
means of the potter. The whole phenomenal world is the reflection of Free 
Will of the Absolute or Parama Śiva. It is this svātantrya which is most crucial. 
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However, the manifestation of the Free Will is actualized through the 
śaktipañcaka (five powers), viz., cit, ānanda, icchā, jñāna, and kriyā. This fivefold 
power is a prerequisite for all divine or ordinary actions. Principally, even in 
the act of making a pot, these five factors are responsible. Here, the doer one 
with citi (universal consciousness) by his action power ever fashions upon 
Himself different modes of action and hence is able to be reflected as various 
forms.  
In this darśana, cause and effect are not separate new entities. To reflect 
externally whatever that is in the cause is known apparently as the effect. 
Kāśaida, thus, does not perceive cause and effect as independent and so 
different. The ultimate cause or the doer is Śiva—this the unique stand 
maintained by Kāśaida. That is, the causal doctrine of Kāśaida establishes 
Free Will of the Supreme as the major principle. It reckons the will of the 
Supreme as fundamental instead of causal instruments. Kāśaida establishes 
the entire phenomenon of causality in the parāsamvita and at material, 
psychological, and spiritual level of existence finds the root cause of the Free 
Doer. 
II.2.2 Analysis of Satkāryavāda  
Sāmkhya holds that cause and effect are not essentially different from each 
other. Nonmanifest state is the cause and manifest state is the effect. The effect 
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is the transformation of the cause only. Kāśaida too agrees to satkāryavāda that 
as regards cause and effect there prevails non-difference. It critiques Sāmkhya 
only on the ground that Sāmkhya cannot arrive at this conclusion through its 
metaphysical positions. Sāmkhya posits purusa and prakrti principles. Purusa 
is cetana (animate) but it is inactive; without expectancy whereas prakrti is 
acetana (inanimate) but an active principle. Prakrti adorns multifarious 
phenomenal forms due to its transformation under the aegis of purusa. In this 
view, the phenomenal world is parināma (transformation) of basic prakrti. 
Kāśaida argues that jada (gross) is of static nature and is the object of 
validity (prameya). To consider jada as the transformed means that it 
undergoes the act of transformation. So jada possesses the quality of being 
transformed. Hence jada or pradhāna is of pluralistic nature (bahutattvavādi) 
which has to be believed as that which is one; of unitary nature, for essentially 
pradhāna is undifferentiated. But this will be contradictory to admit of both 
unitariness and pluralism in the same premise simultaneously. Secondly, it is 
also improbable to conceive of kriyā (action) in jada (gross), for kriyā pertains 
only to cetana (active). Sāmkhya considers agentiality not in purusa, but in 
pradhāna, and even if one considers the latter, then it stands for the agent of 
action, not for the cause. But Sāmkhya considers pradhāna as kārana (cause). 
The situation is that Sāmkhya's prakrti which is jada (gross) has neither any 
kartā (agent of action) nor any kārana (cause). 
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Hence, Kāśaida exhibits that Sāmkhya cannot theoretically ascertain 
the satkāryavāda on its metaphysical ground. Parināmavāda of Sāmkhya offers 
that the effect is the transformation of the cause. If it is so, the transformed has 
to be different from its transformer. The cause then gives birth to the effect 
which will be of different nature. This itself negates the very core of 
satkāryavāda which posits non-duality of cause and effect. In fact, Kāśaida's 
satkāryavāda is the refined thesis, for whereas Sāmkhya accepts only jada as its 
cause and jada also as its effect—that is semblance of jada action and jada doer, 
Kāśaida holds that the cause is nothing but the doer, and the effect is but 
external manifestation of His Free Will for satisfaction and therefore the effect 
inheres in the cause. 
II.2.3 Analysis of Asatkāryavāda  
The main features of Nyāya-Vaiśesika causal doctrine can be summarised as 
follows: 
 Without upādāna kārana (material cause) act is not possible. 
 Cause and effect are separate. 
 Effect is completely a new entity from its cause. 
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To Kāśaida, satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda are not different but both are 
jadakāranavādi. Kāśaida refuted causality of satkāryavāda by showing that 
Sāmkhya's notion of jada is asat (non-existent) and without expectancy.  
Nyāya-Vaiśesika recognizes iśvara as the instrument cause or the 
stimulus. This view considers some cetana (active) principle behind any 
action, albeit the real cause is only upādāna kārana (material cause). The pot 
exists solely for the reason that there is clay; leaves sprout because of the seed. 
In these instances cidrūpa kartā (consciousness doer) seems to have no role as 
such. 
Kāśaida demurs with this view, for without cidrūpa kartā (doer with 
consciousness—he himself is kārana) the gross element inert and so constant 
in its nature is incapable of any activity and also cannot bring about other 
non-existent or its manifestation. The gross elements are totally devoid of the 
prospect of interrelationship (anusandhāna). In any instance of causality three 
conditions are necessary: apeksā (mutual expectancy), anusandhāna 
(interrelation), and ekatva (oneness)—which are never possible in jada 
padārtha-s.19  
Vaiśesika believes origin of the world in atoms. Nyāya believes fibres 
(tantu) to be responsible for the phenomenal world. Both, however, agree that 
they are material cause of this world. 
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Kāśaida here differs from these darśana-s because in its thesis material 
cause is without expectancy and agential force, and even if material cause is 
significant then it is always already reposing in the original doer, Śiva, which 
takes to form through śaktipañcaka due to the svātantrya of the Divine. Kāśaida 
here forwards the same antithesis to ārambhavāda (doctrine of new origin) of 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika which it had pitched against parināmavāda (doctrine of 
transformation) of Sāmkhya. 
The causal doctrine of Nyāya-Vaiśesika has three main theses: non-
existence of effect in cause; complete separation of and difference in cause and 
effect; and acceptance of active principle in the form of instrument cause. As 
regards the first two points, Kāśaida never accepts them whilst the third is not 
so much abject. For Kāśaida will reckon with iśvara or instrument cause of 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika as material cause on its own terms with its Free Will. 
However, as it was mentioned earlier, Kāśaida is least interested in the fact 
whether or not the effect is existent in the cause as much it is in the fact 
whether the cause is active or inactive principle. Kāśaida, thus, critiques 
jadakāranavāda with finesse and subtle counter points. Whatever be the stand 
in jadakāranavāda—be it existence or non-existence of effect in cause--in all 
circumstances there will be a necessity of active principle.20 Hence, all types of 
cause repose in cidrūpa, their exterior reflection is kārya (action), and even 
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after pluralistic manifestation, the oneness of the cause remains 
undifferentiated. 
II.2.4 Analysis of Pratītyasamutpāda  
Pratītyasamutpāda or the doctrine of dependent origination has been contested 
from within Buddhist darśana. This doctrine is asatkāryavāda wherein causes 
and effects, although dependent momentarily, are completely separate. As 
stated in Mādhyamikakārikā, in the view of Śunyavāda, pratītyasamutpāda is not 
just momentary or temporal series, wherein the relation of one thing is totally 
negated with that of the other, but it is actually the dependence of one entity 
or quality upon the other. That is, moments in a series are not completely 
disjointed but contingent on one another. And in Śunyavāda, existence of the 
dependent entity is not a valid posit.21 In traditional sense, thus, Śunyavāda 
does not recognize pratītyasamutpāda to be a causal doctrine at all. It is so 
because in order to call it a causal doctrine, one has to accept relation between 
the cause and the effect. The relation can exist only between the two coeval 
entities whereas in pratītyasamutpāda existence of the cause is antecedent and 
that of the effect posterior. Secondly, apart from the issue of relation, the 
preceding moment when considered as the cause and the succeeding to be its 
effect, the consideration of the succeeding one as totally different amounts to 
the dissociation of the preceding moment as the cause in the process. As a 
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result, another problem would crop up: what about the intermediate particle 
moment between the preceding and the succeeding moment? How to define 
these moments? If one accepts oneness between the two moments, then it 
goes against the thesis of Hīnayāna philosophy as well as asakkāryavāda of 
pratītyasamutpāda. To save itself from this theoretical rupture, Śunyavāda 
reached the conclusion that all objective entities for their existence depend 
upon one another, hence, objects have no actual existence, nor essential 
nature. 
This form of pratītyasamutpāda is different from other causal doctrines, 
for in it objects are shown to be of contingent existence only, not independent. 
There is also one view shared by thinkers such as Stcherbatsky22 that 
pratītyasamutpāda should not be considered and compared with the causal 
doctrines, for the Lord Buddha had promulgated it for the remedial purpose 
of cessation of suffering, not for the sake of causal doctrine. Although there is 
some substance in this view, the later Buddhist logicians have not only 
conspicuously used pratītyasamutpāda as a causal doctrine, but also have 
emphatically put it so. Therefore, this view stands for the unpicking scrutiny 
of Indian logicians. 
In the texts of Kāśaida, the term 'pratītyasamutpāda' as such is never 
referred to. However, its critique is found under the nomenclature of 
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'pūrvāparibhāvavāda'. Pūrvāparibhāva suggests that the preceding cause is 
different from the succeeding cause. As stated earlier, Buddhists do not 
regard any one constant or inconstant cause that yields effect; nor do they 
accept spatio-temporal immediacy in two things to be claimed as cause and 
effect. Owing to the doctrine of ksanavāda (momentariness), they uphold 
sequentiality whereof the cause is ever a priori and the effect is ever a 
postpriori. This is the pūrvāparibhāva of Buddhists.  
Kāśaida critiques this view first on the premise of absence of 
expectancy (apeksā). When the antecedent and the posterior objects are held to 
be different then they become two different forms. The questions then arise: is 
there any substantial difference between the two? Is there any qualitative 
excess, extremity or uniqueness found in one of the two? And if such excess 
or extremity is not found in two objects, then one has to admit of the fact of 
notional duality (bhāvadvaya) and 'this object' and 'that object' would just then 
be two forms. More so, in such notional duality, there will not be even a scope 
for the conjunction 'and', as they are separate. Hence, the question of relation 
between the gross cause and the gross effect appears, which in turn also 
expects the principle of divine kinesis (cetana). Buddhist causal doctrine is 
thus not called a doctrine of 'uninterrupted flow', but of 'fragmented 
sequences'. To Kāśaida, then, without cetana tattva the definite anteriority and 
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posterity of the object are not plausible, nor can this be called a causal 
doctrine. 
Buddhist causal doctrine has two clear posits: 1) the cause is antecedent 
and the effect posterior, 2) with specific cause the specific effect comes into 
being. In the view of Kāśaida, pratītyasamutpāda is problematic, for in its 
position—'on account of that'—there is a sense of the past, and in the 
position—'this happens'—there is a sense of the present. This position 
indicates the action of the doer's act. There is obvious definiteness involved in 
saying, 'on account of that, this happens' or else there might be smoke where 
there is pot. In other words, cause and effect have anyonyāpeksā (mutual 
expectancy). However, mutual expectancy is not in the nature of gross 
elements. Therefore, this principle of 'antecedent-posterity' becomes 
completely implausible in the absence of cetana kartā. The cause and the effect 
needs must have the relation of commensuration with each other which is the 
crux of any causal doctrine. And this commensuration does not reside in jada 
(gross), but in cetana (kinetic). 
Kāśaida, moreover, has always stressed apeksā (expectancy) in 
causality. It recognizes two kinds of mutual expectancy23:  
 Anyonya-anusangitātmikā, and  
 (Abhiprāyātyikā) anusandhānarūpa. 
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The first is a condition where two entities are so relied on each other that with 
the termination of the one, the other also ends. There exists permanent 
oneness in the two. The second is ahbhiprāyātmikā apeksā such as in eater's 
expectancy towards the food. Although the eater possesses desire for the 
food, he does not seem to be anusangi (ancillary) of the food, but in his 
consciousness he attains to the proclivity to the food whereof on desiring the 
food he relates himself to it and acts upon it. Both these forms of apeksā are not 
possible in jada which is incapable of establishing mutual relationship. Sans 
the principle of cetana tattva, there will be misapprehension of the causal 
relations. 
II.2.5 Analysis of Vivartavāda  
Vedānta darśana upholds no causal theory at spiritual level but in the context 
of the world at practical level its theory of vivartavāda (doctrine of appearance) 
is posited as a causal theory. Vivartavāda of Vedānta is satkāryavādi. However, 
Kāśaida refers to this causal theory by the term ‘citkāranavāda’ (doctrine of 
supreme consciousness as the cause).  
In the causal doctrine of Vedānta or śāntabrahmavāda—as called by 
Kāśaida, there are chiefly two positions of vivartavāda which invite critical 
scrutiny: first, cid as the cause; second, falsity of the effect. These two 
positions also cover other auxiliary questions such as existence of effect in 
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cause, distinction of jada from cetana; and definitions of sat (existence) and 
sattā (prevalence). 
Advaita Vedānta is cidātmavādi. Saccidānanda (sat+cit+ānanda—
existence, consciousness, bliss) alone is truth; all the rest is untruth. For 
instance, only the cidātmā (soul) of the pot maker is real; the rest is jada (gross) 
and mithyā (false). Kāśaida demurs with Vedānta as it does not accept 
cinmātra (pure consciousness) as the cause but instead considers cidrūpa 
(active consciousness). The reason why Kāśaida rejects cinmātra as the cause is 
that to exist as a cause is to act as a doer and this power lies only in cidrūpa. 
This agential act is possible only when the cause has, 1) will to act, 2) objective 
(effect) of the will, 3) definite action with will, 4) and the doer with the willed 
action. Although Vedānta accepts Brahman in its pristine form and regards 
will in the Absolute for plurality, ‚ekoham bahusyām bhavah‛, yet there is 
absence of the willed action in It. This is an incomplete doctrine, for the cause 
of Vedānta has will to act but is incapable of any action, and this situation is 
hardly different from jadakāranavāda. For the distinction between jada and 
cetana is none other than the distinction of will, knowledge and action. 
Vedānta upholds cinmātra possessing the will but considering it actionless, the 
principle becomes static and gross. 
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Kāśaida agrees with Vedānta that cid is the cause of the universe, but it 
critically differs on the notion of cid that Vedānta offers. To Kāśaida, Vedānti’s 
notion of cid is incomplete, for along with cid, its svātantrya (Free Will) should 
also be accepted. Without postulating the Free Will, it is difficult to accept just 
cid as the cause. The fivefold power of action (śaktipancaka), viz., cit, ānanda, 
icchā, jñāna, and kriyā reside in the cause or the doer in unison. This is the 
vimarśa śakti (action power) necessary for external manifestation that ever 
suffuses in the prakāśa (light; knowledge; Śiva). In Kāśaida that which is 
without Free Will is jada. Vedānta while not accepting Free Will in the cid-
kārana proceeds only to undo its own position that annuls its own purpose. 
The argument forwarded by Vedānta is that it does not consider the 
effect to e real. Only when one recognizes the effect to be real does the 
question of agential cause and its Free Will in it arise. The effect as such is 
false in Vedānta, only the cause is truth. As a result, the doer or action is not 
necessitated; so far as the distinction of cause and effect prevails in the 
worldly matters, its reason is traced in avidyā, ajñāna, or māyā. The 
phenomenal world of multifarious forms is but appearance of one truth alone. 
Kāśaida is least satisfied with the postulation of māyā in the causal 
doctrine. It maintains that if māyā is the reason of the distinction between the 
cause and the effect, then māyā too must have some cause. If māyā pertains to 
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jīva (individual or differentiated soul) then there is one difficulty as regards its 
oneness with the Brahman, and if māyā resides in the Brahman then the 
Brahman will be affected by the faults such as avidyā.24 Further, even if one 
accepts cause as the existent and effect as the non-existent, another problem 
then is, it hardly defines māyā on non-contradicting terms, which posits that 
cause and effect are nothing but appearance of distinction due to māyā. Here, 
it should be noted that Kāśaida too accepts the principle of māyā but its 
unique stand on it is that māyā is construed as the excellent Free Will of the 
Brahman or Parama Śiva.25 Hence, Kāśaida does not have to face Vedānta’s 
paradox. 
In the causal doctrine of Vedānta, the prevalence (sattā) of the effect is 
truth in the form of the effect prior to the action, but untruth in the form of the 
effect after the action. For instance, the form of a pot is truth and existent in 
the worldly context, but it was truth when it was clay, not when the clay 
assumed a shape. On this point, Kāśaida argues that if one does not regard 
the pot in the clay after the action then it suggests that a unique effect comes 
out of the cause. This point when extended suggests that what was earlier 
non-existent later comes into being. This is not śāstraic (approved by the 
system), for asat remains asat remains—this is parmārtha. Abhinavagupta, for 
the sake of example, suggests that howsoever hard the Vedāntis may try the 
black colour cannot become the white colour.26 
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In the view of Kāśaida, hence, there is an anomaly in considering the 
effect to be false post hoc, but truth when it prevails in the cause prior to 
action. 
II.3 Nyāya-Vaiśesika Darśanas  
Nyāya and Vaiśesika are independent darśana-s and have their discrete 
history of development. Although antiquity of these darśana-s is unknown to 
us, the first systematic efforts of compiling the system are found in 
Gautama's27 Nyāyasūtra and Kanāda's28 Vaiśesikasūtra, and as is the wont, 
precious little is known about the writers of these texts. However, it is often 
debated whether Vaiśesika system was historically contemporaneous to or 
successor of Nyāya. There are certain similarities and dissimilarities in the 
philosophical positions held by these two darśana-s. They share a common 
theoretical premise on eikya, samyoga, samavāya, dravya, guna, karma, samanya, 
viśesa among others. These similarities apart, both the systems differ from 
each other in certain respects. For instance, Nyāya accepts sixteen categories 
(padārtha-s) whilst Vaiśesika permits of only seven padārtha-s. Further, 
Vaiśesika accepts viśesa as the independent padārtha while Navya-Nyāya 
(New Nyāya) does not reckon so. Vaiśesikas consider samavāya (inherence) to 
be extra-sensory (atindriya) and therefore inferential (anumeya), but 
Naiyayikas consider samavāya to be experientially cognizable (pratyaksa). 
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Vaiśesikas are 'pilupākavādi' (adherents of atom as essence) and Naiyayikas 
are 'pitharpākavādi' (adherents of constituents as essence). To Vaiśesika, atman 
is inferential (anumeya) whereas Naiyayikas call it intellectually perceptible 
(mānaspratyaksa). Vaiśesikas consider primarily two pramāna-s viz. pratyaksa 
(self-experience) and anumāna (inference) while Naiyāyikas add to it two 
more viz. upamāna (analogy) and śabda (verbal testimony). 
Apart from separate commentaries on Nyāya and Vaiśesika, the 
composite model of Nyāya -Vaiśesika was being discussed during or after the 
9th century AD. Such works were called ‘Prakarana grantha’.29 Texts of such 
composite model by some logicians have survived through ages namely 
Śivaditya’s (late 9th c. AD) Saptapadārthi, Keśava Miśra’s (12th c. AD) Tarkabhāsā 
with his commentary Tarkarahasyadipikā, Viśvanāth’s (1654-?) Bhāsāpariccheda 
and his commentary on it, Siddhāntmuktāvali, and Annambhatt’s (1625-1700) 
Tarkasamgraha with his commentary on it, Tarkadipika. These texts have been 
immensely liked and appreciated by both logicians and students of Indian 
logic. Of these four writers, Annambhatta was prolific. Apart from 
Tarkasamgraha and Tarkadipika, other texts ascribed to him are Mitaksharā 
(commentary on Paninisutra), Tattvabodhini Tika, Nyāya pariśista Prakarana, 
Subodhini Sudhāsāra. According to Chandrashekhar Shastri, Annambhatta also 
authored Tattvacintāmanyalokasiddhānjana, and Brhmasūtravrtti.30  
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II.3.1 Padārthas :  Epistemological Categories  
In Nyāya and Vaiśesika two major subjects can be clubbed together: padārtha 
(categories) and pramāna (instruments of cognition). As mentioned above 
Nyāya accepts sixteen padārtha-s. They are: Pramāna (means of knowledge), 
prameya (object of knowledge), samśaya (doubt), prayojana (purpose), drastānta 
(familiar example), siddhānta (established principle), avayava (members of 
syllogism), tarka (deliberation), nirnaya (conclusion), vāda (disputation), jalpa 
(debate), vitanda (wrangling), hetvābhāsa (fallacious reasoning), chala (quibble), 
jati (false objection), and nigrahasthāna (reasons for defeat).  
Vaiśesika, on the other hand, accepts seven padārtha-s31 such as, dravya 
(substance), guna (quality), karma (action), sāmānya (commonness), viśesa 
(particularity), samavāya (inherence), and abhāva (non-existence). Abhāva was a 
latter addition by the Vaiśesikas namely Sridhara, Udayana and Śivāditya. It 
was held by Kanāda that spiritual uplift and liberation would be attainable by 
round understanding of the fact of cognition-experience through six 
fundamental categories. So far as the delineation of padārtha is concerned, 
Vaiśesika system is more elaborate and orderly than Nyāya. Vaiśesika sub-
classifies seven categories in the following manner: 
 Dravya (Matter): 9 kinds→ prthvi, jala, teja, vāyu, ākaśa, kāla, dik, 
ātman, and mana. 
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 Guna (Property): 24 kinds→ rupa, rasa, gandh, sparśa, samkhyā, 
parimāna, prthaktva, sanyoga, vibhāg, paratva, aparatva, gurutva, sneha, 
śabda, būddhi, sukha, dūkha, icchhā, dvesa, prayatna, dharma, adharma, 
and samskāra. 
 Karma (Force in action): 5 kinds→ utksepana (upward), avaksepana 
(downward), ākuncana (shrinking), prasārana (expansion), and 
gamana (motion) 
 Sāmānya (Similarity in genera): 2 kinds→ para (constant and all-
pervasive) and apara (limited) 
 Viśesa:  Difference in species 
 Samavāya (Inherence): ayutsiddha relation of 5 types→ avayava and 
avayavi, guna and guni, kriyā and kriyāvāna, jāti and vyakti, viśesa and 
its adhikarana nitya dravya. 
  Abhāva (Non-existence): 4 kinds→ prāgabhāva, pradhvansābhāva, 
atyantābhāva, and anyonyābhāva 
Each of these categories is further sub-classified and analyzed. Vaiśesika 
system then distinguishes their universal and constant features from 
particular ones. Nyāya exclusively posits padārtha through three subsequent 
stages: udeśya (naming and classifying), laksana (arriving at definition), and 
pariksā (examination).32 The first step involves nomenclatural identification of 
a given category and its sub-classification if required.33 Thereafter the 
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uncommon characteristic of the posited category is elicited which is a step 
further in validating the category. This is laksana. Amongst all attributes of the 
category, there would be one most essential attribute. Laksana thus comes to 
define a given category with its asādhārana dharma (sui generis characteristic). 
Nevertheless, laksana will be accepted as valid only when it is qualified in that 
it is free from three definitional defects namely ativyāpti (over-generalization), 
avyāpti (over-specificity), and asambhava (improbability). Definition thus must 
be irrefragable. After the nomenclatural identification and definition, the 
posited category is examined for its validity. This method of establishing a 
category is accepted by other darśana-s as well. However, it must be noted 
that some of these categories primarily pertain to physical science and may or 
may not be acceptable for its pure logical analysis in the light of present 
development in quantum mechanics. This act of refining and re-evaluating 
Vaiśesika categories through particle physics demands a fact-based rigorous 
scientific research. 
Other than the deliberations on padārtha-s, the most interesting and 
significant deliberation in Nyāya-Vaiśesika is on the means of knowledge. 
"Buddhikhanda" of Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta is chiefly devoted to 
enquiry into such means. The whole process of valid cognition involves four 
factors, namely pramā (valid knowledge), pramātā (knower of valid 
knowledge), prameya (object of valid knowledge), and pramāna (means of 
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valid knowledge). Of these four, the last one is of the main concern here, 
which Keśava Miśrā defines it as, ‚pramākaranam pramānam‛ (That which is 
karana (peculiar cause) of pramā (valid cognition) is pramāna (means of 
cognition)) 
In the Western philosophy, the major claims to cognition are in the 
form of views broadly categorized as the rationalists, the empiricists, and the 
Kantian synthesis of the two. The rationalists have prestiged idea whereas the 
empiricists held sensory experience supreme. The ramification of the two in a 
conjoined manner develops only in Kant. In Indian philosophy, especially in 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika, experience as a means of cognition has been extensively 
investigated which is not just confined only to the sensory experience.  
II.4  Prāmānyavāda and Khyātivāda :  Theories of Valid Cognition 
& Error 
The question of validity or invalidity of knowledge is as much crucial as 
primary. In what manner and when can one know whether a specific 
experience is valid or invalid? Different darśana-s resolve this question in their 
own ways, and their positions are accordingly classified as either the 
doctrines of self-validity (svatah prāmānya) or of derived validity (paratah 
prāmānya). For instance, Sāmkhya holds that both true and false experiences 
are known intuitively. Nyāya system, however, determines any experience to 
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be veridical or otherwise after its examination by non-contradicting evidence. 
Nyāya does not presume validity or invalidity until any experience is proved 
so. This approach depends on grounds other than mere experience of 
cognition, hence it is paratah prāmānya. To the Buddhists, the cognition of any 
experience is a prima facie fallacy, but may be reckoned true only if proved to 
be so by independent evidence. On the other hand, Mimāmsā and Vedānta 
accept every experience as valid, but may regard it as false if so proved later 
on or if negated by another subsequent experience. This approach is called the 
doctrine of self-validity of knowledge (svatah prāmānya). 
Mādhvārcārya in his Sarvadarśanasamgraha succinctly puts this whole 
issue as follows: 
Pramānatvāpramānatve svatah sāmkhyā samāśritāh | 
Naiyāyikāste paratah saugataścaram svatah‖ 
Prathamam paratah prāhuha prāmānyam vedavādina | 
Pramānatvah svatah prāhuha parataścāpramānatam ‖ 
While considering pramā, questions related to the nature and types of 
apramā naturally arise. The theory of error or khyātivāda is a unique feature of 
Indian darśana tradition wherein each one has its own theory of error in sync 
with its epistemology and metaphysics. Khyātivāda is characteristically 
developed to indicate apramā. They are as follows: 
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 Asat khyātivāda (Cārvāka) → the doctrine that the object of illusion is 
nonexistent. 
 Akhyātivāda (Prabhākara Mimāmsā) → the doctrine that the object 
of illusion is due to the non-cognition (of the difference between the 
seen and the remembered object) 
 Viparīta khyātivāda (Kumārila Bhatta Mimāmsā) → the doctrine that 
illusion is due to the consideration of remembered object instead of the 
perceived object. 
 Ātma khyātivāda (Yogācāra Buddhism) → the doctrine that illusion is 
external projection of one's own kalpanā (fancy). 
 Anyathā khyātivāda (Nyāya) → the doctrine that illusion is the 
perception of an object that is not here but elsewhere. 
 Anirvacanīya khyātivāda (Śamkara’s Vedānta) → the doctrine that the 
object of illusion is indescribable in terms of being and nonbeing, 
reality and unreality, existence and nonexistence. 
 Sat khyātivāda (Rāmānuja’s Vedānta) → the doctrine that the object 
of illusion is also real. 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika system is empirical in that it does not consider truth 
or falsity as an attribute of knowledge as such, for truth or falsity arises from 
circumstances other than those that give rise to knowledge. And one must 
empirically find out the truth by independent evidences. So the veracity of 
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experience is found out after the pragmatic verification only. The experience 
of finding silver in a mother-of-pearl turns out to be a perceptual illusion only 
when the seeker fails to extract silver out of it. 
Darśana-s differ from one another as regards svatah prāmānya (self 
validity or intrinsic truth theory) and paratah prāmānya (derived validity or 
extrinsic truth validity) along with khyātivāda (theories of error) and they are 
listed as below: 
 Sāmkhya: 'intrinsic truth theory' (svatah prāmānya) with 'intrinsic 
falsity theory' (svatah aprāmānya) 
 Mimāmsā: 'intrinsic truth theory' (svatah prāmānya) with 'extrinsic 
falsity theory' (akhyāti/ vipartita khyātivāda-s) 
 Nyāya: 'extrinsic truth theory' (paratah prāmānya) with 'extrinsic 
falsity theory' (anyathā khyātivāda) 
 Buddhist: 'extrinsic truth theory' (paratah prāmānya) with 'intrinsic 
falsity theory' (ātma khyātivāda) 
 Buddhist *Śāntaraksita's+: In abhyāsadaśāpanna jñāna (empirically 
derived cognition) both truth and falsity are intrinsic and in 
anabhyāsadaśāpanna jñāna (non-empirically derived cognition) both 
truth and falsity are extrinsic. 
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 Jainism: 'intrinsic truth theory' (svatah prāmānya) with 'intrinsic 
falsity theory' (svatah aprāmānya) 
Pramānas :  Epistemological Means of Cognition  
The system of pramāna-s in Nyāya-Vaiśesika can be illustrated as follows:  
 
Figure 1   
 
*Annambhatta’s Nyāya-Vaiśesika Model+ 
Buddhi / Jñāna (cognition)  
 
  
 
  
 
 
[* arthāpatti and anupalabdhi are accepted only in Vedānta and Mimāmsā, not in Nyāya-
Vaiśesika.] 
II.4.1 Classification of Pratyaksa  jñāna  
The term buddhi calls for the possible meanings such as 'cognition', 
'instrument of cognition' and the 'act of cognition'. In Nyāya-Vaiśesika it is, 
however, employed in the sense of 'cognition'. Buddhi is posited as the quality 
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(guna) of ātman. For the instrument of cognition, the term used here is manas 
(mind). In the systems of Sāmkhya and Vedānta, antahkarana (internal organ) 
is an overarching concept that is distributed into four faculties according as 
their functions viz. mana (mind), buddhi (intellect), ahamkāra (principle of 
individuation), and cita (consciousness receiving impressions).34 Nonetheless, 
Nyāya-Vaiśesika accepts buddhi as jñāna (cognition). Tarkasamgraha states, 
"sarvavyavahārheturbuddhirjñānam". That is, buddhi is essential for dealings of 
all living beings. However, this definition is not inclusive of nirvikalpa jñāna 
(self-realizing knowledge) and thus not appropriate in śāstraic terms.35 Hence, 
the definition is further refined by Annambhatta in Dipikā as, 'jānāmi' 
ityanuvyavasāyagamyajñānatvameva laksanamityarthah|'. Buddhi is that cognition 
which is subject to the sense 'I know this' (anuvyavasāya). To Naiyyāyikas 
cognition is threefold: 
 Indriyārtha sannikarsa: sense contact––e.g. the eye contact with the 
pot while seeing it. 
 Jñāna: cognition of pot––buddhi helps manifest ātman with the 
cognition 
 Anuvyavasāya: reflective cognition––e.g. 'I know that this is a pot'. 
Anuvyavasāya is the knower's awareness of being aware of self in 
the process of cognition, 'I know that I know'. 
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In Nyāya-Vaiśesika buddhi is not independent by itself but exists only under 
the aegis of ātman. Buddhi or jñāna (cognition) has two broad divisions: smrti 
(recollection plus ante-natal traces) and anubhava (experience). Smrti is born of 
samskāra-s (traces), which in return are caused by anubhava.36 Anubhava is the 
root of all mental activities and all mental activities predicate only on 
anubhava. Praśastapāda of 4th c. BC in his Padārtha Dharma Samgraha, which is 
an independent commentary on Vaiśesika sūtra, develops his model of 
classification of means of knowledge in accord with Vaiśesika system. He 
divides buddhi (cognition) into two: vidyā and avidyā. Avidyā is fourfold: 
samśaya (doubt), viparyaya (illusion), svapna (dream), and anadhyavasāya 
(indecision). Vidyā too has four divisions: indriyaja (sensory), anindriyaja (non-
sensory), smrti (memory), and ārsa (revealed or divine). Indriyaja is sub-
classified into two more: sarvajñiya (all-encompassing) and asarvajñiya 
(limited). Asarvajñiya is further classified into savikalpa (determinate) and 
nirvikalpa (non-determinate). Here, anindriyaja cognition is anumāna 
(inference) and ārsa vidyā is the truth revealed to the yogin-s or self-realized 
souls. This classification may be illustrated as in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 
*Praśastapāda’s Vaiśesika Model+ 
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In Nyāya-Vaiśesika model of Annambhatta, anubhava is classed into two 
pramā or yathārtha (valid cognition) and apramā or ayathārtha (invalid 
cognition). The valid cognition is to perceive the padārtha as it is in itself. 
The valid cognition is of four types—pratyaksa, anumiti, upamiti, and 
śābda which have respectively four karana-s (peculiar causes) viz., pratyaksa, 
anumāna, upamāna, and śabda. The undisputed authenticity of any padārtha is 
achieved by the pramāna (means) only. Once the means of cognition are 
verified and attested, acquisition of knowledge thereafter is hassle free and its 
legitimacy is assured. 
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Further classification of Pratyaksa jñāna shown in the Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
*Nyāya-Vaiśesika Model+ 
Pratyaksa Jñāna 
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(knowledge through direct experience) viz. Nirvikalpak pratyaksa 
(Indeterminate direct perception) and Savikalpak pratyaksa (Determinate direct 
perception). In fact, many logicians tend to see these types as stages rather 
than distinct categories. 
The Nirvikalpak pratyaksa (Indeterminate direct perception) is that 
which shows merely the sensible object without any further information 
about it such as name, class or qualities, for they are not vividly perceived. 
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This perception is likened to the cognition of a kid or a deaf person: 
‘bālakamūkādīvijñānasadrsya nirvikalpam’.  Here, after experiencing one can say 
there is something, but cannot affirm what it is. For instance, a small kid and an 
adult look at a clock. Both of them do perceive the object. However, the kid is 
unable to identify what the object is with regard to its name, class and 
qualities. The adult, contrariwise, knows them. 
Regarding the Savikalpak pratyaksa (determinate perception), it is said, 
‘nāmajātyādīyojanāsahitam savikalpam’. That is, the determinate perception is 
one that reveals the name, the genus and the qualities of the object to one who 
perceives. Most of the common experience in human activities is of this 
nature. It is also evident that much of the information given in this 
determinate perception comes from memory and not from the contact of the 
senses with the object. Hence the Buddhist do not consider savikalpak pratyaksa 
as perceptual cognition. 
Some logician also point out a third stage of perception that culminates 
over the preceding two. It is called Hānopādāno-peksābuddhi—the sense of the 
object being desirable, undesirable or indifferent.  This sense is developed by 
the perceiver when the second stage of determinate perception is over. This 
third cognition refers to the practical relation of the object to the self. 
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The reason of pratyaksa jñāna or direct perception is sannikarsa (contact) 
of senses and object of sensation. Nyāya-Vaiśesika accept two kinds of 
relation between the sense organs and the sense objects in the act of 
perception: sanyoga (conjunction or temporary union) and samavāya 
(inherence or permanent union). Relation of samavāya is ayutsiddha wherein 
existence of one thing wholly depends on the other. It is of five kinds: avayaga-
avayavī (part and the whole); guna-guni (quality and substance); kriyāvāna-
kriyā (agent of action and action); jāti-vyakti (universal and particular); and 
viśesa-nitya dravya (unique constant element). Moreover, these sense contacts 
of worldly cognition as regards sight and sound are of six types: 
 Samyoga (Conjunction): It is the contact between the sense and the 
object when one is aware of a concrete object like a tree, a bird, etc. 
It is called sanyoga that is a temporary union separated in course of 
time. Here, the object perceived is not in permanent contact with 
the sense that perceives it as they are separable. Hence sanyoga. 
 Sanyukta Samvāya (Inherence in that which is conjoined): It is a 
double contact operating in perception of one thing which is in 
permanent union (samavāya) with the object, which, in turn, is in 
separable union (sanyoga) with the sense. Here, inherence is a 
relation of a quality that resides in the object inseparably. In 
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perception of the one, the other is perceived and so it is called a 
double contact. Here, the perceived quality or genus is in sanyoga 
(separable union) with the sense of sight and its quality or genus is 
in samvāya (inseparable union) with the object. For instance, in 
perceiving the colour of a cloth, the sanyukta samvāya is involved. 
 Sanyuktasamaveta Samavāya (Inherence in the inherent with that 
which is conjoined): It is a triple contact operating in perception of 
things that are inseparably united with things having already 
sanyukta-samavāya relation. For instance, when one is already aware 
of the colour and perceives a coloured cloth, then the contact 
between eyes and the genus of the colour cognized is threefold, 
viz., 1) sanyoga (separable conjunction) of the eyes with the cloth, 2) 
samavāya (inherence) of the given colour with the cloth which is in 
conjunction with the eyes, and 3) samavāya of the particular colour 
of the cloth with the genus of colour (colour in general). So, the 
cloth is conjoint with eyes (sanyukta), the cloth inheres in the colour 
(samaveta), and the genus of colour is in inherence (samavāya) with 
the particular colour. This perception triad is called sanyukta-
samveta-samavāya. 
 Samvāya Samvāya (Inherence): To Naiyāyikas, samavāya is the 
contact involved in the direct apprehension of sound. They hold 
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that ākāśa (ether), which is the essential constituent of the organ of 
hearing, fills the cavity of the ears. In their view, sound is an 
inherent attribute of ākāśa. Thus, on catching the sound by the ears, 
the selfsame quality of ākāśa is in contact with ākāśa of the ears. As 
there exits relation of inherence between the quality and the 
substance, the perception of sound by the ears is called samavāya. 
 Samveta Samvāya (Inherence in that which is inherent): It is a 
double contact involved in the direct cognizance of the generic 
nature of sound. The generic nature of sound has inherence in the 
particular sound heard by the ears and that particular sound heard 
by the ears is samaveta (inherently related) with the ears. Hence, 
samaveta-samavāya. 
 Viśesana-viśesya bhāva (the relation of qualification and the 
qualified): To Naiyāyikas, it is a peculiar contact involved in the 
perception of the non-existence of an object. For instance, absence 
of a book on a writing desk. One perceives the empty space but is 
reminded of the object that usually accompanies it. This notion of 
the non-existence of the object is the qualification (viśesana) of the 
place which is qualified (viśesya) by it. Hence, viśesana-viśesya bhāva. 
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This sixfold doctrine of sense contact seems to be a new feature of later 
Nyāya, for it is neither mentioned in Nyāyasūtra of Gautama nor in the 
commentaries on it. 
Smrti is recollection (of experience) on the basis of past impressions of 
given experience. Tarkabhāsā states: ‚jñātavisayam jñāna smrtih‛ (knowledge of 
known things is recollection). Similarly, Tarkasamgraha holds: ‚samskārjanya 
jñānam smrtih‛ (knowledge produced of past impressions is recollection). Both 
these definitions are valid as they foreground gain of knowledge through 
recollection which marks a psychological process in the absence of direct 
experience of object to be known.  Smrti (recollection) is either valid or 
invalid. It is valid only when it is based on the impressions of valid experience 
and is invalid when based on the impressions of invalid experience. Thus true 
or false recollection determines the veracity of smrti. To the Naiyyāyikas, all 
knowledge as such is but an objective correspondence. 
Pratyaksa pramāna or direct experience is knowledge of an object 
received through the actual contact of the senses with the object. Pratyaksa 
pramāna is further sub-divided into nirvikalpa (non-determinate) or āntara 
(introspective) and savikalpa (determinate) or bāhya (external). The internal 
direct experience is the cognition gained through one's mind (manas) which is 
the internal sense (āntara indriya) that includes knowledge of one's 
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psychosomatic conditions such as pleasure, pain, fear, anger, fatigue, hunger, 
thirst, etc. The external direct experience is acquired through external sense-
organs viz., ears, eyes, tongue, nose, and skin. These give us knowledge of 
sound, sight, taste, smell and touch. 
Apart from the pratyaksa pramāna, Naiyāyikas in the paroksa pramāna 
(indirect means) include anumiti (inference), upamiti (analogy), and śābda 
(verbal testimony). 
II.4.2 Śabda  (Verbal Testimony) 
Darśana-s differ in their stand on verbal testimony as the direct means of 
cognition. Mimāmsā, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vedānta accept śabda as a separate 
means of valid knowledge. Per contra, Vaiśesika, Jaina, and Buddhist do not 
identify śabda as an independent pramāna. These seemingly identical positions 
apart, each darśana has a distinct theory behind considering śabda as pramāna. 
Mimāsmā, Yoga, Vedānta while considering śabda recognize only Vedas and 
whatever that is based on Vedas or that does not contradict them. Nyāya, 
more to this, also considers any statement that is spoken by a reliable person. 
In this wise, Nyāya admits two kinds of verbal testimony: Vedic (scriptural) 
and laukika (worldly). 
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a. Nyāya View  
Both Tarkabhāsā and Tarkasamgraha state: "āptavākyam śabdah |" (sentence 
uttered by a reliable person is verbal testimony). The word 'āpta' is to be 
understood with its nuances. In spiritual context, āpta stands for one who has 
realized the Self. His words are valid knowledge. In this sense Vedas and 
āgama-s in India are valid knowledge as they are given by the mantradrstā 
(seers), and such texts are called apauruseya (revealed or unauthored) whose 
validity of knowledge is not contingent upon the individual; it is truth itself. 
On the other hand, in the worldly context, āpta stands for a person who 
speaks truth and therefore his utterance is reliable. For the purpose of 
meaningfulness, combination of words needs to satisfy certain conditions, 
viz., ākānksā (expectancy or syntactic intention), yogyatā (compatibility or 
semantic appropriateness), and sannidhi (contiguity or immediacy of 
utterance). However, words are indicators of meaning, which takes place in 
multiple ways. As it is said: 
Śaktigraho vyākaranopamānakośāptavākyād vyavahārataśca | 
Vākyasya śesādvivrteravadanti sānnidhyatah siddhapadasya vrddhāh ‖ 
(Tarkasamgraha, 1971, 158) 
(First, meaning of a word can be known through grammar; second, 
through sādraśya (semblance); third, through dictionary; fourth, 
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through āpta vākya (reliable sentence); fifth, through conventional 
usage; sixth, through the context; seventh, through the definition; and 
eighth, through immediacy of utterance) 
b. Vaiśesika View  
Nyāya and Vaiśesika are called samāna tantra (parallel systems) but they are 
divided on the independent status of śabda. In Vaiśesika system, there are 
only two pramāna-s: pratyaksa (direct) and anumāna (inference). Other means of 
cognition such as upamāna (analogy), śabda (verbal testimony), aitihya 
(history), arthāpatti (postulation), sambhava (probability), and abhāva (non-
presence)—all these six means are subsumed under the category of anumāna 
(inference). Vaiśesika system is, in fact, a theistic system and begins with 
"athāto dharma vyākhyāsyāmah |" (Vaiśesikasūtra 1.1.1). Further, it also 
recognizes Veda as pramāna, "tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmānyam |" 
(Vaiśesikasūtra 1.1.3). However, it is curious to find that in Praśastapāda Bhāsya, 
śabda is not regarded independently and is reconciled with anumāna: 
"śabdādināmapyanumāne'ntarbhāvah, samānavidhitvāt |" 
Here, the reason given is that the procedure of cognizing śabda is 
identical with that of anumāna. Anumāna is cognized through vyāptigraha 
(realizing concomitance), lingajñāna (knowledge of sign), vyāptismrti 
(recollecting concomitance), and anumiti (inference). Similarly, śabda is 
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cognized through sanketagraha (realizing indication), vākyaśravana (hearing 
sentence), padārthasmrti (recollecting lexical meaning), and śabdabodha 
(realizing meaning). 
Vaiśesika system, moreover, differs from Mimāmsā in that the latter 
considers śabda as svatah prāmānya whilst Vaiśesika calls it paratah prāmānya by 
stating "radvacanāt prāmānya". 
c. Mimāmsā View of Prabhākara  
Mimāmsā system has two sub-divisions of exegetes: Prābhākara school and 
Kumārila Bhatta school. In the Prābhākara system, śabda is subsumed under 
anumāna like in Vaiśesika. But the difference is that Prābhākara reckons śabda 
to be an independent means and rejects laukika vākya (worldly sentence) to be 
a valid means at all. Their opinion is that the fruition of verbal testimony is 
realization of word meaning that brings to light the object of knowledge. In 
the worldly statements knowledge of 'āptottkatva' (reliability) is necessary. A 
reliable person is he who has the right knowledge of meaning.  Therefore, the 
sentential meaning permeates in the knowledge of the speaker and this can be 
cognized through inference. Hence, a new statement cannot be called śabda 
pramāna, as it is already under the purview of inference. However, Vedic 
statements being 'apauruseya' need no condition of reliability (āptottkatva) and 
so they are surely valid. This is the view of Prābhākara. 
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d .  Mimāmsā View of Kumārila  
More central to the differences between two schools of Mimāmsā is the 
question as to what is more significant in language—word meaning or 
sentence meaning. Nyāya and Kumārila school of Mimāmsā stressed the 
word meaning and regarded sentential meaning as the construct of word 
meaning. This linguistic view is called abhihitānvaya vāda (relation of 
designata). The Prābhākara, on the other hand, stressed the sentential 
meaning which is known as anvitābhidhāna vāda (relatedness-designatum 
theory). 
Abhihitānvaya vāda of Bhatta holds that the meaning of the word is 
primarily derived through the abhidhā śakti (denotative power) of the word. 
The aggregate meaning of sentence is thereafter had by the tātparya śakti 
(intended meaning). So first the abhihita (denoted) meaning is realized by 
abhidhā śakti and thereafter anvaya (agreement) takes place between all the 
words in a sentence.  
Opposed to the above view is Prābhākara’s anvitābhidhāna vāda. In this 
view, abhidhā does not indicate the literal meaning of the word but indicates 
only the agreement of meaning in the words. For the indication necessary for 
abhidhā śakti does not reside in the word only but in the concordance of the 
meaning of the word. Abhidhā (denotation) indicates only the anvita (agreed) 
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meaning, not just isolated meaning of the word. And thus there is no 
necessity of tātparya śakti.  
The question of śabda śakti is also variously understood. Śabda śakti 
(indication power of word) is broadly known to be fourfold: abhidhā (primary 
meaning), tātparya (intended meaning), laksanā (secondary derived meaning), 
vyanjanā (tertiary derived meaning or suggestion). The last two are primarily 
held by grammarians and poeticians. However, as regards the locus of śabda 
śakti, there are four main positions in Indian logic. That is, śabda śakti resides 
in: 
1. only Jāti (universal) 
2. only Vyakti (particular) 
3. Jāti viśista vyakti (universal, uniqueness and particular) 
4. Apoha (exclusion of co-referent) 
Here, the first view is adopted by Mimāmsā; the second by Navya-Nyāya 
(New Nyāya); the third by Prācina Nyāya (Old Nyāya); and the fourth by 
Buddhist.37 
Mimāmsā and Vedānta here add two more: arthāpatti (necessary 
presupposition) and anupalabdhi (non-existence of object). They consider 
Brahman as a necessary presupposition, which for them, is a valid hypothesis. 
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Anumāna (inference) is twofold: svārthānumāna (inference for self) and 
parārthānumāna (inference for others). The inference for self is had by 
parāmarśa (consideration) of the effect on the basis of its supposed natural 
cause. However, when it comes to be shown to others, there has to be a 
systematic explication of the inference that involves five members or stages of 
syllogism. These five stages are pratijñā, hetu, udāharana, upanaya, and 
nigamana. The other indirect pramāna is upamāna (analogy), which is 
comparison on the basis of certain similar attributes. 
e. Jaina and Buddhist Views 
Jaina epistemology as posited by Umāsvātti (1st BCE) in his 
Tattvārthādhigamasūtra has two broad categories: pratyaksa jñāna and paroksa 
jñāna. Unlike other darśana-s, Jaina darśana does not consider sense perception 
as pratyaksa pramāna. Without the help of senses or mind pratyaksa pramāna is 
sought only by virtue of ātman.  Pratyaksa pramāna-s are further sub-divided 
into three more: avadhi (clairvoyance), manahaparyāya (telepathy), and keval 
(omniscience). Avadhi (clairvoyance) is attained through the yogic powers 
with attenuation of karmic bondage that gives knowledge of things in 
different and distant times. Telepathy is direct knowledge of thoughts and 
feelings. A seeker who has over rāga (attachment) and dvesa (aversion) attains 
manahaparyāya (telepathy). Keval jñāna is omniscience which is unconditional 
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and undifferentiated knowledge of the truth. Those jivanamukta ahanta-s who 
have attained complete knowledge gain kevala. Then paroksa pramāna (indirect 
means) is twofold: mati and śruti. Mati is knowledge of the present objects 
acquired through the mind and the five senses. Śruti is knowledge of past, 
present or future gained through reasoning. Śruti jñāna includes words of 
tirthankara-s or āgama-s. This typology may be illustrated as in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 
[Umāsvātti's Jaina model] 
Jñāna (cognition) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bauddha darśana offers only two major categories for pramāna-s: valid and 
invalid. The term Pratītyasamutpāda is formed by pratītya (after the gain of one 
thing), and samutpāda (origin of something) which is Buddhist cause-effect 
principle. The pramāna-s in this system can be illustrated as below: 
 
 
  Pratyaksa    Paroksa 
  Avadhi  Manahaparyāya  Kevala   Mati    Śruti 
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Figure 5 
[Bauddha Model] 
 
Jñāna (cognition) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Besides the major darśana-s, other philosophical systems also propose their 
epistemological models which vary in enlisting the number of pramāna-s. For 
instance, 
The Purānas (Historians) admit of eight pramāna-s: Pratyaksa, Anumāna, Śabda, 
Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi, Aitihya, and Sambhava. 
Tantra recognizes nine pramāna-s: Pratyaksa, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna, 
Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi, Aitihya, Sambhava and Cestā. 
Others include ten pramāna-s: Pratyaksa, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, 
Anupalabdhi, Aitihya, Sambhava, Cestā, and Pariśesa. 
Pramāna vidyā (epistemology) in Indian darśana-s is of heterogeneous 
character, for each system in sync with its prameya śāstra (metaphysics) differs 
Yathārtha Ayathārtha 
Pratyaksa Anumāna  
Svārthānumāna Parārthānumāna  
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in enumerating and extending number of pramāna-s. More so, in different 
darśana-s the same pramāna categories and terms tend to adopt altogether 
different import such as pratyaksa, mati, and śruti in Jaina; vijñāna in Bauddha; 
māyā in Advaita; purusa and prakrati in Śaivism among others. This apart, 
these systems make no bones about their being mystical in that they accept 
phenomenally non-verifiable categories such as samskāra, karma, māyā, avidyā, 
anugraha among others which seem unreal to the empirically trained mind. 
Further, understanding of one category or concept in one system may not be 
exactly applicable and relevant for the same category in another system. This 
elaborate situation of Indian epistemology therefore often seems very 
complex to the learners. Hence, it behoves the knower of Indian epistemology 
to see every system in its particularity and its similarities and dissimilarities 
shared with other systems.  
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2 The firelike Logos doctrine of Heraclitus was later developed into the pantheistic 
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10 Melchert, p. 539 
11 Nietzche, The Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1974) p. 115 
12 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999) p. 50 
13
 Pratyabhijñāhrdayam states in this regard: 
Śabdabrahmamayam paśyantirūpam ātmatattva--iti vaiyākaranāh srisadāśiva 
padamdhyāsitāh | 
(The grammarians attribute the highest reality to the status of Śri Sadāśiva by 
considering ātman (Self) principle as Śabdabrahma in the form of paśyanti.) 
Ksemarāja by this means that the grammarians reach only up to paśyanti, as 
Bhartrhari in his Vākyapadiya regards paśyanti as Śabdabrahma or Reality as Vibration, 
which is confined to the stage of Sadāśiva. Grammarians, thus, do not reach up to 
Parāvāk which alone refers to the stage of Parama Śiva.   
14 Buddhist epistemology has further development into Śunyatā, Mādhyamika, 
Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Svātantrika. Sautrāntika branch recognizes as its base 
Suttapitaka which comprises sermons of the Buddha. The other branch focused on the 
definition (vibhāsā) of the sūtras came to be known as Vaibhāsika. These two 
branches accept the dyad of pramāna and prameya, and are known as Sarvāstivādi or 
Hīnayāna. On the contrary, the branches under Mahāyāna are known as Vijñānavādi 
(Yogācāra) and Śunyavādi. Vijñānavādi reckons vijñāna (consciousness) as devoid of 
sense objects--only consciousness prevails and due to illusion it is experienced 
variously in forms of sense objects. It recognizes the dyad of pramāna and prameya as 
sāmvrtika satya. Śunyavāda, on the other hand, regards the dyad of pramāna and 
prameya as non-existent. 
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15 Padārtha in general parlance is used to signify 'object'. However, as a technical term 
in Indian philosophical discourse it means 'category'. 
16 Tattva here is understood as the very being of a thing; principle. The 36 tattva-s in 
Kashmir Śaivism are as follows: 
 1-5 tattva-s of Universal Experience: Śiva tattva, Śakti tattva, Sadāśiva tattva or 
sadākhyāta tattva, Iśvara or Aiśvarya tattva, Sadavidyā or Śuddhavidyā tattva 
 6-11 tattva-s of Limited Individual Experience: Māyā, Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga, Kāla, 
Niyati. Kalā is fivefold: Nivrtti kalā, Pratisthā kalā, Vidyā kalā, Śāntā kalā, and 
Śāntātīta kalā 
 12-13 tattva-s of Limited Individual Subject-Object: Purusa, Prakrti 
 14-16 tattva-s of Mental Operation: Buddhi, Ahamkāra, Manas 
 17-31 tattva-s of Sensible Experience: (17-21 Jñānendriya-s or sense perception: 
smelling, tasting, seeing, feeling, hearing); (22-26 Karmendriya-s or organ 
action: speaking, handling, walking, excreting, sexual act); (27-31 Tanmātrā-s 
or subtle elements of perception: śabda, sparśa, rupa, rasa, gandha) 
 32-36 tattva-s of Materiality (Pañcabhuta): Ākāśa, Vāyu, Teja, Āpas, Prthvi 
[The tattva-s from no. 12 to 36 are taken from Sāmkhya system.+ 
17 Although anekāntavāda and syādavāda have the same thesis, the former is concerned 
with tattvamīmāmsā (ontology) and the later with jñānamīmāmsā (epistemology). 
18 Śaiva darśana is, however, an overarching system in India with the following 
subtypes: Pāśupata dvaitavāda, Siddhānta Śaiva dvaitavāda, Lakulīlśa Pāśupata 
dvaitādvaitavāda, Viśistādvaita Śaivamata, Viśistādvaita or Vīra Śaivamata, 
Nandikeśvara Śaivamata, Raseśvara Śaivamata, and Kāśmir advaitavādi Śaivamata.  
19 "Ekānusandhānavisayā hiyam sarvāpi kāryakāranabhāvavyavahārasaraniriti<|" 
(Śivadrstivrtti 4.42..43) 
20 "tatśca yadi bijam sadamkuro san athāpi viparyay ubhayamapi vā sat yadi vāsat athāpi 
ekam sopākhyamanyat nirupākhmam, dvayamapi vā sopākhyam vā, tathāpi, prātipadikārtham 
tram dharmāntarena samuccayādināpyanāgrālingitamavatisthate, tasya 
samastasyāpeksārupatvena caitanyaviśrāntasvāta |"                                                     
(Iśvaraprtyabhijñāvimarśinī, 2.4.15) 
21 "Yah Pratītyasamutpādah śunyatām tām pracaksate |" (Mādhyamikakārikā, 24.18 ) 
22 vide Stcherbatsky's Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna. 
23 "Sā ca dvividhā anyonyānusangitātmikā abhiprāyātyikā vā<" (Tantrālokaviveka, 9. 11) 
24 ‚Cidrūpaśyeiktvam yadi vāstavam bhedah punarayamavidyopaplavāt—ityucyate tadā 
kasyāyambidyopaplavah—it na sangacchate | Brahmano hi vidyeikarūpasya 
kathamvidyārūpatā, na cānyah kiścidasti vastuto jivādiryasyāvidyā bhaveta |‛ 
(Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, 2.4.20) 
25 ‚Māyā nāma tasya utkrstam svātantryam |‛ (Mahārthamañjari, 17) 
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26  Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, 2.4.3 
27 Authorship is highly contested. In ‘Śāntiparva’ of the Mahābhārata and 
Pratimānātaka by Bhāsa, it is claimed that Nyāyasūtra is first composed by Gautama 
Meghātithi:  
Meghātithirmahaprājno Gautamastapasi sthitah | 
Vimruśya tena kālena patnyā samsthāvyatikramam ‖ Śāntiparva’ (233-45) 
Meghātithe nyāyaśāstram< (Pratimānātaka, Anka 5)  
Later in CE 150 Aksapāda gave a recension of Nyāyasūtra. On the other hand, 
commentators of Nyāyabhāsya, Nyāyavārtika, and Jayanta Bhatta in his Nyāyamanjari 
claim that Aksapāda himself is Gautama. Whereas some say that Nyāyasūtra is after 
the time of Buddha as it disproves of the theory of Śunyavāda. D.R. Bhadarkar opines 
that Nyāyasūtra in its present form as a whole is not composed by just one person. 
(Jetli and Parikh 5)  
28 Vāyupūrāna considers Kanāda a contemporary of Gautama, and he lived in 
Prabhas-Patan of Gujarat. No other personal information is available. 
29 About the Prakarana texts it is said, 
Śāstraikadeśasambandham śāstrakāryāntare sthitam | 
Āhuh prakaranam nāma granthabhedam vipaścitah ‖ 
Prakarana texts elicit only pertinent major issues from any śāstra with snippets from 
other systems. They are reader’s guide to a particular system. Keśava Miśrā’s 
Tarkabhāsā, Annambhatta’s Tarkasamgraha, Viśvanātha’s Nyāyamuktāvali, Jagadiśa 
Tarkālamkāra’s Tarkāmrta, and Laugaksi Bhāskara’s Tarkakaumudi are examples of 
Prakarana texts. In these Prakarana texts, tenets of Nyāya and Vaiśesika are jointly 
presented, albeit with a difference that one or the other darśana remains 
predominant. For instance, Tarkabhāsā draws its arguments on padārtha and pramāna 
from Nyāya tradition whilst Tarkasamgraha and Nyāyamuktāvali do this from the 
viewpoint of Vaiśesika tradition. 
30 Jetli and Parikha: 1993, 15. 
31 Dravyagunakarmasāmānyaviśesasama vāyabhādāh sapta padārthāh * (Tarkasamgraha 1) 
32 Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyasūtra Vārtika Bhāsya states: Trividhā cāsya śāstrasya 
pravrttiruddeśo laksanam pariksā ceti |But this triadic test comprising udeśya, laksana, 
and pariksā applies mainly to Nyāya, not to other darśana-s. For instance, Vaiśesika 
accepts only first two: udeśya and laksana. And in Jaina and Bauddha only udeśya is 
enough. 
33 Padsyārthah padārtha iti vyupattyabhidhetvam padārtha sāmānyalaksanam | (Dipikā) 
34 Śankara in his Nirvānaśatakam begins thus,  
Manobudhya'hamkāra cittānināham, na ca śrotrajihve na ca ghrānanetre | 
Na ca vyoma bhumir na tejo na vāyuh cidānanda rupah Śivoham Śivoham ‖ 
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35 Pratyabhijñāhradayam critiques in this regard: 
Naiyāyikādayo jñānādigunāsryam buddhitattvaprāyameva ātmānam samsrtau manyate, 
apavarge tu taduchhede śunyaprāyam | 
(Naiyāyikas and others (here Vaiśesikas) consider Self as long as it is in the worldly 
condition, as practically identical with buddhi (intuitive faculty of  certain 
knowledge) which is the substratum of knowledge, and other qualities. In liberation 
when buddhi disappears, they consider Self as almost identical with the void.) 
In this wise, Netra Tantra states, "Those who are attached to the limited self (the body 
as Self; the buddhi as Self, etc.) do not reach the highest stage of Śiva." (8th Patala, 
verse 30) 
36 Samskāramātrajanyam jñānam smrtih | (Tarkasamgraha) 
37 For detailed discussion on apohavāda vide Rajnish Mishra's "Buddhist Theory of 
Meaning" in Sanskrit Studies, Vol. 1, ed. Kapil Kapoor (New Delhi: DK Printworld, 
2005) pp. 49-79 
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CHAPTER  TWO 
Cosmology & Metaphysics of Literature in Indian and 
Western Traditions 
 
Cosmology and metaphysics of literature figuratively suggest the nature and 
disposition of the discipline called literature. The term cosmos implies an orderly 
universe whose parts are well configured, and to reckon with its metaphysics is 
essentially to examine the nature of reality. To conceive of the universe of 
literature as an ordered intellectual activity would enable one to consider the 
way its nature of being is disposed. The natural disposition of various literary 
expressions exhibit distinct characteristics of their conception of subject matter, 
construction with formal devices and execution of the expression, which one 
conventionally calls literary form. The various literary forms in their 
development have been specific to their language, social customs and religious/ 
festive rituals of the community, oral or written practices among others. The 
study into such a disposition of literature in literary traditions offers an 
ontological understanding. And this examination in the process predicates on the 
study of taxonomy. Taxonomy of literature suggests a systematic and synergic 
construct of different literary forms in a given knowledge culture. In fact, 
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taxonomy is scientific term concerning classification. The term is formed of two 
Greek root words: taxis ‘arrangement’ + -nomia ‘distribution’. A literary 
taxonomy is a systematic arrangement—which is not to mean a hierarchy—of 
literary instances in a class according as their generic attributes and the 
distribution or placing individual instances in sync with the generic 
arrangements. 
A comparative approach to the literary taxonomy shall yield an insight 
into inter-relationships between literary principles of genres, their analyses, other 
art forms and historical-cultural factors of dissemination and practice of 
literature. To the domain of critical enterprise, comparative study offers its 
methodology for evaluating more than one object/field of study. It would be 
attempted here to pry into the literary taxonomy as it exists in the West and in 
India by placing the two close together, albeit with the awareness of the reach of 
its findings and its provisional truth or non-conclusiveness. 
1.  Taxonomic Musings in Literary Discourse 
The obtaining concern in the following discourse is to evaluate the criteria on 
which literary taxonomy rests in the western and Indian literary traditions. It 
would also be worthwhile to underscore homology or heterogeneity inherent in 
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the theoretical framework of classification. The task at hand seems too diffused 
to justify the diversity of and ever new combinations enabled by theories for the 
factors determining the classification. Malshe attempts on this issue and enlists 
temporal and atemporal criteria. 1 The diachronic aspect affecting categorization 
can be periods, political events, socio-political/economic trends, racial or national 
history, cultural landmarks, linguistic history, literary or aesthetic parallelism. 
The criteria of synchronic classification are even more untypical, namely, 1) 
Geographical/ national: Indian literature; American literature, 2) Linguistic: 
Gujarati literature; English literature, 3) –isms: symbolist; surrealist; classicist, 4) 
Social: folk literature, urban literature, protest literature, 5) Content based: 
literary—non-literary; historical, mythological, 6) Formal or structural: verse-
prose distinction; on the basis of medium—oral or written. 
The above inventory is but one of many demonstrations of literary 
classification. This indicates how one literary instance or a genre can be classified 
by different parameters. And the favour for any particular parameter in analysis 
would hinge on dominant theory/ideology in the concerned writer’s works. 
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I 
Western Literary Taxonomy 
In the west, the first systematic classification is observed in Aristotle. Aristotle’s 
scheme first distinguishes visual arts (painting) from aural/sound on the basis of 
distinct medium. Different components of sound, viz. rhythm, melody, and 
language in varying combinations lead to different artistic representations. Thus 
come dance and music for the first two sound components respectively. The 
language part of artistic representation remains undesignated in Aristotle which 
should be called ‘literature’2 or even better ‘vāngmaya’ (verbal discourse). The 
verbal discourse is bifurcated into two: prose and verse. And the verse chiefly 
being metrical, also imbibes qualities of rhythm or music category. Now on the 
basis of object of imitation there are two: noble action and trivial action. 
Performing verbal arts imitating noble actions earlier existed in the form of hymn 
and encomia (dithyrambic & gnomic poetry) whereas those imitating trivial 
action were in invectives or satires (Phallic songs). The dithyrambic poetry is 
heroic poetry that includes epic (narrative) and tragedy (performative). Satires 
(iambic poetry) incorporate the form of comedy (performative). 
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What Aristotle does is a calculated elucidation of various art forms that 
combines each other’s elements and shows the natural progress in his 
categorization. More so, in showing the affinity between music and poetry, he 
corrects his teacher’s metaphor. Plato correlated poetry with painting in order to 
show its distance from the Idea, but this newfound kinship with music annuls 
the implications suggested by carpentry and painting.  
The criteria for classification employed by Aristotle are three: medium, 
object, and mode. Of the three, the first and third bear no truck with human 
essential factors such as reason, emotion, moral, justice among others. Medium 
and mode, in this way, are formal criteria. On the other hand, the ‘object’ of 
imitation refers to the moral character of the human beings: ‘comedy takes as its 
goal the representation of men as worse<than the norm’, while tragedy shows 
men as better than the norm. More to this, Aristotle construes that such a moral 
criterion is also applicable to art forms other than dramatic poetry such as 
painting, music and dance. However, he focuses mainly on dramatic poetry. The 
moral criterion involves value judgement to classify the generic categories such 
as comedy and tragedy. And this value judgement or moral worldview is not as 
objective a parameter as the other two criteria. Many modern critics, particularly 
Northrop Frye, found the moral criterion too simplistic. It also has a binary 
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model where one term is privileged in comparison to the other. The complexity 
in Aristotle's model is due to the fact that formal and moral criteria co-exist 
wherein the latter has had a telling impact on the entire western literary 
classification. What one finds in Aristotle’s Poetics is that the object of imitation is 
the only fully realized criterion. And responding to this issue in fact makes one 
postulate few issues from margins.   
For the Greeks, action was the culmination of ethos (moral principle of 
character). Aristotle holds that the end and purpose of life is a kind of action: 
doing something, and not just being a certain kind of person. In fact, ‘action’ in 
Aristotle is variously interpreted by successive thinkers, as he famously 
prioritized action over character. S. H. Butcher, in this regard, construes that the 
drama is will or emotion in action. To Butcher, action is not different from 
character insofar as it springs out of character and consequently reflects that 
character. The indisputable moral choice of human agent leads to eudaimonai 
(happiness). An action morally governed is a central concern in Greek 
worldview. Here, any further inquiry into the priority given to criteria of 
classification shoots off in the direction of metaphysics via ethical/religious 
givens of the time. Secondly, Aristotle puts premium on tragedy-comedy dyad 
and shows no further ramification of dramatic forms. One can say that he 
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considered works of ancient Greek writers and being an ontological thinker, he 
studied what was at hand and the way the object of study then existed. But 
theorizing classification is at once abstract and particular. A speculative 
approach would certainly enhance the reach of classification as is evident from 
Frye’s schema. But since the object of imitation in Aristotle recognizes human 
action on the basis of polar qualities: better/common; good/worse; noble/inferior, 
the classification itself delimits its scope for the concerned literary forms. The 
dominance of moral criterion can be further viewed from the point that in 
Aristotle’s view drama is actually an imitation by the poet. The poet controls the 
performance and the text of the performance. And in the text important is mythos 
(arrangement of events). In principle, Aristotle’s poet is a foil to Plato’s. A poet 
now is not tactless imitator but one who recreates the world. And the 
representation of better men in terms of probability helps him answer 
philosophical contentions. Hence, Aristotle's poetic forms comprise only four: 
epic, satire, tragedy and comedy. Aristotle located ‘poetry’ within a broader 
aesthetic scheme and analyzed its constituents, especially tragedy.3  
After Aristotle, there was little theoretical contribution from successive 
thinkers and literary critics. In the Roman age, Horace almost followed Aristotle 
in his discussion on tragedy and epic. However, Horace also formally enlisted 
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small genres such as lyric, pastoral, satire, elegy and epigram. These small genres 
are elaborated upon in his Satires and Epistles. Horace onwards the genre theory 
tends to be more formalized and prescriptive, for the principle of ‘imitation’ was 
upheld as ‘imitate the model’. And the process of imitation becomes easy when 
the model is more formalized. The criterion for Horace was ‘decorum’ or 
propriety. Rules of decorum were expected to bring about harmony between 
subject matter and style and meter. Thus, Horace’s ideas grew into one 
formalized and prescriptive genre theory. 
By the end of Middle Ages, early Renaissance’s different social-economic 
conditions and literary practice effected a change in literary forms. Tragedy and 
comedy lost their conventional dramatic signification. Dante uses ‘comedy’ in the 
title of his work. Chaucer’s Prologue to the ‘Monk’s Tale’ considers ‘tragedy’ as a 
‘storie’ which shows the hero’s fall from prosperity to misery and ‘endeth 
wretchedly’. Other new genre in this period predicating upon the classical form 
emerge as variants of ‘epic’ in the form of romance literature along with religious 
allegory, and Petrarchan sonnet. The Renaissance critic Sidney went to the extent 
of comparing poetry with two non-poetic genres: philosophy and history. 
Aristotle had argued that poetry is more philosophical than history, but Sidney 
crowned poetry and put it above philosophy. Sidney divided poetry into ‘three 
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general kinds’: i) hymns or religious odes, ii) philosophical poetry (natural, 
astronomical, historical), and iii) creative poetry. The creative poetry is further 
classified into the heroic, lyric, tragic, comic, satiric, iambic, elegiac, pastoral and 
certain others. Interesting to note is that Sidney orders his categories in the 
chosen hierarchy. Moreover, Sidney favoured mixing of genres in the manner 
such as tragedy and comedy, prose and verse, heroic and pastoral. Sidney’s 
originality lay not in following the ancient models but having imagination, 
creation, and invention as the base of his criteria. 
The succeeding centuries witnessed a more rigid approach to literary 
classification. Neoclassicists took genres as pure, classically defined, beyond 
writerly/readerly intervention and hence inviolable. Dr. Johnson’s defence of 
Shakespeare seems more like an exception in this case. Further, if one looks at the 
take on literary genres adopted by English critics, one notices that there is an 
attempt to establish a hierarchy of genres. In the hierarchy, epic or heroic poetry 
holds pride of place; tragedy thereafter followed by comedy, then satire, and 
pastoral the endmost. Ironically, Neoclassical age excels at satirical and mock-
epical works rather than epical and tragic. 
Northrop Frye in his celebrated Anatomy of Criticism (1957) sets himself the 
task of revising Aristotelian model in non-moral terms. In place of moralistic, 
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and author-oriented critical approaches, he advocates a ‘rhetorical or structural 
analysis of a work of art’, an approach that is ‘centripetal’ in thrust rather than 
‘centrifugal’. Frye divides literature into five ‘modes’: 1) Myth: the hero is better 
than other men and the environment in type. 2) Romance: the hero is better than 
other men and the environment in degree. 3) High Mimetic: the hero is better 
than other men in terms of type but not than his natural environment. 4) Low 
Mimetic: the hero is better than neither men nor his environment; he is as we are. 
5) Ironic: the hero is inferior and less intelligent than our selves. The above 
scheme is indeed speculative and enables Frye to develop a more refined scheme 
of dramatic/literary forms.  
In order to comprehend Frye’s generic scheme, one needs to reckon with 
Aristotle’s influence on him. Aristotle argues that to understand any natural or 
humanly-made phenomenon, it is necessary to ascertain the four conditions 
(causes) necessary to its existence: Material cause (the material it is made of or 
the social environment in which it is produced), Efficient cause (the divine or 
human agent responsible for its existence), Formal cause (what it is meant to be, 
what shape it is meant to have), Final cause (to what end it exists, its ultimate 
purpose). The material cause of work of art, for Frye, consists in social conditions 
and cultural demands which produced it. The quest to understand the material 
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cause of literary works leads the critic outside of his own discipline and into the 
province of biography, socio-political history and literary history. However, Frye 
is averse to any biographical or historical criticism as they tend to be 
‘centrifugal’, for it leads the critic away from a literary work. In its stead, Frye 
looks for a kind of literary psychology connecting the poet with the poem and 
private mythology, the poet’s own peculiar formation of symbols, of much of 
which he is unconscious. Frye’s point is that the literary work does not derive its 
significance solely from the personal life of the poet. The repository is what he 
terms an ‚archetypal symbol‛ (506), the significance of which resonates in the 
work of more than one poet. In short, no literary work is explicable with 
reference solely to the author’s personal life. Frye’s view is, in fact, that the 
‚unity of the work of art...has not been produced solely by the unconditioned 
will of the artist‛ (505). This is because the artist is only the human medium 
through which the finished artistic product assumes a particular shape or ‚form‛ 
(505). Frye’s real interest, like Aristotle, is in the ‚formal cause‛ (505) of the 
individual literary work, that is, the particular literary forms available to and 
unthinkingly utilised by a writer intent upon representing a particular subject-
matter. For Frye the question of determining the formal cause of the poem is, 
hence, a ‚problem deeply involved with the question of genres‛ (505) or ‘kinds’ 
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of literature. Frye dismisses in this respect two ‚fallacious‛ (505) conceptions of 
genre: a) the ‚Pseudo-Platonic‛ (506) (the view that genres exist ‚prior to and 
independently of creation‛ *506+), and b) the ‚pseudo-biological‛ (506) (which 
conceives genres as so many ‚evolving species‛ *506+). A Platonic view of genre 
necessarily involves a deductive approach to the study of genre whereby one 
postulates the traits peculiar to a particular form and then searches for actual 
examples which prove its existence. Frye adopts, by contrast, an inductive 
approach (one undoubtedly inspired by Aristotle): he examines a whole range of 
literature in order to ascertain those features of particular works by which they 
may be sorted into various categories. To comprehend a particular genre 
involves ascertaining its four causes, the most important of which is, for the 
reasons outlined above, the formal cause. To understand the formal cause of a 
particular genre, Frye advocates in place of historical and biographical 
approaches what he terms a ‚literary anthropology‛ (506). This kind of criticism 
is one ‚concerned with the way that literature is informed by pre-literary 
categories such as ritual, myth and folktale‛ (507). The ‚relation between these 
categories and literature‛ (507), he argues, ‚is by no means purely one of 
descent‛ (507). That is, we should not think solely in temporal terms that more 
sophisticated forms of literature are the complicated derivations or descendants 
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of more primitive and simple pre-literary forms (myth, folktale, etc.). Rather, 
literature is best understood as ‚not only complicating itself in time, but as 
spread out in conceptual space from some unseen centre‛ (507). Accordingly, 
Frye asserts that the study of literature must proceed on the basis of the 
‚assumption of total coherence‛ (504), that is, the acceptance of the existence of a 
‚coordinating principle, a central hypothesis which . . . will see the phenomena 
as parts of a whole‛ (504). He is of the view, rather, that all pre-literary and 
literary works form a cohesive and systemic whole in relation to which the 
individual work must be studied precisely because of what it shares with other 
works. In a nutshell, Frye’s argument is that there are certain recurrent narrative 
patterns (what Frye calls mythoi) which both pre-literary and literary forms share. 
The fundamental meaning of all fictions for Frye consists in what are sometimes 
called ‘pre-generic plot-structures’ as a result of which we understand why a 
particular story has ‘turned out’ as it has when we have identified the archetypal 
myth, or pre-generic plot structure, of which the story is an exemplification. The 
goal of literary criticism is, for Frye to discern the archetypal form which the 
author merely ‚recreated‛ (508) in his individual work. The best way of 
detecting the archetypal form of a particular literary work is to proceed, 
according to Frye, inductively. He proposes that one start with the ‚intricate 
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verbal texture‛ (507) and patterns of imagery to be found in the text to hand, 
before moving on from there to the ‚network of psychological relationships‛ 
(507) between characters and the sequence of actions in which they are involved 
(the plot). This is where an Aristotelian approach to analysing plot-structure is 
extremely useful. Further, he argues that one must see narrative as the ‘linear 
movement’ or artificially ordered sequence of actions performed by characters. 
Similarly, an image is not merely the verbal replica of an external object, but any 
unit of a verbal structure seen as part of a total pattern or rhythm. In other 
words, one should not seek to understand a literary work as if it were a reflection 
of real life.) For Frye, the narrative and imagery patterns detectable in this way in 
literary works can be traced first to myths and thence to those human rituals, in 
the form of harvest songs, sacrifices and folk customs, etc., handed down from 
time immemorial. These rituals are themselves responses to or attempts to render 
intelligible natural cycles such as the solar cycle of the day, the seasonal cycle of 
the year and the organic cycle of human life. That is, such rituals represent an 
effort on the part of humans to ‘humanise’ natural phenomena, in other words, 
to make some sense out of events in the physical world over which humans in 
fact have little control and which are in and of themselves perhaps inherently 
unintelligible. As such, rituals are ‚deliberate expression of a will to synchronize 
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human and natural energies‛ (509). These rituals are themselves at some point 
formalised into ‘myths’ which are, consequently, essentially narratives 
constructed around a central human protagonist the pattern of whose actions 
reflect or correspond to the natural cycles. Hence, we may tabulate the 
relationship between natural cycles, rituals, myth, and literary genre in the 
following manner: 
 
Daily  Seasonal  Human Cycle 
Dawn  Spring  Birth 
Zenith  Summer  Marriage or triumph 
Sunset  Autumn  Impending death 
Night  Winter  Dissolution 
 
Frye points out that all literary genres are initially ‚derived from‛ (511) and thus 
variations on the ‚quest-myth‛ (511). All myths are basically concerned, that is, 
with some kind of quest to accomplish some sort of goal. Each genre gestures 
towards a particular kind of human quest, that is, one involving the protagonist 
in a specific pattern of actions. In other words, the hero may triumph (comedy), 
fail or be killed (tragedy), be reborn (romance) and/or be the object of criticism 
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rather than adulation (satire). Each pattern of actions and thus each genre are 
traceable and thus correspond to a particular cycle, especially of the seasons: 
comedy—summer / midday; tragedy—autumn / dusk; satire—winter / night; 
and romance—spring / morning. Literary history, he contends, may be divided 
into particular stages in which any one of the genres/archetypal forms listed 
above predominate. Moreover, Frye goes so far as to argue that all art caters to a 
single impulse. The ‚final cause‛ (512) or ultimate purpose of literature is the 
‚resolution of the antithesis‛ (512) between day and night, light and darkness, 
summer and winter, life and death, etc. which informs all myth. All art functions 
to myth (based upon an archetypal pattern of human experience) the birth, 
revival, resurrection of the hero, the triumph, marriage or apotheosis of the hero, 
the fall, sacrifice, isolation or death of the hero, the unheroic nature of the hero 
effect the ‚mingling of the sun and the hero, the realizing of a world in which the 
inner desire and the outward circumstance coincide‛ (512). The ‚central myth of 
art must be the vision of an omnipotent personal community beyond an 
indifferent nature‛ (512), man triumphant over a nature subservient to his will, 
Frye contends. In summary, for Frye, literature is not mimetic. Literary writers 
reflect not reality but, rather, regurgitate in complex ways in their individual 
works those simple pre-literary mythical narratives that are central to the 
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cultural heritage of humanity. The human actions depicted therein are ultimately 
grounded in those personifications which humans have come to attach to natural 
events and phenomena in an effort to humanise an inherently intransigent and 
unintelligible natural world. It must be noted, however, that it is not for the most 
part a question of the writer consciously deciding to write a particular narrative 
corresponding to a specific genre. The choice of narrative form originates in the 
collective unconscious of mankind: when one wants to treat a particular aspect of 
human existence, particular forms suggest themselves automatically. For 
example, tragic human experiences necessitate the utilisation by the writer of the 
appropriate genre, in this case, tragedy. Frye seems to say that one’s range of 
choices in this regard as a writer is not delimited by the range of narrative forms 
at the disposal of a given culture: the process which Frye describes is one that is 
universal to all humankind. Although the specifics and the particularities may 
differ from culture to culture, any given story is ultimately reducible to its 
archetypal core which is, from Frye’s viewpoint, the true significance or meaning 
of the work in question. All humans everywhere, from his point of view, have 
had to contend with the same natural facts which they have attempted to render 
intelligible and to overcome in remarkably similar ways. In short, Frye’s 
argument is that the different forms taken by literary works pre-exist the 
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intentional or unintentional choices made by their writers. In other words, 
writers (for the most part unthinkingly) utilise certain pre- existent literary forms 
(or genres) that are universally appropriate to and thus indispensable in the 
treatment of the subject-matter (that is, the particular aspect of human 
experience) which they want to deal with. Frye proposes that the totality of 
literary works therefore constitutes a ‘self-contained literary universe’ which has 
been created over centuries by the workings of the human imagination. The 
ultimate goal (final cause) in so doing, Frye suggests, is to ‘humanise’ the alien 
and indifferent world of nature, to render it, in appearances at least, malleable to 
human will. That is, literature plays an essential role in refashioning the material 
universe into an alternative universe that is humanly intelligible and viable, one 
adapted to essential human needs and concerns.  
Since then literary forms and genology have undergone major changes. 
Modern critics have mostly discarded mimetic and moral posits of Classical and 
Neoclassical poetics.4 The postmodern condition accepts ‘carnival’ of forms, and 
the very ‘impurity’, ‘indeterminacy’, and ‘play’ of generic norms is cherished. 
The distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’; ‘classic’ and ‘popular’, ‘original’ and 
‘hybrid’ is viewed as too simplistic and reductionist practice offering untenable 
criteria for literary classification. 
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II 
Indian Literary Taxonomy 
Indian systems of knowledge in general and Sanskrit poetics in particular have 
always delved deep into systematization of domains of knowledge. For centuries 
poeticians have deliberated on literary classification from various viewpoints. 
AK Singh rightly observes, ‚the classification of literary forms in Sanskrit poetics 
is valid because it categorizes literary (verbal) discourse ontologically on the 
basis of the primary categories of subject-matter, its originality, organization, 
suggestion, form, style and liveliness (ramaniyata)‛.5 Here, the criteria involved 
for literary classification are galore. 
 The encyclopaedic Nātyaśāstra of Bharata is the primordial text in 
providing a rich classification of dramatic forms. The first basic distinction is 
made between mediums: drśya (representation) and śrāvya (aural). Since drśya 
involves presentability it is synonymous with drama. The drama in Indian 
poetics is the imitation of situations (avasthānūkrti nātyam) (and not of action, 
which presupposes centrality of human agent). Drama is called rūpaka 
(representation), as it assumes various rupas (personae). There are ten rūpakas: 
nātaka, prakarana, samvakāra, ihāmrga, dima, vyāyoga, anka, prahasana, bhāna, and 
 188 
vīthī. Besides these ten rūpakas, there are eighteen uprūpakas (minor plays). The 
latter differ in the sense that they rely chiefly on bodily gestures and music, 
which are secondary in rūpaka. The rūpakas require superior and more complex 
forms of acting. However, the classification extends only up to the drśya category. 
Bhāmaha’s Kāvyalamkāra posits different kinds of literary forms. It is the 
first extant text on theoretical study of poetry with the focus on figures of speech. 
The term kāvya is a vast rubric in Sanskrit poetics in which all creative verbal 
types and subtypes submerge. However, nātya and kāvya traditions have 
received separate critical attention. Bhāmaha uses three broad criteria for the 
classification: i) structure and language, ii) subject matter, and iii) nature of 
composition. The first criterion involves compositions in Sanskrit, Prākrta, and 
Apabhramśa. The second category includes four sub-categories: Khyat vratta–real 
narrative of gods; Kalpita vastu–fiction; Kalāsrita–relating to arts; and Śāstraśrita–
relating to science. The third criterion of form is further classified into five 
categories: sargabaddha (epic), ābhineya (performance based), ākhyāyīka (verse 
narrative in first person), kathā (narrative in third person), and muktaka (stray 
verses). 
Dandin develops his model on two criteria: form and language. The 
former involves three classes, viz. padya (poetry), gadya (prose) and campu 
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(mixed). The poetic composition can be connected (nibaddha) or unconnected 
(anibaddha). The prose form likewise involves the dyad of connected and 
unconnected compositions. Kathā is example of nibaddha type. Dandin does not 
entirely agree with Bhāmaha’s explanation for kathā and ākhyāyikā. To him, they 
more or less denote the identical type of narrative. In Ānandavardhana’s 
Dhvanyāloka kathā is further elaborated into parikathā, khandakathā, and sakalakathā. 
Dandin then includes nātaka in the category of campu. And, on the basis of 
language, he reckons with compositions in Sanskrit, Prākrta, Apabhramśa and 
Miśra. 
It would be timely to dwell more on the narrative form here. Bhāmaha, 
Dandin, Bhoja, and Viśvanātha have shown interest in the prose form. The 
commonly known Ākhyāna-jāti or ‘class of narrative’ has its members, viz. kathā, 
ākhyāyikā, and ākhyāna. The term kathā means fictional narrative in general, and 
‘story’ of particular scope and size. Kathā is an imaginary prose (or verse) tale 
rendered in third person. Ākhyāyikā is a prose tale based on history or tradition 
and its narrative is biographical or autobiographical. It is mostly in the first 
person narration. Hence, Dandin’s claim that kathā and ākhyāyikā are the same in 
terms of narrative, language or chapter division is often questioned by later 
poeticians. Hemcandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana accepts the difference between two 
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forms and states that concerning the narrative and representation of hero in both 
the forms, one learns that the hero in kathā is noble (abhijāta), faultless, and 
deeply peaceful (dhīra). The hero of ākhyāyikā speaks about himself at length. This 
type of hero is full of verve and panache but not as noble as that of kathā. Ākhyāna 
is the most ancient form of narrative meant to be publicly recited. It is the 
wellspring of kathā and ākhyāyikā. Hence, the distinction between these narrative 
forms is understood on the following criteria: 1) language of composition, 2) 
medium, 3) scope, 4) narrator, 5) type of protagonist, 6) subject-matter, 7) nature 
of subject-matter (fictional or historical), 8) characters (gods, legends, kings<),  
and 9) construction (parva, sarga, kānda, lambha or ucchvāsa). 
Vāmana’s criterion for classification of literary composition is medium: 
prose and poetry. Poetry could be either anibaddha or nibaddha. The prose form 
has three sub-types: vrttagandhi (with metrical passages), cūrna (with lucid and 
short compounds), and utkalikā (long compounds, metrical passages, complex in 
understanding). 
Rudrata in his Kāvyalamkāra restates the earlier classificatory model with 
little difference. Kāvya is divided, as it were, into laghukāvya and mahākāvya. On 
the basis of subject matter in narrative (kāvyakathā) he shows two kinds: utpādya 
(wholly fictional) and anutpādya (based on legend and history). Later, Pt. 
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Jagannātha adopts an essentialist view when he classifies kāvya into uttamottam, 
uttama, madhyama, and adhama. 
Rājaśekhara in the 10th c. AD presents a detailed account of literary and 
non-literary categories. His model of taxonomy concerns itself with knowledge 
systems per se than strict literary classification. The classification stems from 
vāngamaya (verbal discourse) which has two classes: śāstra and kāvya. Śāstra is 
further divided into apauruśeya (non-contingent texts—independent of author) 
and pauruśeya (authored). In the category of authored text, he enlists Purānas 
which include Itihāsa, Ānviksiki, Mīmāmsā, Dharmaśāstra, Kāvyavīdyā, and a group 
of kāmaśāstra (erotics), śilpaśāstra (architecture), arthaśāstra (economics), vārtā 
(agriculture, trade). Here, Purānas are in narrative mode while the rest in 
technical and formulaic manner. While considering a category of Itihāsa under 
authored texts, he devises two narrative kinds on the basis of protagonist: 
parākriyā—the progress of narrative is shown through one protagonist, e.g. the 
Rāmāyana, and purākalpa—the progress of narrative is shown through many 
heroes, e.g. the Mahābhārata.6 Over and above Rājaśekhara is not concerned much 
with the details pertaining to the narrative form. In the ninth chapter of 
Kāvyamīmāmsā, he thinks of five sub-types of unconnected poetic compositions. 
They are, 1) Śuddha (meaning derived from factual description devoid of any 
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story), 2) Citra (with illustrating description), 3) Kathotha (meaning elicited with 
the help of story), 4) Samvidhānakabhu (meaning given with the help of an 
imagined but possible event), 5) Ākhyānakavāna (meaning articulated with the 
help of legend). This model of classification is based on the discoursal devices 
which are employed by the writer to propound the meaning. 
Some of the generic models are illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 1       Generic Model in the Agnipurāna 
      
 
Kāvya  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Śravya Draśya 
Gadya Padya Gadyapadyobhaya 
Cūrnaka Utkalikāprāya Vrttagandhi 
Gadyakāvya 
Ākhyāyikā Kathā Khandakathā Parikathā Kathānikā 
Mahākāvya Kalāpa Paryāyabandha 
Viśesaka Muktaka Kulaka Kośa 
10 Rūpakas & 
27 Uparūpakas 
 
  
Karambhaka 
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Figure 2       Generic Model in Bhāmaha 
Kāvya  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Language 
Padya 
Subject matter Composition 
Gadya 
Medium 
Sanskrita Prākrta Apabhramśa 
Khyātavrtta Kalpitavastu Kalāśrita Śāstrāśrita 
Sargabaddha Abhineya Ākhyāyikā Kathā Muktaka 
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     Figure 3        Generic Model in Viśvanātha 
Kāvya  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Draśya     Śravya 
10 Rūpakas † 
18 Uprūpakas * 
Padya Kāvya Gadya Kāvya Gadya (long narratives) 
Sargabaddha/ 
Mahākāya ‡ 
Kāvya (a part of Sarga) 
Khandakāvya (a subpart 
of Kāvya in a Sarga) 
Muktaka Sandānitak
a 
    Kalāpaka   Kulaka 
Kośakāvya 
Muktaka Utkalikāprāya Vrttagandhi Cūrnaka 
Kathā 
Ākhyāyikā 
 Campu 
Virūda 
  Karambhaka 
Non-metrical gadyakāvya  
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Figure 4.1        Generic Models  in Hemcandrācārya  
 
Kāvya  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    Śravya    Preksya  
Geya kāvya Pāthya kāvya 
Dombikā 
Bhāna 
Prasthāna 
Śingabhānikā 
Prerana 
Rāmākrida 
Srigadita 
Hallisaka 
Gosthi 
Rāsaka 
Nātaka 
Prakarana  
Nātikā 
Samvakāra 
Īhāmrga 
Rāgakāvya 
 
Dima 
Vyāyoga 
Utsrstikān’ka 
Prahasana 
 
Bhāna 
Vīthī 
Sattaka 
Padya Gadya Miśrita 
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Figure 4.2  Generic Model in Hemcandrācārya  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sargabaddha
/Mahākāvya 
Sandāntika Muktaka 
Ākhyāyikā Kathā 
Campu 
Padya Gadya Miśrita 
Viśesaka 
Kalāpaka Kulaka Kośa Samghāta Samhitā 
Prahvikā 
Śravya Kāvya  
Matallikā Manikulya 
Parikathā Khandakathā Sakalakathā Upakathā Brhatkathā 
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*18 Uprūpakas : Nātikā, Trotaka, Gosthi, Sattaka, Nātyarāsaka, Samlāpaka, Śrigadita, Vilāsikā, Durmallikā, 
Prasthāna, Ullāpya, Kāvya, Prenkhana, Rāsaka, Prakaranī, Hallisha, Śilpaka, Bhānikā 
‡ Mahākāya : Textual division of a mahākāvya (epic) depends on the language of composition: in Sanskrit 
language it is called ‘Sarga’; in Prākrta language it is ‘Āśvāsa’; and in Apabhrmaśa language it is 
titled ‘Kudvaka’. 
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III 
 
2.  Criteria for Classification  
The postulates of literary classification in the west and in India show that 
there are a few parameters similar in kind, but their treatment and 
application differ. One can enlist the following major criteria for classification 
in the classical literary tradition of the west. 
 Medium 
 Object 
 Mode (form) 
 Decorum (style) 
 Imagination/creativity (essence) 
 Subject-matter (fictional/non-fictional) 
 Protagonist-based (nature of hero) 
The criteria adopted for literary genres in India are as follows: 
 Language 
 Form or composition 
 Subject-matter 
 Essence/substance 
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 Medium 
 Discoursal devices 
 Protagonist-based (nature; role; type; and number of protagonist) 
 Style/liveliness 
Here, the category of medium must be understood differently in both the 
literary traditions. Unlike the western classifying criterion of medium, which 
incorporates distinction of verbal compositions from non-verbal such as 
painting and music, Indian knowledge system does not harness them 
together under one parent criterion. Kāvya is canonically thought and 
analyzed in a distinct manner from kalā. Classical Indian canon of kalā has 
reckoned with the sixty-four arts and the number of which may be 
reconsidered to add new forms of arts of the present time such as film-
making that has again a distinct medium. To name a few from classical arts, 
there are gīta (music), vādya (instrumental music), nrtya (dance), nātya 
(histrionics), citra (painting) among others.7 
Another difference to be observed in the classical western and Indian 
genology is in the ramification of the criterion of mode. The basic dyadic 
classification in verbal discourse in the west is diegesis (telling) and mimesis 
(showing). The former at its best culminates into epic. Here, the prose form is 
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not much developed (or available for that matter) in the incomplete Poetics of 
Aristotle, nor the subsequent theoreticians come to chip in. In fact, the prose 
of Plato is also remarkable for its literariness. Plato’s philosophical dialogues 
do share a dramatic literary contract of (verbal) performance. The progress of 
idea in the narrative is peculiar due to Socratic Method of refutation. And for 
that matter elenchus, which is a philosophical discoursal device, becomes a 
narrative technique. However, Plato’s dialogues are not much studied from 
this perspective. In this case then the prose form has to wait until the 
romances of medieval age come to the fore in Judeo-Christian civilization and 
much later, it satisfactorily developed from the 18th century onwards. It is 
only in modern times that non-literary forms such as essays, memoirs, 
biographies, travelogues among others gain critical attention. On the other 
hand, the prose form in Indian classical genology is much discussed and 
theorized upon. The debate on kathā, ākhyāyika, and ākhyāna is a case in point. 
Moreover, prose existed in other forms such as carita or biography (e.g. 
Harśacarita), narrative (e.g. Hitopadeśa, Pañcatantra), philosophical treatise with 
narrative as its device (e.g. Yoga Vāsistha, Śatapatha Brāhmana) and the 
Pūrānas. This indicates how comprehensive flourish in thought and practice 
of diverse literary forms was achieved in the Indian counterpart. 
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In the western literary taxonomy the moral criteria has had a 
considerable influence on the philosophy of literary classification. The 
theoretical alternative model such as from Frye and contesting voices effacing 
the sacred generic boundaries made the enterprise of classification dynamic 
and flexible. It has to be noted that not just literary but historical and 
philosophical factors are equally responsible in overhauling the concept of 
genology in the west that put a corrective to the reason(s) for classification. 
More so, theory and practice of literature also brought out the issue of 
hierarchy in genology. One can add here that the thought of classification is 
not synthetic but analytic in character. The very act of partitive analysis 
makes grounds for comparative value judgement. As a result, hierarchy in 
genology becomes a by-product of the act. Whether explicit or implicit, but 
superiority of genre over another does exist in the corpus of literature at any 
given point of time and irrespective of literary traditions. 
When one looks at Indian classical system of literary classification, one 
finds that its model is richer and subtler. It is also largely formal in character, 
and one of its reasons lies in epistemological status of kāvya (literary 
discourse). Right from Bharata’s time the objectives of kāvya have been clear: 
the four ends of life, viz. dharma, artha, kāma and moksa.8 The later centuries 
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saw addition in the number of objectives in one or the other way. More so, 
Indian mind is not perplexed by non-rational approach to the cognizance of 
the tertiary forms of realities: vyavahārika (of manmade society), prātibhāsika 
(of forms and appearances), and pāramārthika (of spiritual). Symbolical, 
figurative and mythical thinking is not treated as antithetical to reason and 
reality.9 And the questions regarding truth value and ethical function of 
literature being largely taken care of by such an arational philosophical 
worldview, it would not be unlikely to see Indian theoreticians having their 
taxonomical models based more on formal criteria. Thus, the dilemma as 
regards the epistemological status of literature in society is not so acutely felt 
in Indian poetical tradition as it was in the western counterpart.10  Given the 
philosophical mooring and complex schematization, it remains the fact that in 
the Indian tradition of genology one scarcely comes across major departures 
from the established philosophy of classification, which bespeaks doubly of 
the profundity of the classical thinkers and submissive appraisal of the latter. 
Here, it should be reckoned that both the western and Indian literary 
traditions have nurtured critical/philosophical concern for classification and 
with the passage of time has grown into a large intellectual construct inhering 
in the rich possibilities of critical ruminations. 
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3.  Taxonomy of the Domains of Knowledge in 
Kvyamīmms  
 
Rājaśekhara a poet, playwright and poetician of the 10th century AD, availed 
himself of a rich tradition of Sanskrit grammar, kāvya and poetics that was 
already established by his time. His Kāvyamimāmsā differs from the rest of 
works in Sanskrit poetics in terms of its subject matter and objective. Its 
practical side lies in its concern for improving poetic craftsmanship; its 
contribution lies in making Sanskrit literature a discipline of knowledge; and 
its historical significance in dealing with issues that were normally left out in 
poetics proper. In this chef-d’oeuvre, Rājaśekhara offers a vast taxonomic 
classification of domains of knowledge which must be seen as a distinct 
inductive theorization from some generic models of classification offered by 
other poeticians. The poeticians such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, Viśvanātha, 
Ācārya Mammata among others specifically focus on the classification of 
literary forms (vide Generic Models). Rājaśekhara, however, differs from the 
rest in that he sets out to classify the seats of knowledge, of which literature is 
one of several other domains, as were studied and practiced in his time.  The 
historical significance of this taxonomy is that for the first time in the history 
of ideas literary discourse is construed as one serious domain of knowledge 
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among other technical ones. It will be, therefore, useful to glimpse his second 
adhyāya ‚Śāstranirdeśa‛ where he expounds his thesis. 
Rājaśekhara, first of all, offers two broad divisions of the verbal 
discourse—Kāvya, and Śāstra and emphasises the knowledge of Śāstra for 
better appreciation of Kāvya. 
Here, Śāstras are of two kinds according to their respective issue of 
origin: apauruśeya and pauruśeya. 
a) Apauruśeya: It means revealed, unauthored or divine. Such texts are 
a non-contingent text, not confined by time, space or individual, i.e. 
Vedas. It has been accepted in the Indian tradition that Vedic 
mantras are not a creation of common individuals with their I-
consciousness. It is knowledge ‘seen’ by the seers. 
b) Pauruśeya: It means human or authored. These are contingent texts 
predicating upon time, space and individual. They were authored 
but still many works are anonymous, for anonymity of authorship 
was seen as a virtue amongst its writers, as any attempt of 
establishing human ego was to be held at bay. 
The former, thus, is also known as Sruti and the later as Smrti. 
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I  Vedic Texts  
Further, Sruti i.e. Apauruśeya is further divisible into— 
a) Mantrik 
b) Brāhmana 11  
i.e., the functional incantations are mantras and its descriptions are 
Brahmanas. In other words, the Brahmanas is that part of Sruti texts (Vedas) 
wherein some connection between mantras and rites or ceremonies is 
established. 
 With the broader distinction of Sruti and Smrti, Rājaśekhara proceeds 
with the Vedas. 
a) Rgveda (Study of scriptures) 
b) Yajurveda (Study of various yajna practices) 
c) Sāmveda (devotional cult based on music) 
These three are known as Trayi (threefold). Here, rk, yajna and saman are the 
three categories of Vedic mantra—and, 
d) Atharvaveda (Source book of worldly knowledge)  
Now in these, the verses are called Rk. The song or choral portion is 
called Sāma. The one without rhyme or song is called Yajus. 
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Apart from these Major Four (Vedas), Rājaśekhara takes into account 
Upvedas. They are four in number— 
e) Itihāsaveda (Historical Narrative) (here, some say that it is 
Arthaśāstra or Sthapatyaśāstra) 
f) Dhanurveda (Science of Archery) 
g) Gandharva (Science of Fine arts) [supposed to be propounded by 
Narada Muni] Ref. ‚Śantiparva‛ of the Mahabharata. 
h) Ayurveda (Science of Life) 
Moreover, Rājaśekhara considers Ācārya Drauhini’s opinion that 
Geyaveda or Ganaveda is the soul of all Vedas as the fifth Veda. 
Then follows subordinate branches of knowledge emerged out of the 
Major Four. 
1. Śiksā (Science of proper articulation and pronunciation or      
phonetics) 
2. Kalpa (Rituals/ Religious ceremony) 
3. Vyākarana (Grammar) 
4. Chandas (Prosody) 
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5. Jyotisa (Astronomy) 
6. Nirukta (Etymology or explanation of difficult Vedic words) 
These six domains of knowledge put together are known as Vedānga 
[lit. Veda + anga ‘parts or limbs’+, i.e., Six Auxiliaries to the study of Vedas. 
They are designed to teach how to recite, understand, and apply Vedic texts. 
Now, Rājaśekhara himself proposes the seventh Vedānga, viz. 
Alamkāraśāstra.12 He says, ‚Comprehension of the Vedas remains incomplete 
without an auxiliary knowledge of rhetorical figures.‛ 
After this, Rājaśekhara elaborates on the above mentioned seven 
disciplines, of which the seventh one Alamkāraśāstra remains to be explored. 
II  Non-Vedic Texts 
In the second part of classification, Rājaśekhara mentions Paureśeya Śāstra or 
Smrti texts. The Smrti are the recollection of the meanings of Sruti. Here, the 
broader category has four heads— 
a) Purāna (Historical/Mythical texts) 
b) Ānviksiki (Philosophy) 
c) Mimāmsā (Epistemology) 
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d) Dharmaśāstra (Sociological e.g. Manusmrti, Parāsharsmrti) 
First, Purānas comprise tales and legends of the Vedas retold 
figuratively. Unfortunately, as and when it was uncritically reused by the 
laity, its metaphors were understood literally. The word ‘purāna’ suggests ‘of 
ancient times’. It is a genre in Vedic, Jaina, and Buddhist religious literature 
which primarily comprises cluster of narratives related by one person to 
another in often a complex frame narration. The Purānas in Vedic order are 
eighteen in number. The thematic sub-divisions in Puranas are as follows— 
1. Creation of the Universe 
2. Inclusive Creation or Cosmogony and geography 
3. Genealogy of kings, heroes, sages, demigods, etc. 
4. Philosophy of certain devotion cult 
5. Period of different Manus 
6. Historical description of mankind and destruction of the world. 
7. Itihāsa (Historical Narrative) is also a type of Purāna. Here, the 
progress of historical narrative is of two types: Parākriya, and 
Purākalpa. 
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Here, the first type of historical narrative has only one protagonist or 
central character while the later has two or more. Further, its historical 
description is indicated by the particles iti, aha/ ha–itihās. The respective 
examples are— 
5-a) The Rāmāyana, and 
5-b) The Mahābhārata. 13  
Here, one might question Rājaśekhara for considering the Ramayana 
under the category of itihāsa, as it occupies the highest place in Indian kāvya 
literature tradition. 
 Rajsekhara postpones the discussion of philosophy for a while. He 
describes the types of Mimāmsā.14 Vedic sentences and their logical exposition 
is the subject of Mimāmsā. 
i) Karma Mimamsa or Purva Mimamsa 
ii) Bramha/ Jñānmimāmsā or Vedāntaśāstra or Bramhsūtra or Vedantasūtra 
or Sarirakamimāmsā 
 
With this, ancient thinkers posit fourteen Vidyāsthāna or to figuratively say, 
‘seats of knowledge’— 
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 Major Four (Vedas) 
 Six Vedanga (Auxiliary) 
 Four Upvedas (Śāstras) 
In a figurative language Rājaśekhara maintains that knowledge 
acquired through these fourteen sources pertains to all things existent in the 
three worlds, viz. the earth, the sky, the heaven. 
To these group of fourteen can be added ‘Kāvya’, says Yāyāvariya, as 
the fifteenth branch of knowledge.  
What further can be added are: 
16) Vārtā (Common speech) 
17) Śilpaśāstra (Archeology) 
18) Arthaśāstra or Dandaniti 
In all these are now eighteen genres. Hence, Ānviksiki, Trayi, Vārtā 
and Dandniti are the four disciplines. However, Ushna, Brhaspati and 
Kautilya differ in their priorities when it comes to add to the fourteen existent 
seats of knowledge. Rājaśekhara, here, adheres to Kautilya’s view.15 
But, Rājaśekhara posits ‚Sahitya-Vidya‛ as the fifth discipline. The 
reason is: it is the soul of all other disciplines and its knowledge leads to 
‘Dharma’ and ‘Artha’ i.e. prosperity and success. 
 212 
Ānvīkśikī is of two types: Purvapaksa and Uttarpaksa. Purvapaksa, as it 
contests authority of the Vedas, comprises three schools of philosophy— 
i) Cārvaka 16  
ii) Buddhist 
iii) Jaina 
Uttarpaksa, too, comprises three schools of philosophy— 
 i)  Sāmkhya (Numeric) 
 ii)  Nyāya (Logic) 
 iii) Vaisesika (Atomic School)  
The term ānvīkśikī is also understood as ‘philosophy’. However, it should be 
made clear that ‘philosophy’ is understood differently in the west and in the 
east. Betty Heimann draws one’s attention to this point. In the west the Greek 
term philosophy is philo+sophia ‘love of wisdom—of human reason, measure, 
of judgement and discrimination.’ The Sanskrit term here is anu-īksikī ‘survey 
of all things’, more so, ‘along all existent facts’. ‚Thus contemplation of 
reality, not discrimination in a rational order, is the cardinal aim of Indian 
Philosophy, the Sanskrit name of which means no more than synopsis, 
comprehensive view and receptive contemplation.‛ (Heimann, 27) These Six 
Darsanas17 or ‚Demonstrations‛ or ‚Six Insights‛ are collectively known as 
 213 
Tarka. The term Tarka, however, is narrow in that it only indicates logical 
scrutiny, hence rejected by the most philosophical schools in the tradition. 
(Heimann, 27) 
Rājaśekhara says that the arguments (or kathā) on which tarka is based 
have three varieties18. 
a) Vāda (Exposition) 
b) Jalpa (Debate/ discussion/ dispute to win over opposite defence) 
c) Vitanda (Fallacious controversy used to fault the opposite defence) 
Besides this, in addition, ‘agriculture’, ‘animal-care’, and ‘trade’—all 
together form Vārtā śāstra or ‚Popular usage‛. Ānviksīkī, Trayi, Vārtā 
together can be understood only on the basis of Dandnīti. Thus, all these 
Śāstras are composed of sūtra, which helped to memorise them orally. These 
are pithy aphorism strung together. Thus, the above classifications present an 
overarching taxonomic division of various fields of knowledge in Indian 
context. 
These generic and disciplinary classifications form macro categories of 
thought in a given knowledge culture. This apart, there also exists a system of 
classification within a verbal or written discourse that forms micro categories 
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of thought, i.e., structural division of a discourse, which is discussed in 
following passages. 
4.  Structural Divisions in Narrative Ecologies of the Indian 
and Western Literary Traditions  
 
Structural division of a text is an issue that enjoys a wild growth on the 
unattended edges of the contiguous fields of narratology and genology. 
Narratology is called for because it has to do with structural aspects of a 
narrative. Genology is of a concern, for it is a domain of discussions about 
any sort of classification that happens to affect genre. Despite their history of 
robust practices, none of the two fields has felt the necessity to delve into the 
issue of structural division of a text which exists on the margin shared by 
narratology and genology. In the modern theoretical discussion, structural 
divisions of text find no clear conceptual ontology as their so called ‘terra 
episteme’19 (knowledge field) in poetical debates remains undefined. In a 
situation of such indefiniteness, resorting to the definitive theoretical posits of 
narratology and genology will serve no good. Although it is attempted here 
to underscore certain theoretical observations in the study of structural 
divisions, the study primarily rests on the inductive reasoning drawn from 
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the available data, and precious little on the formulas of narratology and the 
abstractions of genology20. 
Although neologism is a bane of narratology, it is safer to use it as 
conceptual categorization rather than theoretical absolutes. ‘Narrative 
ecology’ as a compound idea models itself on the principles of systemic 
function of environment—an integrated web-like structure where every 
single natural phenomenon is interlinked and interdependent. In this regard 
‘narrative ecology’ conceptualizes creating and designing the narrative 
environment wherein the stories unfold. A narrative environment can be 
either virtual or physical. The former is a narrative framework to be assessed 
from both narratological and thematic positions. The latter, physical narrative 
environment might be any location or space where stories can be told or 
performed. The narrative ecology, however, is sensitive to the factors such as 
elements of narrative, ordering or structuring the narrative and modes of 
dissemination. The Western and Indian literary traditions have their marked 
distinction as regards structuring their literary as well as scientific discourses. 
A logical extension of this point would imply that each genre in its literary 
tradition has its own customs and departures for internal textual divisions. 
The point comes home when one enlists titular categories such as ‘canto’, 
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‘book’, ‘section’, ‘chapter’, ‘act’, ‘scene’, etc. in the Western and ‘parva’, ‘sarga’, 
‘khanda’, ‘kānda’, ‘udyota,’ ‘ullāsa’, ‘pariccheda’, ‘adhyāya’, ‘anka’ among others in 
the Indian context.  Nomenclatures of such ilk also suggest their particular 
narrative function and they punctuate the ‘space syntax’ in the given 
discourse. However, this critical pursuit also needs to be located in generic 
specificities, for these textual divisions assume their narratological 
significance only in their context of genre. And the situation is doubly 
complicated by the fact that each literary tradition has its taxonomic versions 
with diverse criteria. This obfuscation notwithstanding, the study promises 
findings of teleological necessities and conventions behind this multitude of 
structural divisions and their consequent impacts on thematic and reception 
aspects.  
John Frow while considering the structural dimensions of genre refers 
to Ann Imbrie: ‚(genre is defined) by the way it expresses human experience 
(subject matter) through an identifiable form (formal character) that clarifies 
or discovers the values in or attitude toward that experience (generic 
attitude)‛.21 What is meant here is that genre acts as a regulating principle 
upon structuring and shaping of meaning at the level of text for specific 
teleological end—it produces effects of truth and authority that have bearing 
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upon the content. According to Frow, the structural dimensions configure a 
genre in primarily three ways: a) the formal organization, b) the rhetorical 
structure, and c) the thematic content.22  
The formal organization of a genre consists of ‘material’ and 
‘immaterial’ aspects whereof the former includes language, layout of printed 
pages, paragraphs, grammar and syntax, and the latter includes time and 
space. 
The rhetorical structure of a genre is concerned with the way the 
message establishes textual relations between the author/sender and the 
reader/receiver. Having established this relation, the rhetorical structure then 
involves a negotiation and an agreement or a disagreement about the status 
of validity of the message. 
The thematic content of a genre is thought of as that human experience 
which a genre invests with significance and interest. It is here that one deals 
with a set of topoi, recurrent topics of discourse or a recurrent iconography. 
In the above positions, especially with regard to the formal 
organization of a genre what is in ellipsis or missed out is the textual division 
of the thematic content affecting the rhetorical structures viz. ‘chapter’. 
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Chapterization is an internal ordering of a genre that is contingent on 
its specific (non)literary form and narrative framework. In its crude sense a 
chapter is understood as a practical division that signals break; a new set of 
arguments in a work. It is more conspicuous in written literature than it is in 
oral. Its usefulness is understood by the fact that such a textual division 
monitors progress in narrative; increases reproducibility of the message 
outside the context; facilitates objective mode of citation that more or less 
remains immune to any distortion of textual import in different time and 
place; and that it yields a definite shape to the work. If these are the 
teleological necessities common to all forms of narrative, it also must be 
reckoned that these necessities have varying degrees of fulfilment in the 
myriad forms of human verbal and nonverbal expressions. Literary traditions 
in the West and in India in accord with their narratological and generic 
requirements have variously prized these teleological necessities of narrative. 
And this accounts for varied practices of chapterization as to why we have a 
reservoir of styles and nomenclatures of internal structural divisions of the 
text. 
I 
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Textual divisions have a long history in the Western and Indian traditions of 
writing. In the early times efforts were made to systematise body of scriptural 
texts. In the Semitic world systematizing narrative schema and generic 
classification find their roots in theological works. The Holy Bible is the 
sacred book of Judaism and Christianity. However, the Bible of Judaism and 
the Bible of Christianity differ in some important ways. The Jewish Bible is 
the Hebrew Scriptures with 39 books originally written in Hebrew, except for 
a few sections in Aramaic. The Christian Bible has two parts: the Old 
Testament and the New Testament with 27 books. Christian theology 
ascribed the Old Testament to Judaism. The Christian version of the Old 
Testament structures the text in two slightly different forms by the two 
principal divisions. The version of the Old Testament used by Roman 
Catholics is the Bible of Judaism plus 7 other books and additions to books; 
some of the additional books were originally written in Greek, as was the 
New Testament. The version of the Old Testament used by Protestants is 
limited to the 39 books of the Jewish Bible. The other books and additions to 
books are called the Apocrypha (not canonical) by Protestants; they are 
usually referred to as deuterocanonical books by Roman Catholics. 
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The Jewish Bible called Tanach, the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
versions of the Bible differ in order as well as the number of books. The 
Canonical texts in these three religions vary from one another: 24 for Jews, 73 
for Roman Catholics, 66 for Protestants, and 78 for Orthodox Christians.  
The Tanach of Judaism is an acronym of three distinct parts: the Torah, 
or Law, also called the books of Moses; the Neviim, or Prophets, divided into 
the Earlier and Latter Prophets; and the Ketuvim, or Hagiographa, including 
Psalms, wisdom books, and other diverse literature. The Christian Old 
Testament organizes the books according to their type of literature: the 
Pentateuch (Five books: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and 
Deuteronomy), corresponding to the Torah; historical books; poetical or 
wisdom books; and prophetical books. The Protestant and Roman Catholic 
versions of the Old Testament place the books in the same sequence, but the 
Protestant version includes only those books found in the Bible of Judaism. 
The New Testament includes the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, 
a history of early Christianity; Epistles of Paul and other writers; and an 
apocalypse, or book of Revelation.  
The Bible of Judaism is not just confined to Pentateuch as set by the 
Christian theologicians. The Pentateuch in its limited sense is understood as 
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the Torah. However, the Torah in Jewish tradition also implies the whole 
corpus of Jewish scriptures. Jews are critical of Christian chapter divisions of 
the Bible. In fact, the chapter divisions and verse numbers have no 
significance in the Jewish tradition. Nonetheless, in modern editions of the 
Tanach chapters are made for the convenience. The adoption of the Christian 
chapter divisions by Jews began in the late Middle Ages in Spain, partly as a 
result of a debate over systematizing biblical citations. The above positions 
may be graphically represented as in Figure A. 
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In the Jewish textual traditions, the chapter divisions are not only a foreign 
feature with no basis in Mesorah23, but are also open to severe criticism of 
three kinds: 
 
  The chapter divisions often reflect Christian exegesis of the Bible. 
  Even when Christian exegesis is not implied, the chapters often 
divided the biblical text at many points that may be deemed 
inappropriate for literary or other reasons. 
Figure A 
          The Bible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jewish Tanach Christian Bible 
(Catholic) 
Torah Neviim Ketuvim Old Testament New Testament 
Pentateuch 
4 Gospels 
22 
Epistles 
5 Books 8 Books 11 Books 
Wisdom/Poetry Prophecy 
16 Books 7 Books 18 Books 
History 
5 Books 
1 Acts of  
Apostles 
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  Christian chapter divisions ignored the accepted closed and open 
space divisions which are based on Mesorah. 
This notwithstanding, as the chapterization provided useful citations, they 
are often included in most Hebrew editions of the biblical books. In Christian 
theology referencing and citation have been of narrative concern which is 
evident in different modes of excerpts such as catena, lection, periscope, 
analects, canticle, and scholium among others.24 Jews on the other hand do 
not necessarily reference the specific verse in a chapter. However, in many 
recent editions of the Tanach it has been largely noticed that the main text is 
unbroken and uninterrupted at the beginning of chapters, which are noted 
only in the margin. The absence of chapter breaks within a text in these 
editions also serve to reinforce the visual impact created by the spaces and 
‘paragraph’ breaks on the page, which indicate the traditional Jewish 
Parashah25 divisions. The division of the text in parashot (plural of parashah) 
for the biblical books is independent of chapter and verse numbers, which are 
not part of Mesoratic tradition. Parashot are not numbered, but some have 
special titles. 
The above concerns of textual divisions and stichometry underscore the 
textual traditions at variance in Judaism and Christianity which are markedly 
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punctuated by their subtle differences in history of origin of faith and their 
interpretations of the human communion with the Divine.  
In the Semitic tradition the other major scriptural text is Qur’an. Qur’an 
is not a poetic composition and so it has no verse. Here, √qaraa, root of the 
word Qur’an, analogous to the Rabbinic mikra, suggests to ‘address’, ‘recite’; 
and with regard to its etymology to ‘call’, ‘cry aloud’, and ‘proclaim’. It 
consists of 114 Suras of unequal length. Sura means literally ‘row’ or ‘fence’. 
JM Rodwell in his translation of the Koran mentions: ‚The word Sura occurs 
nine times in the Koran viz. Sur ix. 65, 87, 125, 128; xxiv. I; xlvii. 22 (twice); ii. 
21; x. 39; but it is not easy to determine whether it means a whole chapter, or 
part of a chapter, or is used in the sense of ‘revelation’.‛ (Rodwell 19) All 
Suras (with the exception of Sura 9) begin with the recitation formula 
bismillahir rahmanir rahim (In the Name of God, the compassionate, the 
merciful), which is of Jewish origin.26 In technical language, it is the passage-
wise division of the Qur'anic text, i.e. a chapter or part, set apart from the 
preceding and following text. Each Sura comprises Aya (pl. Ayat). All 114 
Suras in the Qur'an have names, which serve as a sort of heading. The names 
are often derived from an important or distinguishing word in the text itself 
or it is titled after one of the first few words with which the Sura begins. It is 
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believed that the order of the Ayat within each Sura and the arrangement of 
the Suras were finally confirmed by the Prophet under the guidance of Angel 
Gabriel in the year of his death, when Gabriel twice came to revise the text 
with him. 
The Qur’an is divided into thirty chapters called ‘Parahz’ (pl. Siparah). 
A Siparah is made of Suras that may begin from one Parah and end in the 
other one. Every Parah is given a name and so is every Sura. All 114 are 
broadly divided into two sections, viz., Meccan section comprising 87 Suras 
(revealed in Mecca) and Median Sura with 27 (revealed in Medina). 
The Suras have been grouped into four kinds by the scholars: 
  al-tiwal (long ones): 2-10. 
  al-mi'un: suras with approximately 100 ayat: 10-35. 
  al-mathani: suras with less than 100 ayat: 36-49. 
  al-mufassal: the last section of the Qur'an beginning with Sura qaf: 50-
114. 
Other Divisions of the Qur’an 
Juz' (pl. ajza') literally means part, portion. The Qur'an is divided into 30 
portions of approximately equal length for easy recitation during the thirty 
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nights of a month, especially of the month of Ramadan. Usually they are 
indicated by the word and the number of it given alongside, (e.g. juz' 30 
beginning with Sura 78).  
Some copies of the Qur'an have the suras divided into paragraphs called 
Ruku'. They are indicated by the symbol and the explanation of the Arabic 
numerals written with each is as follows, e.g. 2:20: the top figure (2) indicates 
that this is the second completed Ruku ' in the respective Sura (here Sura al-
baqara). 
Copies of the Qur'an printed in the Middle East in particular have each 
juz' subdivided into four ‘Hizb’ indicated by the sign e.g. 2:74 is the 
beginning of the second hizb of the Qur'an, indicated by the figure 2: 
Each hizb is again subdivided into quarters, indicated as follows: 
First quarter of the hizb: rub' al-hijb 
Half of the hizb: nisf al-hijb 
Third quarter of the hizb: thalathat arba' al-hijb 
The Qur'anic text is also divided into seven parts of approximately equal 
length, called ‘Manzil’, for recitation over seven days, indicated in some 
copies by the word manzil and the respective number in the margin. 
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Some of these Arabic terms have more than one meaning. They may be 
explained as follows: 
 Ayat: a paragraph in the Qur’an or the Bible; a verse sentence in 
the Qur’an; a circular graphological mark indicating the end of an 
ayat. 
 Surah: row, fence; gist, crux; explanation; an Arabic lexicon. A 
surah is formed a group of ayats. 
 Ruku’: in the reading of the Qur’an a collection of a few ayats is 
called ruku’. In performing the namaz, when a person stands up, 
bows ahead and puts his or her hand on knees it is called ruku’. A 
ruku’ is bowing ahead which is different from ‘sajda’ and ‘kayda’27. 
 Parah: (pl. Siparah) a section, part, division; a small particle; gift. A 
number of ayats and surahs form one parah. There are 30 parahz in 
the Qur’an. 
 Juz: (pl. ajza) instead; without; a portion, part; a bundle of 8 or 16 
pages. 
 Hizb: of a duva (prayer), a particular set of lines to be recited. 
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 Manzil: destination; a place for respite; while reading the Qur’an 
when seated, a juncture in the text where one is required to 
perform sajda, it is called manzil. 
These terms suggest specific divisions of the text of Qur’an as well as they 
indicate the corresponding ritualistic method of recital. 
The three Semitic religious texts also serve the purpose of chronicling 
and documenting the lives of their prophets and saints with a view to 
organizing scattered societies, establishing ethical codes and promulgating 
their faith further. At the thematic level of the narrative, these texts give the 
stories of origin of the world and man; miraculous incidents; hagiography; 
ethical lessons; and eschatology or the end of life/world. It may be argued 
that to an extent, these three major Semitic texts share a common narrative 
contract with Purānic texts in Indian religious corpus with similar concerns. 
(vide the discussion on Purānas in the taxonomy of Kāvyamīmāmsā p. 210) 
However, it must be added here that Indian darśanas and Semitic texts 
hugely differ in regard of their metaphysics. 
These copious modes of chapterization in scriptural texts of Semitic 
culture attest the scholarly attention given to the structural divisions as a 
result of a long history of contested exegeses. This textual ordering in these 
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texts has bearing upon the ritualistic functions these texts serve in their 
respective traditions. More than literary or narratological considerations, 
these scriptural divisions are prompted by purposes such as incantatory 
practices, need for objective referencing and scholarly citations. The reason 
behind systematizing scriptural texts in Semitic culture may well be found in 
their shared metaphysics. It is interesting to note that in the Semitic culture 
practice of reciting sacred words in all religious occasions is of utmost 
importance. In most of their rituals performed the sense of ‘Hearing’ is vital 
as against ‘Seeing’ in oriental religions.28 The Western Semitic civilizations 
have not been primarily oral. Curiously enough, their written codices and 
texts which are visual are compiled and classified on aural principles.  
In the Western literary traditions, however, the above varieties have not 
tellingly percolated down to textual divisions of literary forms. In the major 
literary forms such as epic, drama, and prose and poetry the textual divisions 
have been limited to Book, Prologue: Act: Scene: Epilogue, Chapter or 
Section, and Canto respectively. Besides nonliterary fields in the Western 
tradition, for instance philosophy, logic, grammar, science, etc., do not enjoy 
separate titular distinction as is evident in the Indian oral and written 
traditions. 
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II 
Ancient Indian oral and written traditions exhibit quite a rich spectacle for 
internal textual divisions. In the Vedic and Āgamic contexts, unlike in Semitic 
culture, no one scriptural text is given a premium status vying with the other. 
Besides, the scriptural texts exist in a sort of taxonomic unison with various 
commentaries, explanatory works, glossaries, philosophical treatises, eclectic 
digests, folk tales, myths, legends and narratives. Both śāstra and kāvya 
traditions exist parallelly and often mutually draw on generic attributes of 
each other which becomes evident in cases of śāstra- kāvya, e.g. Vivekacudāmani 
or Saundaryalaharī by Śamkarācārya and kāvya- śāstra, e.g. Gītagovinda by 
Jaideva. Tout court, the generic ramification is vast and varied and the authors 
turned the situation to their advantage by bringing in creative and fresh 
internal textual divisions corresponding to subject of and treatment given to 
the work.  
Classification of nonliterary texts in ancient India could be said to be 
motivated by pedagogical and research purposes. The different auxiliary texts 
that existed are sūtra texts, bhāsya text, vrtti texts, panjikā texts, and tīkā 
texts. So far as literary criticism is considered, cataloguing of diverse literary 
forms has been invariably found in almost all major poeticians. Nonetheless, 
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VK Chari makes it clear that ‚literary criticism in Sanskrit is not 
predominantly a genre-oriented criticism‛ (63) and that ‚<the theory of 
genres or formal categories did not play a crucial role in Sanskrit theory of 
literature, as it did in Western criticism.‛29 The implication here is that 
although ancient poeticians provided generic classification, their main 
interests lied in discussing literary properties such as figures of speech and 
thought, style qualities, obliquity of expression, suggestion, and the rasas. 
Secondly, the genre concept was not applied as a general criterion of 
evaluation, for no rigorous theorization on criteria of classification has its 
telling presence in poetical works which can offer a framework for evaluating 
a genre on the generic principles. However, it must be noted here that 
Rājaśekhara (10th c AD) in his Kāvyamīmāmsā exclusively devotes his second 
adhyāya, ‘Śāstranirdeśa’, to a taxonomic illustration of verbal discourse as 
available in his time. Apart from numerous generic models of kāvya literature 
found in Sanskrit literary criticism, Rājaśekhara’s model stands out in a part 
reply to VK Chari’s thesis that generic classification do not exist per se in 
ancient poetical tradition of India. Other generic models are given in the 
appendix at the end. 
VS Apte enlists kinds of chapters in the following verse:  
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Sargovargah paricchedodhātādhyāyā’ñka samgraham; 
Ucchavāsah parivartaśca patalah kāndamānanam | 
Sthānam prakaranam caiva parvollās’hānikāni; 
Skandhāñśau tu pūrānādau ca prāyaśah parikīrti tau ‖30 
The kinds of chapters in Indian literary context can be catalogued in 
three taxonomic classes as below: 
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Scripture/Technical Literary Poetics 
Adhikarana Anka Adhikāra 
Adhyāya Āśvāsa (in Prākrta) Adhyāya 
Anuvāka  Kānda Bindu 
Āhanika Khanda Kirana 
Brāhmana Kudavaka (in 
Apabhramśa) 
Marīci (a 
subclass in 
Ratna) 
Kānda (in 
Brāhmana) 
Lahari Mayukha 
Mandala Lambaka Pariccheda 
Nisyanda Mañjarī Prakarana 
Patal Pāda Prakāśa 
Prakarana Parihāsa Ratna 
Sandhi Skandhah Parva 
Sūkta Prakarana Taranga 
Upadeśa Samaya Ucchavāsa 
Valli Sarga (in Sanskrit) Udyota 
Varga Stabdha Ullāsa 
 Ucchavāsa Unmesa 
 Udghāta  Varga 
 Vilāsa Vilāsa 
 Vinyāsa Vimarśa 
 Yavanikā (name of 
Act in Sattaka) 
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These titular nomenclatures are not haphazardly adopted. They have direct 
or indirect structural and thematic moorings contingent on type of discourse. 
Moreover, the tradition of commentary is one of the strongholds of Indian 
knowledge culture whereby a text exists in its generic totality. That is, for the 
pedagogical and scholarly purposes the main text is used and often 
reproduced along with its auxiliary studies. For instance, Hemacandra’s 
poetical corpus includes Alamkāracudāmani, a Vrtti text, whose kārikā text is 
called Kāvyānuśāsana with the commentary on it called Viveka. 
It would be opportune here to look into the root meanings of the major 
terms: 
 Titles in Scripture/Technical texts:  
1. Adhikarana: [adhi+kr ‘control’, ‘hold’+ It is a complete argument 
treating of one subject. According to Mimāmsakas, a complete 
adhikarana comprises five investigative modalities: 
Visayo viśayascaiva pūrvapaksatathottaram | 
Nirnayasceti siddhāntah śāstra’dhikaranam smrtam ‖ 
In this regard, a complete adhikarana contains five limbs: visaya 
(subject matter), śamkā (doubt), pūrvapaksa (antecedent view), 
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uttarapaksa (response to pūrvapaksa in sync with śāstraic tenets), 
which forms siddhānta (established principle) and thereafter all 
this mentation leads to nirnaya (conclusion). Therefore, 
adhikarana implies that which is authentic. Adhikarana is also 
adopted in the texts of Sanskrit literary criticism such as in 
Kāvyamīmāmsā, which was originally composed of 18 adhikaranas 
of which only one ‚Kavi-rahasya‛ has come down to us. 
2. Adhyāya: a lesson; reading; a part or section of a work, a common 
title for chapter. 
3. Anuvāka: saying after, reciting; a chapter of the Vedas, a 
subdivision or section. 
4. Āhanika: performed or occurring in the day time, diurnal; a 
religious ceremony to be performed everyday at a fixed hour; to 
be completed in a day time; division or a chapter of a book. This 
title is mostly adopted in the Bhāsya texts. 
5. Brāhmana: the Brāhmana portion of the Veda (as distinct from its 
Mantra and Upanisada portion) and consisting of a class of 
works called Brāhmanas (they contain rules for the employment 
of the Mantras or hymns at various sacrifices, with detailed 
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explanations of their origin and meaning and numerous old 
legends). It contains vidhi: rules or directions for rites, and artha-
vāda: explanatory remarks. Each Veda has its own Brāhmana. 
6. Kānda: a part or division of a work; any distinct portion or 
division of an action or of a sacrificial rite (as that belonging to 
the gods or to the manes); a thematic division of the title in 
Brhdāranyaka Upanisada; 7 Kānda-s in the Rāmāyana. Kānda is 
usually titled after the theme of the events narrated such as war, 
peace, etc. 
7. Mandala: a large division or book of Rk-veda. The 10 Mandalas in 
Rk-veda are according to the authorial nomenclature of the 
hymns; these are divided into 85 Anuvākas or lessons, and these 
again into 1028 Sūktas or hymns (further mechanical divisions 
into Ashtakas, Adhyāyas, and Vargas) 
8. Nisyanda: to flow or trickle down; flow into; (in Buddhist 
literature) necessary consequence or result. Thematically, 
understanding of the thinker when matured and ripened flows 
freely into his words. 
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9. Patala: eyelid; a cover; a kind of text, especially in Tantra 
tradition; a division or section of a book. As a title of the chapter 
in Tantra tradition, it figuratively suggests a discourse that 
covers and preserves ‘secret knowledge’ which is to be passed on 
to its adhikārī or one who is spiritually eligible for that. 
10. Skandha: a column (of a building); in a narrative skandhas as 
section divisions shore up the load of certain portion of events 
and meanings with a definite size in scale. The Bhāgavat Purāna is 
composed of 12 skandhas. Skandha also means a separate branch 
or system of knowledge. (In philosophy) the five objects of sense, 
(with Buddhists) rūpa ‘form’, vedanā ‘sensation’, samjñā 
‘perception’, samskāra ‘aggregate of formations’, vijñāna 
‘consciousness or thought-faculty’, (with Jainas) the body in the 
widest sense of pinda. 
11. Sūkta: [su+ukta ‘well said’+ Vedic hymns 
12. Upadeśa: [updis ‘to show’+ Law; commandment; the first 
utterance; (in Vedānta) an exegetical reading of the gist of the 
Vedas for expounding the intended meaning; training, 
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indoctrination; stating the secret. This titular category is seen in 
the Gherandasamhitā in the Yoga tradition. 
13. Valli: a creeper; chapter division in Kathopanisada. 
 Titles in Literary texts: 
1. Āśvāsa: [āsvas ‘to breathe freely’+ Revival; breathing freely; a 
narrative conflict with certain solution that brings a sigh of relief 
to characters and readers. 
2. Khanda: to break, to divide; a tale or narrative divided into parts 
(khanda kathā); a minor poem whose subject is not heroic or 
sacred with one topic only (khanda kāvya). 
3. Kudavaka: it is a Prākrta term. In poetry, it is a division of 
metrical lines in equal number. A kudavaka mostly comprises the 
group of 5 ślokas. 
4. Lambaka: It is a name of the larger sections or books in the 
Kathāsaritasāgara (Ocean of the Streams of Stories). This text has 
18 Lambakas comprising 124 Tarangas or chapters. The word 
lambaka is derived from lambhaka comprising lambha ‘obtaining 
or attaining; meeting with, recovery’ from the root √labh ‘to gain 
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possession of; succeed in’. In a narrative the term stands for a 
section or cluster of events where the protagonist after a series 
of conflicts achieves the goal, recovers or reunites and thus 
fulfills expectancy born of narrative. The small chapters are 
called Taranga (Wave) which emerge and subside with the 
narrative flow. The title Kathāsaritasāgara itself is a beautiful 
metaphor in that incidents, anecdotes, traditional wisdom, 
fictional accounts like rivulets and streams endlessly generate 
tales. These varied tales like constant waves in the streams 
ultimately dissolve into the unfathomable ocean which is 
narrative. 
5. Laharī: a wave; ripple. 
6. Mañjarī: a bunch of flowers; a collection of verses in a work as in 
Bharatamañjaī and Brhatkathāmañjarī by Ksemendra. 
7. Parva:  [pr+vanip ‘stem’, ‘knot’+ a knot, joint, limb, member; a 
member of a compound; a cycle of changes in the moon—the 
junction of the 15th and 1st lunar fortnight; a nodal break or 
division in the work at a point where two seemingly different 
themes/events conjoin and come together.  
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Interestingly, the semantic logic of fluctuations and conjunctions 
of the moon also seems applicable to the meaning of parva as a 
book section. In a big literary composition when the size or 
length of a section varies in accord with the gravity and 
propriety of the content, the title parva is adopted. For instance, 
the first ‚Ādī-parva‛ in the Mahābhārata is the longest one and 
its last parva ‚Svargārohana‛ is the shortest one. Parvas are 
titled after the theme of the events narrated such as war, peace, 
etc. Some works have adopted this term in their title viz., 
Parvamālā, Parvaprakāśa, Parvaprabodha, Parvasamgraha, 
Parvasambhava, etc. 31 
8. Parihāsa: Merriment, jesting, ridicule. The term Parihāsa is chosen 
as chapter division in Narmamālā of Ksemendra, which is a 
humorous piece of composition with various jokes and light 
incidents. 
9. Pādah: a fourth part of adhyāya in any work such as in Brhmasūtra 
or Astādhyāyī. For instance, Brhmasūtra has 4 adhyāyas. Each 
adhyāya has 4 Pāda, which in turn has adhikarana in varying 
numbers consisting different number of sūtras. 
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10. Prakarana: [pr+kr>kar+lyut>an ‘forming of a definite shape’+ to 
depict, define or critique; subject, topic, event; treatment, 
discussion, explanation; a part or section of any work.  
A prakarana, as a principle of plot, is a narrative design in a 
specific shape and size whose main function is to support the 
main subject matter of the work. Further, a prakarana involves a 
number of subordinate, diverse and small incidents or subjects 
called ‘prakarī’ in its course. It also means one type of drama 
with contrived or fictitious story such as Mrchhakatika, 
Mālatimādhava, etc. 
11. Samaya: this terms suggesting ‘time’ is employed in 
Samayamātrka which is didactic in nature. The poet makes use of 
this particular term that sheds light on its subject-matter. 
12. Sarga: *√srj ‘to create’+ letting go; creation; nature; universe; a 
large section in poetic composition, especially epic. In view of 
Prof. Kapoor sarga is such a section division that does not 
impede the flow of the narrative.32 
13. Udghāta: beginning; sequence; indication; a part or chapter of a 
work, especially in Kathā. It is an independent section in a work 
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with the title varying in accord with the incident or subject 
matter.  
14. Vilāsa: sensual joy, rapture; a division in a poetic composition in 
the works of Pt. Jagannātha. 
15. Vinyāsa: putting or placing down; arrangement; order or connect 
words, composition (of literary works). This term is figuratively 
used as a section division in Suvrttatilaka, a work on metrics that 
deals with rhythmical cadence of various meters. 
 Titles in Poetics: 
1. Adhikāra: a prakarana or chapter of a work. Bhāvaprakāśa of 
Śāradātanaya (1240 AD) while adhering to the śaivait 
metaphysics of Kaśmira comprises 10 adhikāras. 
2. Bindu: a drop; a point. Mandāramaranda campu by Śrikrsnabhatta 
(1250-1350 AD) comprises 11 bindus. This is an eclectic work 
inclusive of nātya, alamkāra and kavi-śiksā traditions. 
3. Kirana: a ray of light. 
4. Marīci: a ray of light. 
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5. Mayūkha: a ray of light. Candraloka by Jayadeva (1300 AD) has 10 
Mayūkhas. 
6. Pariccheda: to cut on both sides; to limit on all sides, define or fix 
accurately, discriminate, decide, determine (as between false 
and true, right and true); a division of text in chapters which 
vary in their contents. A ‘pariccheda’ is usually not influenced by 
the subject matter of the work; it is albeit reckoned with the 
count or number of section such as pariccheda one, two, etc. 
7. Prakāśa: to become visible; make luminous or clear; in the 
poetical tradition such an exegesis that defines, clarifies and 
simplifies the subject. It is usually adopted as a postpositive 
attributive word in a title, viz., Kāvya prakāśa, Bhāva prakāśa, 
Tarka prakāśa, etc. Besides, as a title of a chapter it occurs in 
Śrñgāraprakāśa of Bhojarāja that has 36 prakāśas, and in 
Daśarūpaka of Dhananjaya (1000 AD). 
8. Ratna: jewel, precious stone. ‘Ratna’ is a type of Adhikarana. 
Alamkāraśekhara by Keśav Miśrā (1563 AD) comprises 8 Ratnas 
and each one is further divided into subchapters called ‘Marīci’ 
(lit. ‘a ray of light’). In Sāhityasāra by Accyutarai Modaka (1696 
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AD), the 12 Ratnas have metaphorical and mythical associations, 
viz., ‚Dhanvantarī Ratna‛, ‚Aerāvata Ratna‛, ‚Visa Ratna‛ (on 
literary defects), ‚Rambhā Ratna‛ (on types of women 
characters), etc. 
9. Sandhi: juncture; structural divisions of plot in Indian 
dramaturgy suggesting a junction of connecting events. 
Ksemendra uses this title in his Kavikanthbharana, a text on 
kaviśiks. There are five Sandhis or chapters in the work. The five 
Sandhis of this work are modelled after five sandhis of drama viz. 
mukha (opening), pratimukha (progression), garbha 
(development), avamarsa (pause), and nirvahan (conclusion) 
which successively help the protagonist realize the purpose. 
This logical development in mimetic presentation is 
extrapolated by Ksemendra in his diegetic discourse so as to 
unfold his thesis in successive Sandhis as: 1. acquisition of poetic 
capacity by a non-poet, 2. training for a poet, 3. attaining 
excellence, 4. merits and demerits, and 5. access of various 
branches of knowledge. 
10. Ucchavāsa: act or respiration; a part or chapter of a book. 
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11. Udyota: lustre, shine. There are 4 udyotas in Dhvanyāloka by 
Ānandavardhana. 
12. Ullāsa: [ud+bhas ‘to cheer up’+ a transport of joy; delight; a type 
of figure of thought; a division or section of a book. Kāvyaprkāśa 
of Ācārya Mammata (1050-1100 AD) is made of 10 ullāsas. 
13. Unmesa: [unmis ‘to open the eyes’, ‘to bloom’+ opening; 
expansion; flash; manifestation; emergence. Vakroktijivitam by 
Kuntaka comprises 4 unmesas. 
14. Varga: a separate division, class, set, multitude of similar things; 
a section, chapter, division of a book, a subdivision of an 
Adhyāya in the Rk-veda, which comprises 8 Ashtakas or 64 
Adhyāyas or 2006 Vargas. In Kāvyalamkārasāra, a text of poetics 
by Udbhatta (800 AD), there are 6 vargas. 
14. Vimarśa: a critical analysis or disputation; (in Trīka darśana) Self-
consciousness or awareness of Parama Śiva full of jñāna and kriyā 
which brings about world-process. Vyaktiviveka, a poetics text by 
Mahimabhatta (1050 AD) includes 3 vimarśas. 
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15. Viveka: an act of discretion of right from wrong. Nātyadarpana of 
Rāmcandra has 4 vivekas. 
The table enlisting the words above variously assorts forty-seven words, 
however, enumeration of which lays no claim to finality. Here, these titular 
nomenclatures are classified under the broad discoursal categories of śāstra, 
kāvya and alamkāra, which encompass in their fold all kinds of compositions. 
The titles under these three discoursal categories have something in common.  
In the śāstra texts the name of a chapter makes a statement about the 
authenticity of the subject matter by suggesting in its etymology the method 
of the discourse. Hence, titles chosen here are technical, terminological and 
specific to certain discourses viz. grammar, Vedas, āgamas, or other 
disciplines. 
In the kāvya texts, titular headings are adopted on the basis of kind of 
literary form in which they are employed, the structure and volume of the 
work, thematic integrity observed for the events or narration, and rhetorical 
effect the discourse wants to produce on its beholders. 
In the alamkāra texts or poetics, titles are often borrowed from the 
previously existing traditions of śāstra and kāvya literature. Here, the chapter 
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titles often figuratively build their relevance upon the main title of the work 
as in Dhvanyāloka. In fact, Sanskrit literary critics have been creative in finding 
out new and striking words as titles for their work of which the headings 
such as ‘Bindu’, ‘Kirana’, ‘Mayukha’, ‘Ratna’, ‘Marīci’, ‘Vilāsa’ among others 
are noticeable. 
III 
In the Western counterpart, the ancient Greek oral texts are often published 
with numerical section divisions only. In the Semitic culture, however, the 
obtaining theological concerns and contentions played a decisive role. It may 
well be inferred from the givens that the system of chapterization in the West 
is influenced more by the ritualistic, anagogic, geophysical (as in case of the 
Qur’an) and historiographical reasons compared to the formal or literary 
criteria.  
In the Indian knowledge culture where each conventional practice of life 
is rooted in its own logic, the situation is more complex. There exists a robust 
system of chapterization based on formal, structural, thematic, figurative, 
mythological and rhetorical criteria whereas the ritualistic and anagogic 
concerns remain secondary and occasional. In fact, parallel to the issue of 
kinds of chapters runs another equally symbolically suggestive issue of 
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number of chapters in a work. Numbers in Indian metaphysics have bearing 
upon metaphysics and ontology of cosmic symmetry.33 They symbolize or 
suggest associations with various deities and universal truths. In most cases 
the specific number of chapter, like its title, is not haphazardly selected. For 
instance, 36 chapters of Nātyaśāstra suggest 36 tattvas of Śaivism; or 8 
adhyāyas in Astādhyāyi symbolize Śivāstaka. The numeric significance of 
chapters requires a special study focusing on the unity of theme of a work 
with metaphysical givens of a particular darśana siddhānta. 
Amidst this vast variety of kinds of chapters, we notice that each kind of 
chapter has its distinct epistemological significance and teleological function. 
Curiously enough, ancient Indian grammarians, philosophers, scholars, and 
creative writers have been consistent and exact in their adoption of the 
specific kind of chapter for their work. And the reason for this curiosity is that 
nowhere in the tradition of poetics or any literary discourse do we come 
across a systematic discussion on it although its uniform practice is there for 
us to witness in innumerable works. 
What is discussed above amply suggests that the existing variety in 
kinds of chapters is not merely the result of idle musing of the composer. 
These terms enjoy their significance for reasons as follows: the generic 
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tradition; structure or design of the work; subject matter; manner of 
performance—aural or visual; and intended rhetorical effect on the receiver. 
These criteria in isolation, however, neither influence nor determine selection 
of the kind of chapters. They are, in fact, inalienably linked together. Each 
kind of chapter achieves its sui generis character only when factors such as 
genre, structure of a work, medium or form, content, and rhetorical 
dynamism of the narrative act in unison and thereby enhance functions of 
one another. This synergy of structure, content, principle of ordering, creative 
play, and figurative import of the titular terms is what characterizes narrative 
ecology in a given literary tradition. In fact, this critical observation on the 
ancient Indian art of composition endorses the fact that an advanced and 
sensitive culture of writing was cultivated by the past thinkers. And therefore 
such a minute care given to linguistic technicalities of structural divisions 
helped secure a strong unitary effect of the work as a whole i.e., prabandha-
rasavyanjakatva. In the present time, relevance of this issue will be surely 
noticeable when the practicing writers and other artists take a leaf out this 
book and learn how to build a verbal discourse which is strong in its 
compositional techniques and thematic effect. It is admitted that any work so 
conceived and composed becomes a signature of the concerned knowledge 
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culture, for the art of composition is the art of systematizing knowledge as 
well.  
The above thought should be pursued little further. Construction of 
knowledge in words is itself an act of making knowledge systematic and in 
the process constructing numbers of systems for that knowledge. In this 
synergy of matter and method every single meaningful word, sentence, 
grammatical relation as well as generic convention, discourse structure, idea 
or theme, creativity or deviation employed to make a striking thematic 
statement, etc. contribute to the reason and purpose of the work. In this 
complex mechanism of verbal discourse, one indeed significant role is played 
by ‘chapterization’ whose ‘terra episteme’ (knowledge field) modestly exists on 
the margins of both narratology and genology. This justification, apart from 
other concerns, partly explains as to why epistemic function and ontology of 
structural division of verbal discourse have hitherto remained undefined and 
non-canonized in poetics.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1  Milind Malshe, Aesthetics of Literary Classification, 2003. 
2 Originally in Latin littera ‘letter of the alphabet’, the term ‘literature’ indicates 
‘writing’. The oral part still remains on the fringes. Instead, vāngmaya is all 
encompassing. 
3 Whether tragedy or epic is superior has been long debated. Theoretically, epic 
enjoys distinction but tragedy has also been favoured. For instance, Neoclassicists 
demurred with Aristotle and considered epic to be the highest literary form. On the 
other hand, narratologist like Gerard Genette in his Narrative Discourse holds that 
tragedy held sway theoretically and historically for centuries until narrative took 
over in new forms in modern times. 
4 There are voices from within western intellectual tradition challenging the 
critical/philosophical enterprise of literary classification. To address this moot issue 
requires another space where one can duly consider contesting voices from Kant, 
Croce, Nietzsche and Derrida. 
5 See Avadhesh Kumar Singh, ‚Classification of Literary Compositions in Sanskrit 
Poetics‛, in Genology, p. 41. 
6  Rājaśekhara considers the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata as itihāsa, as they are too 
massive to fall into the category of mahākāvya. Modern historians like SN Dasgupta 
and SK De partly agree to it. In their view, the Rāmāyana for its sheer poetic quality 
must be called a mahākāvya. In fact, the Rāmāyana for its legendary account of Lord 
Rama also falls in the category of ākhyāna. (see Kapil Kapoor’s ‚Theory of the Novel: 
the Indian View‛ in Genology) 
7 For the list of all sixty-four arts, see the note in Ch. 10 of Kāvyamimāmsā, English 
translation by Sadhana Parashar, or the Purānic Encyclopaedia by Vettam Mani. 
8 Other objectives are: to give mental repose to those who are dstressed or afflicted 
with tiredness, to be conducive to righteous action (dharmyam), to lead to glory or 
fame (yaśasyam), to cause welfare or good (hitam), to cause one’s wisdom to grow 
(buddhivivardhanam), to instruct in the ways of the world (lokopadeśajananam), to 
impart proficiency in the fine arts among others. Notably, the Agnipurāna does not 
acknowledge moksa as the fourth objective of literature, although most others do 
acquiesce to it. 
9 In India almost all disciplines and art forms are attributed with the origin in non-
human divine agency, resulting in a constant blurring of the boundaries of real and 
imaginative. For a broad perspective and detailed account on the philosophical 
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worldview of India, see Betty Heimann’s Indian and Western Philosophy: a Study in 
Contrasts, 1937. 
10 Plato’s The Republic is the major example of questioning the truth value of literary 
discourse.   
 11 Brāhmana is the precept portion of the Vedas whose contents can be 
divided into two heads: a) Vidhi—ritualistic rules, and b) Arthavāda—
explanations.  The Brāhmanas include Aranyakas and Upanisadas. Mantra may 
be understood as ‘instrument of thought’. As a portion in the Vedas, it 
contains songs of praise to gods.                                                                                           
(Bernard 2003:191) 
12 Rajsekhara takes recourse to a mythical account of origination as regards 
Alamkāraśāstra. It was instructed by Śiva to Brahmā and from Him it was 
passed on to others and then it became divided into 18 sections, each of which 
was taught by a particular teacher. Later, study in alamkāra developed into a 
complex system of cognition considering qualitative and functional aspects of 
innumerable alamkāras. However, SK De and SN Dasgupta inform that, 
‚Chāndogya Upanisada gives a list of the old śāstras *VII.1.2.4+; but it does not 
refer to the alamkāra-śāstra.‛ 
(SK De & SN Dasgupta 1962:521) 
  
13 Historians like SN Dasgupta and SK De maintain that the Mahabharata is 
certainly not a Kāvya, for it is too large to fall into that purview, whereas the 
Ramayana is the ne plus ultra of poetic rendition. ‚*The Ramayana] is much 
more delightful and it reveals genuine poetry of the first order.‛ (A History of 
Sanskrit Literature: Classical Period, Vol. 1,  1962, p. li)  
This argument holds a view that the Ramayana does not fall in the 
category of Itihāsa (Historical Narrative), for which Rajsekhara exemplifies it. 
However, it appears that examples of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata are 
used chiefly to elucidate the categories of Parākriyā and Purākalpa. 
 
14 Purva mimāmsā interprets the actions enjoined in the Vedas, leading to 
freedom of the soul. Hence, Karma Mimāmsā. Uttar Mimāmsā interprets the 
knowledge revealed in the Vedas, leading to the freedom of the soul. Hence, 
Jñāna Mimāmsā. However, this distinction is better known as simply Mimāmsā 
and Vedanta. The purpose of Mimāmsā is to enquire into the nature of 
Dharama or Right-Action, for action is the very essence of human existence. 
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Without action, knowledge is fruitless and happiness is impossible because 
Right-Action or Dharma is the spiritual pre-requisite of life. Further, Mimāmsā 
in the process critiques the concept of Pradhāna and Prkrti as posited by 
Sāmkhya. 
(Bernard 121) 
15 Ushna, However, posits here Dandniti as the sole discipline, for the fear of 
punishment induces people to work. Brhaspati posits Dandniti (Law) and 
Vārtā (Common Speech) because livelihood and discipline are essential to 
society. The followers of Manu posit, Trayi, Varta and Dandniti. According to 
Kautilya, Trayi, Ānviksiki, Vārtā and Dandniti are the four important 
disciplines. Here, Rajsekhara subscribes to Kautilya’s suggestion.                                              
(KM I.2) 
 
16 Cārvāka was the founder of a materialistic school of philosophy. His 
doctrines were illustrated in the lost Barhaspatyasutra, as he was said to have 
been a pupil of Brhaspati. The adherents of this school of philosophy are 
called lokāyata, meaning one who is atheistic and materialistic. (See entries on 
Cārvāka and lokāyata in Apte’s Sanskrit English Dictionaries) 
 
17 These classified Six differ from the other classification of Darśanas, i.e. 
   Nyāya<<<<<<<<<<<<<Vaisesika  
        (propounded by                                (propounded by 
          Gotama )                                               Kanāda) 
          Sāmkhya<<<<<<<<<<<<Yoga 
        (propounded by                                 (propounded by 
           Kapila)                                                Patañjali) 
          Mimāmsā<<<<<<<<<<<.Vedānta 
        (propounded by                               (propounded by 
            Jaimini)                                              Bādarāyana) 
(Bernard 18) 
There is an addition of seventh school of Kaśmir Śaivism. It is a system of 
idealised monism based on the Śivasūtra propounded by Vasugupta (9th Century).  
18 Rājaśekhara here follows Nyāyasūtra. However, these three categories belong to 
the total set of 16 investigative modalities given in the opening verse of Nyāyasūtra, 
which propose to discover the truth or Supreme Felicity. They are namely, (1) 
pramāna (means of right knowledge) (2) prameya (object of right knowledge) (3) 
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samśaya (doubt) (4) prayojana (purpose) (5) drastānta (familiar example) (6) siddhānta 
(established tenets) (7) avayava (members of syllogism) (8) tarka (confutation) (9) 
nirnaya (ascertainment) (10) vāda (discussion) (11) jalpa (controversy) (12) vitandā 
(cavil) (13) hetvābhāsa (fallacy) (14) chala (equivocation) (15) jāti (futility) and (16) 
nigrahasthāna (disagreement in principle). 
                                                                                                         (Bernard 39) 
19 I prefer to use this coinage ‘terra episteme’ to signify a field of knowledge which is 
essentially multisystemic, interactive and which resists definition from any single 
point of view. 
20 Paul Cobley in his Narrative observes, ‚While formula is demonstrable, then, its 
reception is less easy to define. Genre, in contrast to formula, is concerned precisely 
with the issue of how audiences receive narrative conventions.‛ (213) 
21 John Frow, Genre, (London: Routledge, 2005) p. 73 
22 Ibid, 74. 
23 Mesorah is a collection of critical and explanatory notes on the Hebrew text of the 
Old Testament, compiled from around 7th to 10th c. AD and traditionally accepted as 
an authoritative exegetic guide, chiefly in matters of pronunciation and grammar. 
24 Catena is a chain or connected series especially of extracts from the writings of the 
fathers of the Christian Church. Lection is a version of a passage in a particular copy 
or edition of a text—a variant reading, and it also means a portion of sacred writing 
read in a divine service. Pericope is a selection or extract from a book. Analects are 
selected passages from the writings of an author or of different authors. Canticle is 
one of the nonmetrical hymns or chants from the Bible. And scholium is an 
explanatory note or comment. 
25 A Parashah (Hebrew ‘portion’) means a section of a biblical book in the Mesoratic 
text of the Tanach. In the Mesoratic text, parashah sections are designated by various 
types of spacing between them as formed in the Torah scrolls. The parashahs are of 
two kinds, open and closed, i.e. paragraphs, which begin a new line, and sub-
paragraphs, which are preceded only by a space. 
26 Vide The Koran, trans. JM Rodwell (New York: Dover Publications, 2005) P. 19 
27 Kaydas is to sit on haunches with knees bent. Sajda is to bow down in sitting 
posture of kayda and touch one’s forehead to the ground, whilst ruku’ as a ritual is 
bowing ahead with palms set on the knees while standing. 
28 Rodwell in this regard notes in his introduction to the Koran, ‚And of all the Suras 
it must be remarked that they were intended not for readers but for hearers—that they 
were all promulgated by public recital—and that much was left, as the imperfect 
sentences shew, to the manner and suggestive action of the recite.‛ (4) 
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29 VK Chari, ‚The Genre Theory in Sanskrit Poetics‛ in Literary India: Comparative 
Studies in Aesthetics, Colonialism and Culture, eds. Patrick Colm Hogan & Lalita 
Pandita, (New Delhi: Rawat Publications), p. 74 
30 VS Apte, Sanskrit Hindi Kosha, (Delhi: Motilal Benarsidass, rpt, 1989) 
31 Vide the entry on parva in William M. Monier’s Sanskrit English Dictionary. 
32 Kapil Kapoor, ‚Theory of the Novel: an Indian View‛ in Genology, pg. 54 
33 Indian mathematics greatly owes to Indian metaphysics. For instance, the word 
Śunya (Zero) in Sanskrit is derived from the root √śun meaning ‘to swell’, ‘increase’, 
‘void’, ‘empty’ which correlates to √brh ‘to grow’ as in Brahman. The term śunya is 
analogous to Brahman which is complete unto Itself. Nothing can be added to or 
distracted from it and yet it adds value to anything with which it is associated. It also 
reflects in the famous Upaniśadic dictum: ‘Purnamada purnamidam purnta purnam 
udacyate, Purnasya purnmdya purnamevvaśisyateAum Śnti Śnti Śnti.’ (Iśaupaniśada) 
(That is perfect, This is perfect. When perfection is taken from the perfect, Perfect alone 
remains. Aum, Peace, Peace, Peace). Thus the Indian gift of Zero to the world has its 
roots in Vedic wisdom. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
Literature as Knowledge & Knowledge of Literature  
  
 
Epistemic value of literature in relation to other domains viz. history, 
philosophy and science has been reckoned with since antiquity in both 
Western and Indian traditions. In the West, Aristotle made philosophy 
coextensive with reasoning, which he also called ‘dianoia’ (thought). In a 
sense, dianoia is allied to the Latin word cogitatum; intelligence or 
understanding, and more specifically the thought or meaning of a word or 
passage. To him, dianoia (all thought) is theoretical, practical, or poetical. By 
practical science he meant ethics and politics; by poetical science, he meant 
the study of poetry and other fine arts; and by theoretical science he meant 
physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. In a way, he differentiated various 
fields of knowledge for the first time in the Western history of philosophy. In 
Aristotelian scheme, there is a certain order given to these domains of 
knowledge. That is, Metaphysics, which is knowledge of immaterial being, he 
called ‘first philosophy’. Then logic or Analytic is regarded as a study 
preliminary to philosophy. Thus, the following order emerges: 1. Logic: the 
method of study employed in all other sciences, 2. Theoretical Sciences: that 
which is concerned with pure, abstract knowledge viz. Metaphysics (‘first 
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philosophy’), Physics, Mathematics, biology 3. Practical Sciences: concerned 
with knowledge as means to conduct or action such as in ethics and politics, 
and 4. Productive or Poetical Sciences: concerned with knowledge to be used 
in making useful or beautiful things. Aristotle regards rhetoric and the arts as 
belonging to the productive sciences. As a family, these differ from the 
practical sciences of ethics and politics, which concern human conduct, and 
from the theoretical sciences, which aim at truth for its own sake. Because 
they are concerned with the production of something useful or beautiful; the 
creation of human products, broadly speaking, include activities with 
obvious, artefactual products like ships and buildings, but also agriculture 
and medicine, and even, more nebulously, rhetoric, which aims at the 
production of persuasive speech (Rhet. 1355b26; cf. Top. 149b5), and tragedy, 
which aims at the production of edifying drama (Poet. 1448b16–17). This was 
first ever an attempt in the West to ensconce a verbal discourse as a seat of 
knowledge in the broader context of human activities, which later Frederick 
Schlegel squarely stated, ‚Literature is the comprehensive essence of the 
intellectual life of a nation‛ whose efficacy must be reckoned along with those 
of commerce, polity, and religion.1  
Terry Eagleton harped exactly on the above idea in his book How to Read 
a Poem and he elaborates on one of the productive sciences viz. rhetoric. In his 
view, what is known as criticism today was in principle known as rhetoric 
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throughout late antiquity and the Middle Ages, and the term in the ancient 
world had both a textual and political sense. A rhetorical study would 
invariably involve the stud of verbal tropes and figures as well as the art of 
persuasive public speech, for the two were closely interrelated. Eagleton 
further says, ‚The ancients recognized a special variety of discourse known as 
poetry; but there was no hard-and-fast distinction between this and other 
species of language. Rhetoric was the science of them all, and poetry like 
history, was just a sub-branch of it‛. (Eagleton, 2007: 10) It suggests here that 
the importance of productive sciences in the ancient knowledge cultures of 
Greece and Rome was equal to practical sciences and theoretical sciences too 
adopted such medium of expression as would produce impact. A cogent 
expression was closely allied to a coherent thought; an aesthetic lapse might 
lead to a political loss. The art of using the language beautifully was the 
discoursal necessity. All domains of knowledge used language, but rhetorical 
discourse, or call it by its modern appellation ‘literature’, used it beautifully. 
Eagleton unhesitatingly traces the early acceptance of poetical discourse as 
knowledge in the Western antiquity as he remarks:  
Rhetoric, then, was a kind of discourse theory, one inseparable from the 
political, legal, and religious institutions of the ancient state. It was born at the 
intersection of discourse and power. The Roman historian tells Tacitus tells us 
that Julius Caesar, along with the emperors Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula and 
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Claudius, were all accomplished orators. But the art of rhetoric was not 
simply a weapon of emperors. In its belief that all citizens must be taught to 
speak well, it was closely bound up with ancient Greek democracy. For the 
Greeks, a free man was one who was to be persuaded by speech rather than, 
like slaves or foreigners, to be coerced by violence. Language was thus the 
supreme capacity which differentiated free, equal citizens from their human 
or non-human subordinates. (Eagleton, 2007: 10-11) 
In the Indian context, one comes across a similar take on verbal 
discourse (vāngmaya) in the 10th c. AD poet, poetician and playwright 
Rājaśekhara, who in his Kāvyamīmāmsā places literary discourse as the 
fifteenth ‘seat of knowledge’ (vidyāsthāna) after four Vedas, six Vedāngas, 
and four Upvedas. In quite mythopoeic manner, he gives the origin of 
poetical discourse, its practice as existent in his time, and teleological 
significance in the sphere of other human activities in that under its 
limitless purview of subjects literary discourse can render knowledge of 
human behaviour, socio-cultural traditions and philosophical givens in a 
palatable and more accessible manner so that people of varying degree of 
intelligence and dispositions may grasp them. 
Knowledge of literature is simultaneously both emotional and 
intellectual complex presented with a deviant use of language, symbols and 
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images. The cognitive purpose, more often than not, remains secondary and 
serves the affective purpose. A literary statement is first processed for charm 
and thereafter for its meaning. The tripartite function of literature, as 
Longinus puts, is to delight, instruct and persuade, finally achieving the 
ēkstasis (transport). Experiencing a literary composition, like other art forms, 
evokes both psychological and neuro-physical responses. Abhinavagupta 
affords a philosophical foundation while explaining this complex of human 
response to an art-experience in the form of his exegesis on rasa. In his theory, 
watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive beholder (sahrdaya) 
involves a loss of the sense of present time and space. Worldly concerns of all 
sorts are for a time being suspended. As one cannot remain neutral (tatastha) 
to what is taking place, the involvement of the beholder, however, remains of 
a purer variety than one normally experiences. Further, there is no direct or 
personal involvement, hence the usual medley of desires and anxieties 
dissolve. The heart of the beholder responds sympathetically achieving 
semblance of feelings (hrdayasamvāda) devoid of selfishness. Finally the 
response becomes total, all-encompassing and one identifies with the 
situation depicted (tanmayibhāva). The limited individual consciousness is 
transcended for the duration of the aesthetic experience and the normal 
waking ‘I’ (aham) is withdrawn. As this happens, one suddenly realises his 
responses are very much unlike what one has hitherto experienced, for now 
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that all normal emotions are gone, one finds oneself in a unique state of 
mental and emotional calm. The intensity of this refined emotion takes one to 
a higher level of pleasure than one could know before. Aesthetic experience 
then exists as a sheer undifferentiated bliss (ānandaikaghana).2 In the history of 
arts as such the ex post facto experience has often been theorized in the form of 
aesthetic studies.  
It remains fruitfully interesting to see that many philosophers, art 
historians, and literary thinkers in both Western and Indian traditions have 
assumed various positions on defining the fine or beautiful, the stages of 
perception of the beautiful, and nature of aesthetic experience.  
Aesthetic Philosophies in the Western and Indian Conceptual 
Frameworks 
In the present time the term ‘aesthetics’ is often casually used by literary 
critics and thinkers in academics, especially when there is a spree of 
alternative aesthetics and alternative poetics. This particular branch of 
philosophy is more often than not studied with and linked to varying 
domains of study namely philosophy, ethics, art history, art criticism, poetics 
and literary criticism. Moreover, in an age of quick communication 
information is so readily available that it is indiscriminately put to use before 
it is properly understood and analyzed. It is no wonder that such 
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commoditization of information for its use value would lead to a maze of 
misinformation, anomaly in ideas and their uncritical adoption. 
The above line of caution is drawn for the sole reason that this study of 
nature, perception, and reception of the beautiful has been differently 
construed as and cultivated in the Western and Indian philosophical and 
poetical traditions. Each tradition of aesthetic predicates on different 
metaphysics and ethics and thereby has different questions, departures and 
definitions, albeit they at times intersect at certain crossroads of intellectual 
endeavours. It is a purpose here to trace and juxtapose the major concerns of 
aesthetic in both the traditions. It will be rewarding as well once the 
differences are made clear before they are paralleled and used 
interchangeably with each other. 
I 
Western Aesthetics  
Aesthetics as a philosophical concern has a long and well developed tradition 
in the West since Plato. The term aesthetic is derived from the Greek from 
aisthēta ‘perceptible things’ from aisthesthai ‘to perceive’. Immanuel Kant in his 
First Critique uses the term ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ in its Greek sense of 
‘sensation’. He uses ‘aesthetic’ to suggest the faculty of sensibility which is 
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considered independently of the faculty of understanding whereof every 
sensation must bear the imprint of temporal and spatial organizations. Here, 
it would be opportune to differentiate between two terms: aesthetic and 
aesthetics. The former is phenomenon and its consequence whilst the latter is 
a systematic study of the former.  In the context of art, aesthetics deals with 
the question of beauty and artistic taste. Aesthetics in a broader sense inheres 
in both the ontology and epistemology of the beautiful. 
Although philosophical investigations into aesthetic existed earlier, the 
term ‘aesthetics’ was introduced in 1750 by the German philosopher 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.  He entitled his Latin treatise as Aesthtica. He 
averred, ‚the aesthetic end is the perfection of sensuous cognition, as such; 
this is beauty‛.3 This definition at least establishes one proposition that the 
realm of aesthetic pertains to the philosophical concerns about cognition. 
Aesthetics is here conceived of as a qualified epistemology of all forms of art. 
It is only in Kant that one sees a severance between phenomenal cognition 
and aesthetic perception. However, the earliest efforts were made in the 
direction of defining the beautiful. At the core lied the question: what is the 
beautiful or the fine? Plato’s Hippias Major is the most engaging site where 
Socrates indefinitely ruminates on the issues of the good, the beneficial, and 
the beautiful. 
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The dialogue in Hippias Major takes place between Socrates and 
Hippias of Elis, who is the richest of sophists and teaches the Greek youths 
fine practices and virtues. Socrates asks Hippias under the pretext of an 
imaginary questioner whether or not he knows about the fine. Every time 
Socrates asks him about what the fine is, Hippias either misinterprets or 
evades the question. Instead of saying what the fine is, Hippias gives 
examples of fine things. In the process Hippias offers three statements in 
general terms without taking any personal stand while Socrates offers four 
statements. The dialogue proposes total seven provisional definitions of the 
fine and each time every definition seems collapsing. These propositions are 
subjected to the dyad of 'logical cause' and 'productive cause' for the 
evaluation of their validity. 
I.1 Logical cause and Productive cause 
Logical cause is that which imparts its essence (ousia) to other things. Hippias 
Major treats the fine as a logical cause which is had by, or occurs in, other 
things. Productive cause, on the other hand, occurs between things of similar 
kind. That is, father is the productive cause of his child. The difference is clear: 
as a logical cause, the fine makes things fine; as a productive cause father 
makes his offspring but does not make it father. The fine as a logical cause 
must be a definitive nature, which it imparts to everything in which it occurs. 
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Socrates, therefore, says, ‚Then all fine things are fine by the fine‛. (286d1) 
Contrariwise, Hippias sees no difference between the fine and a fine thing. He 
fails to see the question: what is that by which all things are fine? This ensues 
seven provisional definitions as follows: 
    1. A fine girl is a fine thing (287e2-289d5) 
    2. Gold makes things fine, when added to them (289d6-291d5) 
     3. To live a certain sort of life (including burying your parents)      
                         is fine for everyone (291d46-293c8)   
  4. The appropriate is fine (293c8-294e10) 
    5. The able and useful is fine (295a1-296d3) 
    6. The beneficial is fine (296d4-297d9) 
7. Pleasure through sight and hearing is fine (297d10-303d10) 
Hippias offers three levels of proposition: 
1. A fine girl—tends to the particular 
2. Gold—pertains to a mass substance, and 
3. A certain kind of life—is a universal 
The first fails because it is not fine in all comparisons, e.g. a girl is not fine 
when compared with goddesses. The second fails because it is not fine in 
every use, e.g. a fig wood spoon and ivory in an artifact are respectively fine 
as well sans gold. And the third fails because it is not fine in every instance, 
e.g. for Greek war heroes and sons of gods. These counter examples apart, 
Hippias 
Socrates 
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these posits do not state what is the fine. Hippias, however, never claims that 
his answers formulate the definition. But in their wider context, these 
propositions remain tenable. 
Socrates essays to find the ousia (essence) which is a logical cause.  
I.1.1 Appropriate 
The first proposition ‘appropriate’ has been used in two kinds of examples:  
a) Plain utensils that are useful for making soup (at 290d by Socrates) 
b) Clothes that make a man look better than he is (at 294a by Hippias) 
In the first case usefulness is an inconstant variable contingent on the object 
and its environment. One thing can be useful in one sense and may not be so 
in another. More so, there is also absence of the relation of inherence between 
usefulness and fine; the useful may or may not be the fine and vice versa. The 
second example fails, for it makes the fine deceitful. It is not the fine but it 
only makes a thing be seen to be fine. 
I.1.2 Able   
Socrates proposes that if the fine is useful and so able like a fine horse, rooster, 
etc. then it is this ability which should be the essence. This creates a binary: 
ability is fine and inability foul. Extension of this argument leads to a 
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problem: ‘could anyone so something he doesn’t know how to do, and isn’t at 
all able to do?’. (296b3) The answer is obviously ‘no’. Moreover, a person can 
do good as well evil; so there exists ability to do both. Here, ability is again a 
contingent variable and fails to satisfy the principle of definition that seeks the 
fine by itself. 
I.1.3 Beneficial  
The next proposition is ‘the useful-and-able for making some good<is the 
fine’ (296e1). Socrates maintains that the beneficial is the maker of good, and 
so the maker is the cause. The fine is, in this regard, a cause of the good. In 
another words, anything fine is a productive cause of something good. If it is 
so, then fine is not a logical cause and the fine as a productive cause does not 
ensure the consequent the same as the cause. As seen earlier for a productive 
cause, father and son are different. Hence, to be fine is not to be good. The 
fine is not a logical cause of things’ being good. Similarly, fine things are not 
made good by being fine. 
I.1.4 Aesthetic Pleasure 
The last definition proposed is: ‘the fine is what is pleasant through hearing 
and sight’. (298a7) For the first time now human experience of feeling is 
counted for evaluating the fine. The pleasure is reckoned with the faculties of 
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hearing and sight. Socrates, however, allows no hedonism. The general 
conception of sexual pleasure as being fine is posited but fails to sustain itself 
on moral grounds that ‘it is the foulest thing to be seen’. (2999a7) Besides, love 
making does not explain what is the fine. 
According to the hypothesis, the fine is that part of the pleasant that 
comes by sight and hearing. That which is not pleasant in this way would not 
be fine. Now the question is: ‘Is the pleasant in one case and thereby fine to be 
so in both the cases? Are they same in being pleasant? Or does one pleasant 
thing differ from another in being pleasant? (299d3) 
Here, Hippias holds that each and both of any pair must have exactly 
the same attributes. For instance, he says, ‘If both of us were just, wouldn’t 
each of us be too? (300e8) Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn’t both of us? 
Or if we were healthy, wouldn’t each be?’ (301a1) However, Socrates differs 
from this view. He shows Hippias that though some attributes are shared by 
both and each of a pair, others are not. Socrates offers counter examples: a) if 
one meets the other and become ‘two’—even numbered, then does that make 
‘one’—odd numbered, two? And b) if both men are strong together, are they 
so individually? Interestingly enough, in spite of difference in their examples, 
both Hippias and Socrates agree that the fine must be shared by both and 
each, and that both and each are made fine by the same logical cause. But 
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their belief is undone by their own examples. The logic: 'if both, then each' 
fails to define the fine. So both ultimately accept that, ‘sight and hearing make 
both fine, but not each’ (303d3). 
The whole disquisition about the fine remains undefined. Like 
Euthyphro, Hippias Major, remains clueless and indecisive. Paul Woodruff 
while commenting on Hippias Major remarks, ‚Plato solves the aesthetic 
problem neatly by bringing the argument back to its most attractive failure, 
thereby achieving a sort of resolution‛. (88) And Socrates accepts that all that 
he has learned is that it is difficult to define what is fine: ‘What is fine is 
hard—I think I know that’. (304e9) 
Hippias Major is an early dialogue of Plato antecedent to the round 
development of his theory of Idea or Forms. Later he associated the true 
source of episteme with the good. Art forms being a mimesis were at remove 
from Idea. Aristotle treated the issue of aesthetic in his Topics which was more 
or less on the line of Hippias Major.4 The definition of aesthetic still remains 
unresolved. Aristotle then shifts his attention from defining the fine to 
analyzing nature and function of artistic representation. He revisited the 
concept of mimesis and turned it into ‘recreation’. To him, one can imitate 
things ‘as they ought to be’ and maintained that ‘art partly completes what 
nature cannot bring to finish’ (Poetics 5.5 51b). Aristotle’s partitive analysis 
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introduced the distinction between form and matter. The artist distinguishes 
the form from the matter and applies that form on another matter. Imitation, 
so, is not just copying an original model; it becomes a particular 
representation of an aspect of things. 
Plato and Aristotle nonetheless agreed upon inevitability of ancient 
Greek principle of kalokagatheia (kalos + aghatheia), i.e., beautiful and goodness 
fused into one. Even though Hippias Major and Topics failed to establish any 
definition, the axiom tacitly held was: the beautiful is the good; the good is 
the beneficial. Both Plato and Aristotle held that aesthetic was inseparable 
from morality and politics. In his Politics, Aristotle considered music as he 
believed that art affects human character. 5  To him, ‘eidon’ (happiness) is the 
aim of life leading to ‘honourable life’ (Politics 180b) and so the major function 
of art is to present human satisfaction. 
I.2 Representational Aesthetics 
Aristotle, unlike Plato, is not much keen on defining the essence (ousia) of 
aesthetic experience. As an ontologist, he enquires how the matter is disposed 
and why it so. Aristotle is concerned with the experience of fine or beautiful in 
relation to the form of tragedy. His basic premise for aesthetic theory is stated 
in chapter 4 of the Poetics and in several places in the Rhetoric. Regarding the 
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nature of Aristotle’s Poetics, Russell and Winterbottom in their Classical 
Literary Criticism (1989) provide a useful insight in following words: 
The Poetics envisages a variety of different interests in literature, the 
politician’s, the poet’s, the critic’s; but the book is not written primarily for 
any of these, but rather for the philosopher. In other words, it is neither 
principally a defence of poetry, nor a treatise on how to write it, nor an 
enunciation of principles of literary criticism, thought it has elements of all 
these: it is first and foremost a work of aesthetic theory, and questions it poses 
are ‘What is poetry, and what is the nature of our pleasure in it?’ (220)  
In Aristotle’s view, human beings enjoy learning or knowing something new 
(Greek term for which is mathēsis) like any other instincts providing pleasure.6 
This mathēsis is a natural desire like hunger and its satisfaction is pleasurable, 
a ‘restoration to a natural state’, like eating (Rhetoric 1371 a 21 ff). The pleasure 
of the audience, reader or beholder is akin to this sort of pleasure, for the poet 
or the orator or the painter makes one see or understand things that one did 
not see before, and particularly the artist points out the relations and 
similarities between things and enable the experiencer say, ‘this is that’. This 
is the basic foundation of Aristotle’s theory of perception. 
Apart from affording a pleasure principle, mathēsis also does something 
in addition: it supplies a necessary justification for mimēsis. Aristotle does 
272 
 
subscribe to the view that mimēsis remains an essential requirement for art. 
This notwithstanding, mimēsis was pejoratively established in Plato’s 
dialogues due to his metaphysical posit of Idea and the hierarchy of 
cognitional validity on his Divided Line whereof artistic activity was an 
opinion born of images of shadows of Idea. But Aristotle transvalued the term 
skirted away Plato’s metaphysical contention by calling mimēsis not copy but 
‘representation’. Aristotle asserts a close relation between mimēsis and 
mathēsis, for the latter, at simplest level, is a necessary first step in learning 
through the former and at more sophisticated level it is where the tragic poet 
makes ‘general statements’ similar to those of the moral philosopher. On the 
other hand, mimēsis at the lowest level as Plato beheld, is mere copying that 
can be performed without any real knowledge of the act or object copied. But 
even here Aristotle implies that though one may not have knowledge before 
one engages in mimēsis one acquires it by active participation/identification in 
the process. And at more abstract level the tragic or epic poet in his 
presentation of individuals in specific situation, makes the beholder aware of 
moral facts and possibilities that may be relevant to more than the situation 
he or she witnesses in perceiving the art. 
The question of truth of mimēsis still persists, for a poem or play 
operating in the realm of fantasy charms and rouses wonder. Although 
Aristotle as such never objected to the fantastic in Homer, he held his 
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judgement with indifference to fantasy in favour of the more rigorous causal 
chain of tragedy which cannot afford to follow epic into the area of the 
marvelous and the irrational. Nonetheless, he recognized the importance of 
surprise. A play might have truthful presentation but its simple causal 
predictability will not give pleasure of sudden realization. Having 
understood this, Aristotle therefore insists on the complex plot with the 
elements of ‘reversal’ (peripeteiai) and ‘recognition’ (anagnorisis). For this 
reason he regards complex tragedy as the entelecheia or full realization of the 
essential nature of poetry. It is the form that makes one realize most truth and 
so a work of art provides the pleasure in fullest measure and concentration. 
Besides, tragedy involves a consciousness heightened by intense emotions of 
pity and fear and both operate in close alliance. Pity is other-oriented and fear 
is self-oriented. Aristotle’s posit that tragedy invokes pity and fear in 
audience suggests that he granted a remarkable degree of identification 
between the audience and the characters presented. This aesthetic principle is 
analogous to the concept of tanmayībhāva in Indian poetics. Aristotle does not 
dwell much on this issue regarding its process and end as is evident in the 
theories of Bhattanāyaka and Abhinavagupta in Indian poetics, but he surely 
implicitly admitted it. For this identification only allows the experience of 
these two emotions. And an offshoot of the stimulation of these intense 
emotions is their catharsis.7 Aristotle’s principle of catharsis is clinical in that it 
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restores the natural state again—being in proportion, which is a prerequisite for 
something to be beautiful; almost endorsing the classical Greek principle of 
kalokagatheia, infusing the beautiful and the good in one. By now Aristotle’s 
aesthetic theory answers two of Plato charges against poetry. Plato debased 
mimēsis in the Republic Book X on two counts that poetry does not present one 
with truth, and it fosters undesirable emotions in the person. Aristotle’s 
answer to the first charge can be found in the mathēsis, whilst to the second in 
his concept of catharsis whose restorative capacities ultimately leads one to 
eidon (happiness).  
I.3 Aesthetic and Ecstasy  
Plotinus (3rd c. BC), the founder of Neoplatonism, gave much importance to 
art in comparison of Plato. He considered the world of sense as good without 
disparaging its materiality. To him, the Soul created the material world, 
which is not the fallen world in Christian sense. In order to follow Plotinus’s 
view on the aesthetic and its experience, it would be congruent to probe 
briefly into his metaphysics. His metaphysics has the model of Holy Trinity or 
the three principal causes:  
 archai (the One) 
 nous (Intellect) and  
 psuchē (Soul) 
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Unlike the Christian Persons of Trinity, these three are not equal; the archai is 
the supreme, nous comes next, and psuchē last. The One is like the Christian 
God and is indefinable. The second, nous, is translated as Spirit, Intellectual-
Principle or Divine Mind. Nous is the image of the One. The One sees itself 
through its own light, i.e., nous. This proposes no substantial difference 
between them, as the seer and the seen are one. Those who are divinely 
possessed can at least conceive of nous but cannot intelligibly speak of it. This 
knowledge is made possible only through ecstasy. The Greek ékstasis means 
standing outside one’s body or rational self. And the third, Soul, inferior to 
nous, is the author of all living beings and inanimate objects. The Soul creates 
the world through Its divine memory and it is in this world of forms that one 
perceives things to be beautiful. Plotinus says: 
Consider, even, the case of pictures: those seeing by the bodily sense the 
productions of the art of painting do not see the one thing in the one only 
way; they are deeply stirred by recognizing in the objects depicted to the eyes 
the presentation of what lies in the idea, and so are called to recollection of 
the truth—the very experience out of which Love rises. Now, if the sight of 
Beauty excellently reproduced upon a face hurries the mind to that other 
Sphere, surely no one seeing the loveliness lavish in the world of sense—this 
vast orderliness, the form which the stars even in their remoteness display, no 
one could be so dull-witted, so immovable, as not to be carried by all this to 
276 
 
recollection, and gripped by reverent awe in the thought of all this, so great, 
sprung from that greatness. Not to answer thus could only be to have neither 
fathomed this world nor had any vision of that other.         (Enneads II. 9. 16) 
Plotinus puts premium on art as it reveals the form of an object more clearly 
than an ordinary experience does. One experiences the aesthetic in ‚reverent 
awe‛ while art raises the Soul to contemplation of universals. In this mystical 
moment of ecstasy the Soul is united, in the world of forms, with the One. 
Thus, aesthetic experience comes close to mystical experience, as one 
looses oneself while contemplating the aesthetic object. In this regard, Russell 
states, ‚There is in the mysticism of Plotinus nothing morose or hostile to 
beauty. But he is the last religious teacher, for many centuries, of whom this 
can be said. Beauty, and all the pleasures associated with it, came to be 
thought to be of the Devil; pagans, as well as Christians, came to glorify 
ugliness and dirt.‛ (Russell 1961, 296) Russell makes an important statement, 
for Plotinus on the one hand marks an end of antiquity of Greek philosophy 
and on the other hand a beginning of Judeo-Christian theology.  
I.4 Aesthetic Qualities and Stasis  
In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas is the major Scholastic thinker who 
appropriated and adapted Aristotle and Plotinus in his Catholic philosophy. 
The Scholastic philosophy holds that God is delight, joy and love. God is the 
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end of all things and all things tend to be like Him. Human happiness does 
not lie in carnal pleasures, honour, glory, power and pelf and creaturely 
comforts. Human senses are not the seat of happiness. Even acts of moral 
virtue are not an end but means and help develop contemplation of God. 
Aesthetic experience is constituted at sensory level but it has to be purged of 
its association with flesh. In this way aesthetic experience must be associated 
with the summum bonum or the highest good. He proposed three qualities of 
beauty viz. integritas, consonantia, and claritas which are discussed below. 
Recognition of beauty through these qualities, which are stages of perception 
as well, leads one to the idealism or supreme quality of beauty which is 
transcendental. His theory has an explicit formulation of beauty as ‘pulchrum 
transcendentalis’, i.e., beauty is conceptually translatable into the other 
"transcendentals" such as ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’.  
Aquinas’s theory of beauty is both used and reworked by James Joyce 
in his A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). In this novel Stephen 
Dedalus, the protagonist who is a budding literary artist, studies Aristotle and 
Aquinas and tries to construct his hypothetical theory of art and shares it with 
his friend Lynch. In fact, it becomes crucial at times to distinguish Joycean 
take on aesthetic from that of Aquinas. In fact, at one point Stephen calls his 
cerebration 'applied Aquinas'. The major posit in Joycean theory is that 
aesthetic experience brings about stasis. The concept of stasis is put forth with 
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its binary opposite: kinesis. The arts which excite the feelings of desire or 
loathing are improper arts; hence kinetic. Desire urges one to ‘possess, to go 
to something’; loathing urges one to ‘abandon, to go from something.’ Arts 
such as pornographic or didactic stimulate kinetic emotions, driven by urge 
or apathy, remain as nervous reflexes and therefore not aesthetic. ‚The 
aesthetic emotion<is therefore static. The mind is arrested and raised above 
desire and loathing.‛ (Joyce 222) Here, definition of art is attempted both in 
terms of its attributes (pathos) and essence (ousia). First, art is construed as an 
image of the beauty that one effortfully expresses from the gross, the raw; from 
sound (music), shape (sculpture), and colour (painting)—which are ‚prisons 
of our souls‛.  Second, art is ‚the human disposition of sensible or intelligible 
matter for an aesthetic end.‛ (224) In the first instance beauty is the major 
term. However, if aesthetic brings about stasis, then so does truth. Stephen 
critiques:  
Plato, I believe, said that beauty is the splendour of truth. I don’t think that it 
has a meaning but the true and the beautiful are akin. Truth is beheld by the 
intellect which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible; 
beauty is beheld by the imagination which is appeased by the most satisfying 
relations of the sensible. (225) 
Beauty and truth are thus teleologically one and thereby transcendental 
correlates. Having the kinship been established between beauty and truth, it 
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still remains to define what beauty is. Stephen quotes Aquinas: ‘Pulcra sunt 
quae visa placent’ or that is beautiful the apprehension of which please. (225) 
The term visa allows all forms of aesthetic apprehensions. This includes the 
pleasant through sight and hearing or through any other avenue of 
apprehension. This definition escapes Socratic dilemma felt in Hippias Major. 
It tactfully avoids the dialectic of Both and Each by including the tertiary level 
of ‚any other avenue of apprehension‛. Philosophically, beauty may be a 
transcendental correlate of truth or summum bonum in Thomism, but when it 
comes to plain definition the idea of beauty has to predicate itself on the 
phenomenal reality. Ontology of the definition has it that it is a phenomenal 
cognition and pertains to formal attributes of an aesthetic object. Still, 
Stephen’s theory answers the ancient most vexed question of defining beauty 
in a sort of reconciliatory mode. To wit, ousia (essence) is promised to be 
arrived at while discussion considers only pathos (attributes). Lynch, who is 
an insouciant audience, impatiently complains and inverts the solemnity of 
discourse: ‚But what is beauty? Out with another definition. Something we 
see and like! Is that the best you and Aquinas can do?‛ (226)  It is proposed 
that in order to know beauty it is important to know the act of aesthetic 
apprehension.  This brings one to Joyce's postulates of Aquinas’s three stages 
of aesthetic perception. These postulations can be tabulated as follows: 
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Stages of 
Perception 
Spatio-temporal reality 
principle 
Nature of 
cognition 
Integritas (wholeness) perceiving an object as one thing synthetic act 
Consonantia 
(Harmony) 
perceiving one thing as a thing analytic act 
Claritas (Radiance) or 
quidditas (whatness) 
or Joycean epiphany 
in Thomism, a supreme quality of 
beauty; a light from some other 
world; or experiencing the artistic 
beauty 
empirical act 
 
The spatio-temporal reality principle gives unity and meaning to an 
experience. As distinguished by Lessing in his Laocoön, Stephen accepts the 
cognitional framework of space and time whereby an aesthetic image is 
presented to its beholder in this framework. The audible image is manifest in 
time; the visible image in space. An aesthetic image is inseparable from 
spatio-temporal reality principle, but its first apprehension as identification of 
that aesthetic image remains ‚selfbounded‛ and ‚selfcontained‛ (230). That is, 
the apprehension happens in time but it is not of time. Thus one apprehends it 
as one thing; one whole. In the whole process apprehension is cumulative, 
inclusive and holistic; therefore the nature of cognition is synthetic. This is 
integritas. 
The second stage of perception is a close reading of the impression 
received in a synthetic manner. One apprehends the form of an aesthetic 
image, its constituents and its construct. One sees a part in its relation to the 
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other part and the aesthetic whole and feels ‚the rhythm of its structure.‛ 
(230) Now, the image is seen as ‚complex, multiple, divisible, separable, made 
up of its parts and their sum, harmonious‛. (230) In this analytical perception 
the aesthetic image which was one thing is now experienced as a thing. It is a 
differential cognition, as other images in space and time are suspended for a 
while and aesthetic image in view is analytically scrutinized as coherent and 
harmonious, hence consonantia. 
Claritas, in Thomism, has Platonic touch of idealism which suggests the 
supreme quality of beauty. Joyce, however, differs from Aquinas as he makes 
Stephen critique it and calls it ‚inexact‛. (230) More so, in Thomism claritas is 
also likened to quidditas, i.e. whatness of a thing. However, in strict 
philosophical sense, claritas comes close to haecceitas, i.e., thisness of a thing. 
Quiddity refers to the inherent nature or ousia. Haecceity is the quality of a 
thing which makes it seem unique or describable as ‘this (one)’. In relating 
beauty with a light from the other world and summum bonum, Aquinas at the 
best makes a referential proposition which does not qualify as quiddity. 
Joyce translates and transvalues claritas as radiance which is, ‚the 
artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force 
of generalization which would make the aesthetic image a universal one, make 
it outshine its proper conditions.‛ (italics mine) (231) Here, two propositions 
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are made. First, ‘artistic discovery’ and ‘representation’ suggest that claritas is 
posited from the viewpoint of the creator. The creator discovers and represents 
the aesthetic, not that he creates it. Art is not aesthetic; it manifests the 
aesthetic. And second, claritas is a ‘force of generalization’8. This proposition 
by its logical extension includes the beholder of the aesthetic. The artistic 
representation is an impersonal act wherein the artist simultaneously 
dissolves and suffuses his identity into the work and aesthetic emotion is so 
depersonalized and thereby generalized that a beholder rises to it and 
experiences it. The artistic experience, ‚like the enchantment of the heart‛, 
(231) in the artist and the beholder becomes one. Claritas differs from integritas 
and consonantia in that it is foremost emotive and experiential whilst the latter 
ones are intellectual and analytical. The concept of claritas as aesthetic 
experience is further reworked and demystified by Joyce in what he calls 
‘epiphany’. Epiphany again has a religious connotation of nativity of Christ 
and his divine revelation to the three Magi. However, Joycean epiphany as an 
independent aesthetic/ literary concept may be explained as follows: a) a wild 
transport of delight; b) a delicate moment that opens a new vista of perception 
of reality to a character and reader; c) lyrical moments of insight that 
encapsulates the essence of the tale; d) ‚it implies that truth was at best 
fleeting, impermanent, intensely personal moment that the artist could strive 
to capture.‛ (Quinn 208) Stephen’s theory of art then goes on with 
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classification of literary forms; however, few points just remain highlighted in 
the work, for instance, distinction between the beautiful and the sublime; 
moral beauty and material beauty; and kinds of beauty proper to each of the 
various arts9. (Joyce 205) 
After the phase of Scholasticism, the 15th c. witnessed a phenomenon of 
New Learning in Europe. Art became more secular. There was an overall shift 
from religious philosophy to science; from metaphysics to physics. In the 18th 
c., German Idealism gave impetus to Romanticism.  
Johann Joachim Wincklemann, a German critic and classical 
archaeologist, accepted the Greek viewpoint that the best art is impersonal 
which expresses ideal proportion in balance rather than its creator’s 
personality. His book History of Ancient Art (1764) gave his theories of 
aesthetic principles. This book exerted much influence on Lessing and Goethe. 
He revitalized Hellenic studies in the context of painting and sculpture. In his 
"Essay on Grace" he says, "There is but one way for the moderns to become 
great, and perhaps unequalled; I mean by imitating the Ancients."10 The 
aesthetic element he most admired in the ancient Greeks was their sheer love 
of physical beauty that was manifest in their all forms of sports, arts as well as 
mythological accounts and philosophy. Winckelmann minutely studied the 
Greek representation of the human form in idealized and beautiful manner. In 
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Greek arts, he marks nit and clear profile of faces of gods and goddesses; 
well-chiselled lavish and sinuous limbs; magnificently raised eye-bone; 
vaulted chin and dignified poise. He was, in his search for real aesthetic, 
obviously possessed by the finesse of the outward form. His quest for the real 
beauty led only to the exteriority, for the form of sculpture is most noticeable 
through its exteriority of medium. Sculpture has a form which is most 
discernible through the senses of sight and touch. Unlike Lessing, 
Winckelmann did not study the limits of mediums in different art forms. But 
he indeed offered a diligent study of the requisites of the artist's medium. He 
showed how a beautiful sculpture sought to express harmony of mind in 
harmony of body which was again a golden mean of ancient principle of 
kalokagatheia.    
I.5 Aesthetic as Disinterested Pleasure  
Immanuel Kant, the pioneer of Aufklärung (Enlightenment) Movement in 
philosophy, established his aesthetic theory in the first part of his Critique of 
Judgement (1790). He is both concerned with the aesthetics and the aesthetic 
along with the sublime. He chiefly looks into sensory-emotive perception of 
beauty or judgements of sentiment and taste.  Judgement in general is the 
determination of whether or not a particular experience is aesthetic. Such 
aesthetic judgement tends to vary from one to another. For example, the 
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statement ‚it’s beautiful‛ and ‚it’s a table‛ are similar in type, yet one is more 
likely to disagree over the former. Kant’s solution has two parts. While 
saying, ‚it’s beautiful‛ instead of saying ‚I think it’s beautiful‛, the 
experiencer claims that beauty resides in the object and so he or she makes 
claim to validity beyond subjective preference. Secondly, beautiful is not a 
determinative concept like table. Judgements about beauty are instead 
‘reflective’ which occur in the absence of a definite rule or standard, and 
hence are more likely to generate disagreement. The ability to judge well 
amidst such uncertainties is what he calls taste. Kant agrees with Hume that 
taste is something learned. Further, Kant distinguishes between the agreeable, 
the good, and the beautiful. The good is a matter of reason, and what one 
desires. The agreeable is a matter of senses, and what one physically desires. 
The beautiful mixes the sensible with the non-sensible and involves no desire. 
So Kant calls judgements of beauty disinterested. 
To Kant, that is beautiful the apprehension of which is disinterested. 
An aesthetic evaluation must not involve only subjective response, for 
aesthetic perception must subsume individual response under general rule 
that encompasses a large number of individual responses. So, beautiful must 
appear beautiful to all. Kant’s basic notion is that a sensory experience of 
pleasure can move from the subjective (‚that is pleasing to me‛) to the 
objective (‚that should please all‛) only if it is purged of its individual, 
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interested elements.11 Kant rejects physical appeal of the aesthetic and claims 
that the formal properties of the observed object, not its physical and material 
properties, most influence aesthetic judgements. Sensual responses are 
subjective and they fail to go beyond the level of the agreeable. It follows that 
in order for an aesthetic experience to call forth a disinterested perception, the 
beautiful has to be devoid of any specific purpose. However, in the judgement 
of the beautiful there is a kind of ‘awareness’ of a harmonious whole, which 
makes the act of aesthetic perception purposive. But this purposiveness exists 
in respect of one’s judgement only; the beauty itself has no purpose. So the 
aesthetic judgement is a ‘purposiveness without purpose’. This suggests that 
judgement of taste is not an act of cognition because beauty is not an objective 
quality of the thing perceived. Seeing the quality of beauty and its aesthetic 
judgement, it comes to the fore that construct of aesthetic experience consists 
of both sensation and thought. In the process of aesthetic judgement, the two 
faculties of imagination and intellect unfold their ‘freeplay’. However, in his 
overall scheme of philosophy, Kant calls beauty ‘the symbol of morality’. It is 
here that he really comes close to providing beauty a purpose and an interest. 
Apart from this theorization of aesthetics, Kant also deals with issues such as 
the ‘sublime’, ‘aesthetic ideas’, ‘genius’, and ‘beauty as a symbol of morality’. 
From the concerns seen above, Kant’s position may be summarised thus: 
 The beautiful has no specific purpose. 
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 Judgements of beauty are universal. 
 Judgements of beauty are simultaneously sensory, emotional and 
intellectual. 
 Aesthetic judgement is not a form of cognition, for beauty is not an 
objective quality of a thing observed. 
 Art is knowledge unto itself. 
According as the Enlightenment assumption, the natural sciences grant 
a public, dependable and verifiable truth whilst the arts are  to deal with 
private taste, ornament or self-expression, and have negligible or no bearing 
on the way things actually are. The following Romantic tradition reacted to 
this and gave arts a special privileged position, seeing as way to absolute 
truth. The difference was clear: science is literal and common-sense; about 
disseminating information, whereas arts concern with inward subjective 
thoughts and disposition. 
Kant’s philosophy offered a distinction between the domain of 
knowledge and the domain of aesthetic activity and judgement. Aesthetic 
pleasure comes about when two mental faculties—the understanding and the 
imagination—infuse in a ‘free-play’. It is this free play which one enjoys, 
arising from the contemplation of beautiful objects characterized by 
‘purposiveness without purpose’. Aesthetic judgements do not predicate on 
the features of the world to which one responds but on features of personal 
response—specifically the interplay of understanding and imagination. When 
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someone makes an aesthetic judgement, nothing in the object is signified, but 
(only) a feeling in the subject as it is affected by the representation. But Kant’s 
passionate conviction that aesthetic experience has its own distinctive 
function and character—it must not be considered under cognition, nor 
(unlike the Romantics) must it be conforming to mystical experience—led him 
perilously close to isolating (and exhausting) the aesthetic realm altogether. 
One result is that evaluative judgements about art and beauty become 
virtually impossible to articulate and sustain. 
I.6 Romantic Aesthetics  
Rousseau’s dictum ‚I felt before I think‛ held its sway over all succeeding 
thinkers. JW von Goethe expressed a modern view of humanity’s relationship 
to nature, history, and society. His works reflected a keen understanding of 
human individuality. In art, the earlier Renaissance subjectivity is 
strengthened and expression of artist’s individuality is prized over 
impersonality in aesthetic experience. 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, a German critic, noted for his writings on 
art, literature, drama, archaeology and theology, studied mediums of art 
forms and their limitations. In his essay Laocoön (1766; trans. 1930), he 
analyzed poetry, sculpture, and painting and defined the limits of each. 
Lessing famously distinguished between visual art and verbal art. Visual art 
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is an art of space; verbal art is an art of time. He construed ‘literature as the art 
of succession and the visual arts as those of juxtaposition, between literature’s 
movement in time and the visual arts’ stasis in space.’ (Prawer 129) Verbal art 
cannot match the prompt vividness of sculpture or painting, but it can present 
things that visual art cannot capture: invisibility, negation, rhetoric. To 
achieve maximum dynamism, visual art must inhere in the ‘pregnant 
moment’ which is most suggestive of the entire situation. Later art critics and 
modernist experiments both in painting and literature have challenged 
Lessing’s space-time divide. However, his theorization stands as the first 
modern contribution to what might be called ‘media studies’ (Leitch 553) and 
offered a new departure in the continuity of literary and aesthetic theory. 
Another German philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), 
considered beauty a moral virtue. Fichte held that the pure, spontaneous 
activity of the ego is the basis of all human experience. The ego can be 
intellectually intuited in all consciousness. To Fichte the very fact that the ego, 
the ‚I,‛ knows its free activity is its self-affirmation, which inevitably brings it 
into an encounter with the ‚not-I,‛ the non-ego, or otherness.  This dynamic 
encounter between the ‚I‛ and the ‚not-I‛ is consciousness. In consciousness, 
the self and the world are interactively defined and realized. Fichte proposed 
ethical idealism emphasising moral will, which is derived in large part from 
this conception. In the world created by the artist, beauty, as much as truth, is 
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an end. Expression and realization of the aesthetic foreshadowed the absolute 
freedom which is an act of self-affirmation. Hence, for Fichte, art is individual, 
subjective and not social. 
Heidegger in his essay on aesthetic ‚On the Origins of the Work of 
Art‛ critiqued Kant. Kant had investigated aesthetic experience in terms of 
the effect of work of art. Heidegger, while contesting Kantian posit, 
emphasized in his essay the autonomous value of a work of art. To him, a 
work of art must not be misunderstood as a thing with distinctive 
characteristics of its own such as the fact that it depicts reality particularly 
well or particularly beautiful. Contrariwise, it reveals the general nature of 
things, thereby opening up a view of the world us. 
I.7 Beauty and Sublime 
If philosophical speculations on beauty constitute aesthetic, it may well be 
said the discourse on sublime constitutes aesthetics. The beauty and the 
sublime in Hellenic philosophy developed respectively as a distinct concept 
and a percept. Plato was concerned with the ousia of the fine in its pure sense 
without its precedent cause, its attributes (pathos), and its effects on the 
beholder. The sublime was, however, an affective principle which was a 
power to move all in all places and always. The sublime predicated on the 
very principle of affectivity and elevating nature. The effect which the 
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sublime produces in the hearer or reader is different from the one of 
persuasion, particularly aimed at by rhetoric. The effect of the sublime is 
ēkstasis which is often translated as ‘transport’. Longinus in his Peri hupsous 
(On the Sublime) analysed external and internal criteria of actualizing the 
sublime: 
 The use of figurative language, 
 Nobility of diction, and 
 Elevated composition 
These three are formal aspects of art constructing its substance variableness. 
The other two are intrinsic and therefore of greater value. 
 Loftiness of thought, and 
 Strong and inspired passion 
The formal aspects are external; existing as skill and so acquired. The latter 
two are innate qualities of poetic genius. 
Longinus’s theory of sublime should be credited for offering a 
systematic discourse on aesthetic experience. Plato did suggest that poets 
often speak in the fit of divine frenzy, but it was Longinus only who for the 
first time in a dignifying way analysed constituents responsible for producing 
the ēkstasis. 
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 Classical theory of the sublime had influenced many successive 
scholars and it was at the core of expressive theory of poetry. In the 18th 
century, Edmund Burke widened the scope and transvalued the meaning of 
the sublime. In his essay ‚The Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful,‛ (1757) Burke distinguished between the 
beauty and sublime. The beauty was identified with delicacy and harmony 
whilst the sublime with vastness, obscurity and a capacity to inspire terror. 
This new take on sublimity differed from the classical view of the echo of the 
great soul. The sublime, erstwhile a quality of linguistic discourse, becomes a 
quality of permeating in all external objects, especially in nature-scapes. Burke 
attributed the source of the sublime to things that are ‚in any sort terrible‛. 
He writes in sub-section VII, ‘Of The Sublime’: 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to 
say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or 
operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it 
is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. I 
say the strongest emotion, because I am satisfied the ideas of pain are much 
more powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure. (Leitch 549) 
The observer here is an external witness to the context of the ‘terrible’ 
and enjoys a ‘delightful horror’. Burke’s proposition attracted many thinkers 
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and writers of the 18th c. and early 19th c., as well as it resided at the core of 
gothic genre in fiction. 
The sublime, however, received an in-depth treatment in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement (1790). Whereas the experience of beauty shows that 
mind and world correspond to each other, the sublime, in contrast, shows a 
rupture between mind and world. When one experiences a cyclone or a 
deluge, nature appears to dwarf human potential and significance. The 
sublime, according to Kant, allows one to peep into things beyond human 
capacity to know and to experience the limits of the sensible, physical world, 
generating feelings of awe and terror.12 Kant carefully offers that the beauty is 
only an ‘ideal’ and not a ‘concept’: ‚Beauty is what, without a concept, is liked 
universally‛. (Book I, Moment 2) Harping on Burke’s idea of the sublime, 
Kant further analysed sublime objects into two kinds: 
 The Mathematical Sublime 
 The Dynamic Sublime 
The ‘mathematical sublime’ is the sublime of magnitude; of vastness in size 
and infinitude in number. The ‘dynamic sublime’ includes objects favourable 
to terror rendering helplessness in the experiencer while perceiving 
overwhelming power of nature, provided that the experience is made 
pleasurable by a safe distance. Kant maintains that the sublimity resides ‚not 
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in the Object of nature‛ itself, but ‚only in the mind of the judging Subject‛ 
who contemplates the object. He likens the experience of sublimity to the 
sudden release after asphyxiation. In the Book II, he writes: 
Hence in the case of the beautiful our liking is connected with the 
presentation of quality, but in the case of the sublime with the presentation of 
quantity. The two likings are also very different in kind. For the one liking 
(the beautiful) carries with it directly a feeling of life’s being furthered, and 
hence is compatible with charms and with imagination at play. But the other 
liking (the feeling of sublime) is a pleasure that arises only indirectly: it is 
produced by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at 
once by a discharge all the more powerful. (Leitch 520) 
If the mind in ‘dynamic sublime’ is checked by the feeling of helplessness 
before overpowering natural phenomena, then in ‘mathematical sublime’ it is 
checked by its inadequacy to comprehend seeming infinity of natural 
magnitudes as one totality. Having seen beauty and sublime in terms of their 
differences, Kant makes his judgement about his own preference in a befitting 
humanist manner. After comparing beauty and sublime, he avers, ‚<the 
concept of the sublime in nature is not nearly as important and rich in 
implications as that of the beautiful in nature‛. (Leitch 521) 
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I.8 Beauty as Ennobling Force  
The Kantian model of aesthetics kept influencing the succeeding thinkers who 
accepted, appropriated or contested it but could never ignore it. The whole 
new humanist philosophy or European romanticism owed their impetus to 
his system. During the late 18th century, another German Romantic 
philosopher hailed importance and priority of art in all human concerns. 
Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), after studying Kantian model of aesthetics, 
dealt with the relations between art, politics, and history in his epistolary 
work On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795). In fact, he was writing 
immediately after the violent aftermath of the French Revolution. The gory 
reality had tellingly marked his ideas on art: how can humanity achieve 
freedom when political solutions so miserably fail? In trying situation like this 
when political/ rational acumen was failing the modern civilisation, the only 
saving grace Schiller could find was in the potential of Art. He held that 
freedom can occur only through education, and the only prerequisite for 
education is the experience of beauty—the elevation of mind and soul 
through art.13 Beauty is an ennobling force that allows everyone to become a 
‚beautiful Soul‛ (schöne Seele) harmonizing duty and interest through art, 
which he called ‚play impulse‛ or ‚play drive‛ that makes reconciliation and 
transcendence possible. 
296 
 
Schiller’s aesthetic theory is grounded less in historical reference and 
analysis than in idealizing the Greek holistic take on art, i.e. kalokagatheia or 
beautiful and goodness fused in one, harmonizing both the human concerns 
of reason and feeling. He considered Greek art as the model to be emulated 
and understood for it simplicity, naturalness and excellence. He says in his 
sixth letter of his work, ‚In fullness of form no less than of content, at once 
philosophic and creative, sensitive and energetic, the Greeks combined the 
first youth of imagination with the manhood of reason in a glorious 
manifestation of humanity.‛ (Leitch 575) 
Schiller, in fact, perceived in the modern times a divide in ‚human 
nature into several aspects‛. (Leitch 575) The mechanization and city life were 
held responsible by him for alienation and fragmentation in human psyche 
and artistic subject and their representations. In his sixth letter, he even 
critiques Kant’s over emphasis on reason as a prime cognitive principle in all 
human activities. Reason may have enabled a mind to reach a high degree of 
abstraction and there by peer into the Absolute. ‚But‛, Schiller suspects, ‚will 
such a mind, dissolved as it were into pure intellect and pure contemplation, 
ever be capable of exchanging the rigorous bonds of logic for the free 
movement of the poetic faculty, or of grasping the concrete individuality of 
things with a sense innocent of preconceptions and faithful to the object?‛ 
(Leitch 579) In fact, this centrality of reason also bears the brunt of leading 
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European civilization to ‘fragmentary specialization of human powers’. The 
redress is found in union with Nature which once existed in the Greeks. It 
behoves the artist to reinstate the harmonious order between man and Nature 
with a noble art, which is not just too topical or intellect teasing. For the cause 
of noble art and artist, he writes in his ninth letter: 
Humanity has lost its dignity; but Art has rescued it and preserved it in 
significant stone. Truth lives on in the illusion of Art, and it is from this copy, 
or after-image, that the original image will once again be restored. Just as the 
nobility of Art survived the nobility of Nature, so now Art goes before her, a 
voice rousing from slumber and preparing the shape of things to come. 
(Leitch 581) 
Schiller’s artist is a high priest of aesthetic imagination, teeming with 
optimism in a hostile environment, who is ‘preparing the shape of things of to 
come’. The artist must rise above the daily chores, mercantile, utilitarian and 
petit limitations of his civilisation and must possess ‘long patience’ and 
‘creative tranquillity’ to muse upon the divine impulse of truthful and 
beautiful in his creation. Schiller’s artist lives in his century but he is not its 
creature. While working for his contemporaries, he creates what they need, 
not what they like and praise. The artist is even advised to defy the world’s 
opinion in order to be true to the heart’s ‚noble impulses‛. It was indeed in 
the spirit of Romanticism to bring about a divine communion between man 
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and Nature whereof Art was entrusted with restorative powers in the midst 
of an unsympathetic and corrupt age. 
I.9 Resistance to Classification of the Aest hetic 
In the 19th century aesthetic discourse, one comes across strong contentions 
made against classification of aesthetic objects. Kant and Croce held that 
aesthetic objects non-classifiable. Not only this but any act of classifying 
human experience and action in the categories and subcategories such as 
cognitive, moral, aesthetic among others is challenged. The classification of 
the aesthetic object is rendered improbable, for every such object is 
considered 'unique' or 'sui generis'. This position held by the thinkers and 
critics in philosophy of the aesthetic called 'nominalism'. Here, the very act of 
classification is viewed as a conceptional mechanism or rational instrument 
that distorts the immediacy of human experience by an imagined order that is 
imposed upon things and is not their inherent quality. In simple terms, 
aesthetic nominalism looks down upon classification that is an external order 
imposed upon objects for the practical purpose for the librarians, book 
publishers, book sellers and readers. 
Croce's aesthetic theory is known as Expressionism, which was 
propounded in his book Aesthetic: as Science of Expression and General 
Linguistic. In his epistemology, Croce broadly conceived of human activity as 
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involving mentation and physical action. The first has 'theoretical' dimension 
whilst the latter has 'practical'. Under the theoretical act are subsumed two 
kinds of knowledge: intuitive and logical. Intuitive knowledge is obtained 
through imagination whereas logical knowledge through intellect. The first 
one results in images and the latter in concepts. The former pertains to 
individual things and the latter pertains to relations between them. These 
differences may be put as follows: 
 
    
 
                     Intuitive                                 Logical                
                    by Imagination <<<<<<. by Intellect 
                     Images           <<<<<<   Concept  
                              the Particular <<<<<<<.. the Universal 
 
Croce's intuition stands for the expression of impressions. He writes, "Every 
true intuition or representation is, also, expression. That which does not 
objectify itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation 
and naturality. The spirit does not obtain intuitions otherwise than by 
making, forming, expressing". (S James 312) Croce uses the term 'expression' 
Kinds of Knowledge 
Means    
End    
Knowables 
                          
Theoretical Practical 
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both in a general sense of 'externalisation' as well in the special sense of 
forming the image of the particular (idea or object) in one's mind. Works of 
art are examples of intuitive knowledge. Contrariwise, logical knowledge 
pertains to science. 
Croce's nominalism rests on two grounds: 
a) that aesthetic object is sui generis, and 
b) that logical knowledge like classification is not possible in the case of 
art which is intuitive. 
Croce accepted Kant in what he said that aesthetic judgement or judgement of 
taste is valid in the case of the particular only, not the universal. The 
judgement refers only to the subject term, not the entire class of objects. For 
instance, 
1. This lotus is beautiful. 
2. All lotuses are beautiful. 
Kant holds that only the first instance is a pure aesthetic judgement. In the 
second example it is the concept of 'lotus' which is attributed with beauty. 
Logically, the second example might seem correct, but it is not so because all 
aesthetic judgements are only reflective and not determinative and therefore 
in the context of aesthetic judgement it is subjectivity rationalized in an 
objective manner. 
301 
 
This follows that with regard to the judgements of taste only the 
particular can be claimed. That is, every aesthetic object must be seen as 
unique, sui generis and non-classifiable. And if the aesthetic object is included 
within a (generic) concept, the judgement becomes logical, i.e. cognitive 
which establishes a relationship between a concept and a quality: for example, 
tables (concept) are useful (quality). On the contrary, beauty is not an 
objective quality that can be equally attributed to generic concepts, for 
judgement of beauty depends on the subject's sense of delight. Even though 
Kant establishes singularity of aesthetic judgement, his theory of 'pure' or 
'free' beauty does mention 'subjective universality'. Subjective universality, as 
discussed earlier, suggests that the aesthetic must appear so as distinct from 
the quality of good and agreeable to all and always. 
Croce's second position is at variance from Kant's. In Kantian 
philosophy, aesthetic experience is not cognition of the phenomenal world. 
Taste and cognition are different species of judgements. Croce, however, 
considered logical knowledge and intuitions as parts of 'theoretical' activity as 
against 'practical' activity which includes activity such as 'economic' and 
'moral'. To Croce, acts of categorization, classification, abstraction or 
conceptualization represent intellectualization that imposes a rational order 
on intuitive experience. Taxonomy of art forms, therefore, is an extra-aesthetic 
activity. So, aesthetic object is 'an individual inexpressible in logical terms'. 
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Consequently, categories like 'tragedy', 'comedy', 'lyric', 'epic', 'portrait', 
'landscape', etc. are merely a logical and intellectual act, not aesthetic. 
 The resistance to classification of the aesthetic in Kant and Croce exists 
purely at the level of aesthetic philosophy that was invariably developed on 
Cartesian model of 'subject' and 'object' and had systematically offered its 
own logic against any act of rationalizing aesthetic creation and reception. In 
the 19th century, however, Existential philosophy was equally averse to 
classification of the aesthetic but had entirely different philosophical stand 
from the classical philosophy of preceding years. Existential thought was 
antithetical to 'order', 'generalization', 'abstraction', 'systematization', and 
'classification', for it prioritized the fact of 'being', 'suffering' and 'ecstatic 
moments' in human life. 
Nietzsche in his The Birth of Tragedy discusses certain problems 
inherent in aesthetic categorization, especially that of literary genres. 
However, it is difficult to cull out a systematic and consistent theory of art 
from his work. In fact, his philosophy has more of a poetic vision than 
scientific objectivity; it is more valuational than factual. 
Nietzsche's take on art is informed of his existential philosophy. He 
was highly sceptical of the Socratic/ Platonic epistemology that laid stress on 
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'knowing' through reason. To him intellectual ideal of virtue is unreal, and 
rational knowledge essentially an illusion. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, he postulates two kinds of 'realities': the 
Apolline reality and the Dionysiac reality. The Apolline reality stands for 
rationality and order. It is reality of 'individuation', which is an illusion. The 
Dionysiac is the real reality of human being. It stands for the unity of life in its 
pristine form as existed in the primitive time before the advent of any civil 
order. Dionysian experience is constituted when there is collapse of 
individuation and the oneness of all things is reinstated. Nietzsche thus 
emphasized 'being' or 'existence', and not 'knowing' or 'essence'.  
Civilizing factors, according to Nietzsche, such as various domains of 
knowledge, arts and skills have deluded mankind and have made one forget 
'the weight and burden of existence'. In the act of excelling at cultural 
practices, mankind has neglected the perennial wound of existence. In this 
deception, Nietzsche finds three basic ways by which human will has created 
the web of illusions. They are: 
 The Socratic knowledge 
 The Apollonian art, and  
 The Dionysian art 
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Through this classification, in fact, all knowledge and cultural practices as 
well as their taxonomy were scandalized and challenged. The Socratic 
knowledge encompasses traditional domains of knowledge viz. logic, 
rhetoric, geometry, science, and ethics among others. Second, the Apollonian 
art includes institutionalized or conventional art forms that promulgate 
qualities such as beauty, form, and order. It constructs general agreement 
among its adherents about the theoretical idea of 'aesthetics'. The Apollonian 
art is thus sharply defined and individualized by its formal attributes as in the 
case of the visual arts, the epic, or the narrative. In fact, Nietzsche calls the 
dialogues of Plato a new mode of writing resembling the novel. The Platonic 
dialogue he calls 'an infinitely enhanced Aesopian fable'. Third, the Dionysian 
art is essentially 'musical', not imagistic. It is 'lyrical', not narrative and 
dramatic. The Dionysian art is averse to aesthetic or seductive effects as it is 
primarily metaphysical. Further, it is 'intoxicating' and 'orgiastic', not serene 
and austere, and it is 'tragic' as opposed to epic. Nietzsche felt that ancient 
Greek philosophers and artists have wilfully chosen self-deluding Apollonian 
art. He rejects Aristotelian theory of art and tragedy. Aristotle held 'plot' or 
'action' to be the most important part of tragedy. Nietzsche rejected it and 
vouched for 'melos' (music) as the essence of tragedy, which is the ecstatic 
song of the chorus. Choral song is the primary element in Greek theatrical 
performance. Aristotle too suggested that tragedy was developed from 
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Dithyrambic poetry (hymns and encomia). Nietzsche offered that the tragedy 
grew out the Satyr chorus of dithyramb that was sung in a rapturous joy in 
the ritual worship of Dionysus. In the tragic play suffering is characterized by 
Dionysiac ecstasy and the dramatic dialogues are Apolline in nature 
characterized by wisdom and rationality. This combination of Dionysiac 
ecstasy and Apolline form was destroyed by Euripides as he intellectualized 
the tragedy under the demonic influence of Socrates, and tolled the death of 
Greek tragedy. Nietzsche even dismissed Aristotle's theory of catharsis of pity 
and fear, for under the Apollonian illusion it unheeded metaphysical pre-
dramatic myth of experiencing myth and settled for evoking a trivial 
'psychological-moral' effect on audience with utilitarian practical purposes.  
I.10 Hegel’s Aesthetics  
Hegel, like Kant, considers the beautiful in the context exclusively of the 
production of art, not in the context of the nature. Hegel takes note of Kantian 
thesis that the beautiful awakens a pleasure which is disinterested. Such a 
perception is both particular in response as well as general, as it were a 
necessity for the aesthetic cognition for everyone everywhere. Taking a cue 
from it, Hegel treats the beautiful in art as the thought or idea. In order for an 
idea to express itself, a tangible form is required. Thus, excellence and 
perfection of a work of art, according to Hegel, will depend on the degree of 
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intimate union of the idea and the form. Hegel comes to note the unification 
of the idea and the form in the production of art in an historical manner. In 
his aesthetics, Hegel first examines the general idea of the beautiful, or the 
Ideal, which he observes successively in relation with nature, and its relation 
with human art forms. Thereafter he seeks to trace progressive series of forms 
under which it has been historically developed.  
To Hegel, the Beautiful is the Idea, but he postulates Idea under a 
particular form. The essential nature of Idea is further clarified with the two 
sub-types: the primitive idea (Begriff) and the veritable idea (Idee). The first is 
more of subjective character and abstract and when it becomes accurately 
representative of the object, or identified with it, it becomes the veritable idea. 
This Idee is identical with truth; however, there is a difference between the 
True and the Beautiful. J. Steinfort Kedney notes that mere reasoning or 
abstraction, as in truth, fails to comprehend the Beautiful in its totality: 
The true is the Idea (Idee) when it is considered in itself, in its general 
principle, and when it is thought as such<When the True appears 
immediately to the mind in its exterior reality, and the idea rests confounded 
and identified with its external appearance, then the idea is not solely the 
True, but the Beautiful. The Beautiful then, may be defined as the sensible 
manifestation of the Idea. The two elements of idea and form are, in the 
Beautiful, inseparable. (1885, 27) (italics mine) 
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Hegel distinguishes between the Beautiful in art and in nature. In nature, the 
primitive Idea passes through diverse phases before becoming the true Idea. 
In fact, the Idea finds its realization in life only, for there is unity that 
constitutes an organism. In nature physical and chemical elements exist 
without organic unity and interdependence and it takes a long time for a 
natural object to come into existence under an organized form. To Hegel, the 
Beautiful in nature is not beautiful for itself but only for another than itself, 
that is, for us. Because an intelligence measures, cognizes, and contemplates 
it. 
Kant contends that one can attribute perception of beauty both to 
nature and to works of art. He says that aesthetic judgements are neither 
objective nor purely subjective. This aspect of Kant's doctrine is highly 
controversial. He makes a very interesting incidental point that beauty has 
meaning only for human beings and for them in so far they are not merely 
rational but also irrational that he has a need of beauty. 
Hegel, on the other hand, applies theory of reality to aesthetics more 
rigorously than Kant did. To Hegel, the supreme reality is spiritual being or 
the Absolute Idea, a perfectly harmonious whole, in which each part is 
meaningful or significant only if it represents the Absolute. Hegel considers 
that art is a sensuous representation of the Absolute. However, art he 
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considers as a lower activity than philosophy or religion as these disciplines 
can more adequately comprehend the Absolute. In a way, art attempts to 
represent God or Reality in tangible form and the more truly it does so, the 
higher the art becomes. 
Hegel sees art in a successive manner that has dialectical progress in 
history. His triad is: Symbolic Art, Classical Art, and Romantic Art. In the pre-
historic or earliest phase of history of mankind, representation of idea existed 
crudely in the form of carving images on stone or wood. These are the 
primordial artistic expressions having a symbolic merit only. Late on 
sculpture comes evolves. The idea of form now becomes even clearer. 
However, the Absolute Idea which is but spirit, cannot be contained in human 
or other shape. Thus the third stage emerges viz. Romantic Art, which is 
manifest in music and poetry. Music and poetry have greater and wider 
significance than sculpture, but from the viewpoint of form they are inferior 
to it. 
Under the influence of Kant and Hegel philosophers in the 19th and 
20th centuries have held that the formulation of definition of art is the chief 
business of aesthetics. 
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I.11 Dissent 
In 20th century, however, one important voice that calls into question the 
aesthetic tradition, prevalent art forms and their ideology is the Russian 
writer Lev Tolstoy, who had carefully studied the history of art and aesthetics 
in the West. He made some sharp observations about Modern art and Modern 
artists in his work What is Art?, and while negating much of what had been 
theorized for aesthetics in esoteric terms, offered his distinct explanation for 
aesthetics. He dismissed aesthetic philosophies of Kantians, Hegelians, the 
French eclectic spiritualists, and the English psycho-physiologists. 
At the outset of his discourse, Tolstoy makes it clear that the 
metaphysical aesthetic trinity—the good, the beautiful, and the true must not 
befuddle the issues of defining art and its function. The conglomeration of 
these three metaphysical entities has been a critical fallacy committed by most 
of the past philosophers, theologicians, and litterateurs. The ancients thought 
that the beautiful must necessarily also be good. Although Socrates, Plato, 
and Aristotle sensed that the good might not coincide with beauty, they tried 
to make the latter a subset of the former. ‚Socrates expressly subordinated 
beauty to good; Plato, in order to unite the two ideas, spoke of a spiritual 
beauty; Aristotle demanded that art affect people morally (katharsis), but even 
these thinkers still could not entirely renounce the notion that the beauty and 
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the good coincide.‛ (Tolstoy, 49) The good is the eternal, the highest aim of 
our life, and is difficult to define further but which defines everything else. 
The truth is the correspondence between the manifestation and the essence of 
the object. And he proposes then that there is nothing transcendental about 
the beautiful but that it is simply pleasing to us.  
Tolstoy disapproved of elitism, esoterism, over intellectualization, and 
demands for refined taste in both expression and appreciation of all forms of 
art. To him, ‚art is that human activity which consists in one man’s 
consciously conveying to others, by certain external signs, the feelings he has 
experienced, and in others being infected by those feelings and also 
experiencing them.‛ (Tolstoy, 40) Infectiousness is Tolstoy’s criterion of art, 
whatever the worth of the feelings conveyed. Good art, then, is art which 
conveys to others the artist’s experience of the good, so that they become 
infected by the same feeling. Further, art affects people independently of their 
degree of development and education. The charm of a picture, sound, or 
image infects any man on whatever level of development he may stand. It is 
the business of art to make understandable and accessible that which might 
be incomprehensible and inaccessible in the form of reasoning. And when a 
person receives a truly artistic impression, it seems to him that he knew it all 
along, only he was unable to express it. ‚Great works of art are great only 
because they are accessible and comprehensible to everyone.‛ (Tolstoy, 81) 
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This is a theoretical position which was precisely absent in the agenda of 
Modernism. Tolstoy shows in his arguments that the modernists do not create 
art but simulate it. And they developed following methods for it: 1. 
borrowing, 2. imitation, 3. effectfulness, and 4. diversion. These factors 
brought in impoverishment of content, revisionism, and lack of novelty in art 
under the guise of cerebral play and medley of distorting allusions. Modern 
art excites rationally, but fails to affect emotively. He calls it ‘perverted art’ or 
‘counterfeit art’ which is, regretfully, institutionalized by professional artists, 
art criticism and art schools.  
Here, Tolstoy’s fundamental thesis may be summarized as under: 
1. Art is a human activity (not divinely inspired). 
2. All forms of sensory pleasure are aesthetic, for all senses admit of 
aesthetic experience, e.g., ‘culinary art’, ‘acoustic art’, ‘art of fragrance’. 
3. Good, Beautiful, Truth—all are different concepts. Good includes 
beautiful, but not the otherwise. The more we give ourselves to beauty, 
the more removed we are from the good. 
4. Moral or spiritual beauty as propounded by Christian spiritualists is just 
wordplay. There is nothing of the sort. 
5. ‘Appearance’; ‘illusion’ is the basis for beauty. 
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6. The question of ‘good art’ and ‘bad art’ is connected with people’s index 
of morality, which leads the query to religion. So, aesthetic criteria for 
high art and low art differ in different religious groups. 
7. Function (aim) of art is to convey to others the loftiest and best feelings 
people have attained to in life. 
8. There is plurality of art in that German art, Indian art, Chinese art among 
others with distinction of culture and religion. The 18th century Europe 
wrongly believed that only theirs was true. 
9. Good art is always understood by all people. It is never esoteric or 
incomprehensible. 
10. Good art infects its beholder and invokes the same feeling as experienced 
by the artist. This experience is elevating; it transcends one from limited 
individual consciousness and merges it with all.  
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II 
Indian Aesthetics  
The Western aesthetics is a long tradition of philosophy concerning the issue 
of definition of the beautiful, its relation to the good and truth; question of its 
objectivity or subjective nature; distinction of the beautiful and sublime; 
properties or formal criteria responsible for beauty; aesthetic value in elite, 
popular, folk and mass arts among others. 
Aesthetic considerations in Indian knowledge system have not been 
systematized under one disciplinary category as it is known in the Western 
counterpart as 'aesthetics'. Indian aesthetics, unlike the Western one, does not 
predicate on philosophical and ethical questions. Sanskrit theory of beauty is 
worked out mainly by the literary critics, not the philosophers. The idea of 
beauty, therefore, is predominantly present in the context of literary discourse 
than in other forms of fine art. Another reason why aesthetic considerations 
received inadvertent attention in Indian discourse is that Indian philosophical 
take on the phenomenal world characteristically impacted aesthetic 
philosophy which shall be discussed later. This apart, Indian theorists have 
not thought of arts in terms of the dyad of 'Fine Arts' and 'Useful Arts'. In the 
Western category, fine arts include architecture, sculpture, painting, music, 
poetry (including drama) and dance. The useful or 'mechanical' arts comprise 
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of smithy, carpentry, pottery, weaving and other skills. The Western thinkers 
have observed this distinction on the grounds that the fine arts cater to the 
enjoyment of man, whilst the useful arts cater to his needs. Although both art 
forms manifest the growth of man, the former one is concerned with spiritual, 
moral and intellectual growth, and the latter with physical and material 
prosperity. 
Indian theorists, who conceived of beauty in relation to verbal discourse, 
however, did not abide by the above categories of art forms. Indian mind was, 
in fact, least fascinated by the kinds of art forms but was keen on the 
ubiquitous nature of the experience of the fine. Different words used in 
Sanskrit poetics for beauty are: camatkāra, cārutva, śobha, saundarya, viccitti, 
vaicitrya, madhura, vakratā, and ramaniyatā. In Indian thought, only the eye and 
the ear are the aesthetic senses.14 Indian aesthetics is primarily concerned with 
poetry (including drama) and music. Poetry is reckoned with as the highest 
form of fine art in which drama holds pride of place. Classical theorists of 
kāvyaśāstra mainly foreground two positions in relation to the theory of 
beauty, viz., experience of the aesthetic, and the constituent of literary beauty 
in kāvya. Profundity of aesthetic experience is famously expounded in the 
rasasūtra of Bharata: "vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicāri sanyogāta rasanispatti" 
(Nātyaśāstra, 6) (rasa or aesthetic relish issues forth with the combination of 
vibhāva (stimulants), anubhāva (consequents), and vyabhicāribhāva (transitory 
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moods)). As regards the constituents of beauty, various claims were laid on 
alamkāra (figure of speech and thought), rīti (style), vakrokti (obliquity), aucitya 
(propriety), and dhvani (suggestion). 
The ālamkārika-s were formalists in that they attributed poeticity of 
poetry to extrinsic features of composition. In all major alamkāra critics the 
principle of rasa as found in Bharata is almost absent since it was upheld 
primarily by the nātya tradition. To them, all the rasa-s subserve beauty of 
expression. 
II.1 Rasa Mīmāmsā  
The rasa principle invites critical attention on following accounts: 1) 
constituents of rasa, 2) issuing forth or realization of rasa, 3) locus of rasa—
from the view point of the dramatist; of the actor; of the composition, and of 
the spectator, 4) nature of rasa—laukika (sukha-dukhātmak) or alukika, and 5) 
kinds of rasa-s. The long tradition of rasa criticism is the site of postulation by 
exponent like Bharata and minute analysis of the above areas by critics like 
Bhatta Lollata, Śri Śankuka, Bhatta Nāyaka, Ānandavardhana, Bhatta Tauta, 
Abhinavagupta, Pt. Jagannātha, and in the 19th century, Bhartendu 
Harishchandra.  
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As regards rasasūtra, a brief is note is required here. The term vibhāva, 
usually translated as ‘stimulant’ suggests the emotive situation represented 
on the stage that in actual life gives rise to emotion shown by the actor. 
However, the relation is not that of causality but of medium to the state of 
mind. Daśarūpaka of Dhananjaya in this regard gives an example of a child 
who fancies horse ride on a stick and tightens the bridle, whips and makes 
him gallop.15 Here, the horse is not the cause of the ride as it is absent. The joy 
of ride, nonetheless, comes from the medium through which the child 
assumes himself of experiencing a horse-ride. Thus, ‘vibhāva’ stands for the 
dramatic condition which is not the cause but only medium through which 
the actor fashions upon himself a certain emotive state and consequently 
expresses the sign which are concomitant to emotion. 
 The stimulant thus has the relation of mediation to emotion. The 
emotion, however, invariably takes to objective reference. The objective 
reference in the phenomenal world abides by spatio-temporal limitations. In 
this regard, vibhāva has two aspects that seem to possess causal characteristics, 
viz., ālambana and uddipana. Ālambana is the object which is primarily 
responsible for the arousal of emotion, e.g. a character assumed by an actor. 
Uddipana is the whole surrounding or environment that facilitates evocation 
of particular emotion.16  
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The expressed emotion through action and gesture is anubhāva. 
Emotions consequently give rise to all the physical changes and in actual life 
they are seen as effects of emotion. However, the term anubhāva in the context 
of rasa stands apart from the physical effects of emotion which exist in real 
life. It is called anubhāva, for the actor enacts character, manifests emotion and 
makes the spectator experience identical emotion. Anubhāva, further, is of two 
kinds: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary actions are willed by the actor in 
emotion whilst involuntary (sāttvika bhāva) physical changes are prompt and 
non-verbal signs of emotion such as blush, horripilation, change of colour, etc.  
Vyabhicāri or sancāri bhāva is transient emotion. In the course of the 
aesthetic experience it accompanies and enhances the represented emotive 
state and after its momentary appearance, fades away anon.  
This configuration of constituents works out sthāyin bhāva-s in the 
audience and ripens them so as to relish an aesthetic experience which is rasa. 
Rasa criticism is chiefly about this epistemology and ontology of rasa, 
that is, operation of this configured constituents; nature and locus of rasa. 
Bhatta Lollata (c. 9th c. AD), who was contemporary of Trika philosopher 
Bhatta Kallata, commented on rasasūtra. Lollata adheres to the tradition of 
ālamkārika-s like Dandin and others and concerns himself with the locus of 
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rasa. In his view, rasa resides primarily in the character and secondarily in the 
actor. The actor identifies himself with the historical character. 
Śri Śankuka (c. 9th c. AD) concerns himself with the emergence of rasa in 
the spectator’s consciousness. Lollata had not considered this aspect. Śankuka 
held that evocation of rasa is purely a subjective psychological experience. He 
offered principle of anukarana (imitation—for the actor) and anumiti 
(imitation—for the spectactor). Sthāyin bhāva which is the core of rasa cannot 
be directly perceived like vibhāva or anubhāva. He, therefore, posits the process 
of inference.  To him, sthāyin bhāva is inferred from vibhāva, etc. which are 
directly cognizable. However, sthāyin in actor is a matter of indirect imitation. 
It is this indirect imitation of actor’s sthāyin inferred by the spectator which is 
called rasa. In Śankuka’s view, the reason why Bharata does not mention 
sthāyin bhāva in rasasūtra is that it has to be inferred (from vibhāva-s etc.). Here, 
the omission of sthāyin is not without purpose. Further, he disagreed with 
Lollata in that the locus of rasa is not in the character and actor, but in the 
spectator, for the realization of rasa ultimately takes place in the consciousness 
of the beholder. 
Bhatta Tauta, teacher of Abhinavagupta, critiqued Śankuka. Śankuka 
held that ‘art is imitation’. Tauta questioned that from whose point of view art 
can be called an imitation—spectator, actor, or critic. In fact, none of the 
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viewpoints make art an imitation. For instance, X imitates particular behavior 
of Y. But it cannot be said that X’s experience of his own mental state is 
imitation of Y’s mental state. From the acting, one may infer the mental state 
of the actor, but it is not possible to infer the mental state of the historical 
persona or legend through actor’s imitation. Secondly, the spectator is hardly 
conscious that he infers sthāyin from actor’s imitation, for he at the moment of 
art experience identifies himself with the character.  Thirdly, when an actor 
shows anger of Rama’s anger, it does not mean that he is really angry, nor 
does he portray actual anger of Rama. In any case, there is no imitation. Thus, 
Tauta rejected anukarana-anumitivāda of Śankuka. 
Bhatta Tauta thus maintains that rasa is neither ripening of sthāyin as 
suggested by Lollata nor is it an inference as mentioned by Śri Śankuka. Tauta 
offers that it is anuvyavasāya. In the tradition of Nyāya anuvyavasāya (reflective 
cognition or apperception) is one of the threefold cognition; the other being 
indriyārtha sannikarsa (sense contact) and jñāna (cognition). Anuvyavasāya in 
the context of rasa is expression of behavior in the manner a person behaves in 
a particular state of mind. It is anubhāvana, that is, specific mode of acting that 
represents a particular mental state. This explains what Bharata means by 
‚Lokavrttānukarana‛. Here, anukarana is not an imitation of a person; it is re-
presenting behavior of a given condition in life.  
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The Sāmkhya interpretation of rasasūtra is also briefly referred to in 
Abhinavabhāratī as it establishes causal relation between vibhāva, anubhāva and 
sthāyin. In this view, sthāyin itself is rasa. However, this not only contradicts 
the fact of experience but it is also a misreading of Bharata’s text. 
Lollata’s position takes its cue from Sāmkhya darśana whilst that of 
Śankuka from Nyāya darśana. The locus of rasa as to whether rasa resides in 
the actor or the spectator remains unsatisfactory in both the theories. Both 
Sāmkhya and Nyāya cannot go beyond explanation of causal phenomenal 
cognition while dealing with aesthetic experience. 
Ānandavardhana recontextualized rasa apart from the nātya tradition. 
He subscribed to the fourth category of meaning namely vyagyārtha 
(suggested sense). The idea of suggestion, in fact, was not alien to poeticians 
prior to Ānandavardhana but they could not develop an independent and 
cogent theory on that. Abhinava refers to Bhāmaha’s kārikā where he included 
the concept of dhvani in vakrokti whereof kāvyārtha, which is rasa, is turned into 
aesthetic experience through vibhāva-s, etc. by vakrokti.17 So if Bhāmaha 
included rasa in vakrokti, Vāmana included it in kāntiguna, and Udbhata in 
samghatanā.  Vyagyārtha is different from abhidhā (denotative or primary 
meaning), laksanā (connotative or secondary meaning), and tātparyārtha 
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(sentential meaning). He posited pratīyamāna as against vācyārtha, for rasa can 
only be suggested, not to be cognized through just grammatical signification. 
Bhatta Nāyaka, however, was not contented with any of these views. He 
agrees with his predecessors that aesthetic experience is had primarily 
because of the objective cognition of the presented but, unlike them, he rightly 
holds, that both the cognizing self and the cognized object, in the realm of art 
experience, are free from all constraints of individuality. The consequent 
subjective state is, in his view, a state of perfect rest of the self within itself, as 
there is sattvodreka (rising of sattva guna). Therefore, such a mental state is 
marked by absence of all psychological, volitional and physical activities and 
the self is free from the sense of attachment or aversion that prevail in mental 
states found in the ordinary life. Bhatta Nāyaka thereby posits three factors 
responsible for the emergence of rasa: 1) Abhidhā (literal meaning arousing 
conventional image associated with the world), 2) Bhāvakatva (a power that 
frees aesthetic representation from all causal relations in the context of 
subject-object duality and so universalizes the resultant emotion), and 3) 
Bhojakatva (a power that gives vent to sattvodreka and subsides the qualities of 
rajas and tamas). This mechanism is sādhāranikarana since the beholder’s 
consciousness is free from limiting psychological, volitional and physical 
activities; it is akin to the mystic experience of Brahman and comes close to 
Brahmānanda. Further, aesthetic experience is not had by perception, inference 
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or remembrance, as it does not pertain to epistemological categories of 
cognition. Cognition of aesthetic experience is not savikalpa jñāna (a 
determinate cognition). Aesthetic experience is equally not nirvikalpa jñāna (an 
indeterminate cognition) as there is subsequent recollection and knowledge of 
it. Thus, Bhatta Nāyaka proposes aesthetic experience of universalized 
aesthetic object by universalized subject in the state of perfect bliss on account 
of the prevalence of sattva. It can be perceived here that Bhatta Nāyaka’s 
theory of sādhāranikarana uses Sāmkhya concepts of guna and Vedāntic 
concepts of ānanda and bhoga. 
In Vedānta Māyopādhika caitanya is posited for explaining the creation of 
the phenomenal world, which comes into being with the māyā tattva or Prakrti 
with predominance of sattva. The three guna-s are the substratum of māyā, 
albeit sattva is predominant in this stage and rajas and tamas remain inactive. 
This sattva-pradhāna prakrti (māyā with predominance of sattva) is Ānandamaya 
kośa of the soul. Here, ānanda pertains to the universal stage of self whereas 
sukha to the limited individual stage (jīva daśā). At the individual stage, under 
the influence of ahamkāra, buddhi (differentiated intellect) of jīva is unable to 
unite subject and object, and thus veiled perception of the world prevents jīva 
from realizing its true self. Here, affection of the limited individual soul by 
the objects is ascribed to the real soul. This mistaken attribution is called 
bhoga. However, when Bhatta Nāyaka says that rasa is experienced as bhoga at 
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the universal level, it suggests that the presented aesthetic object is reflected 
in the reflection of the soul in buddhi. This means that even while experiencing 
aesthetic pleasure at the universal stage, the perceiver and the perceived 
stand in subject-object relation qualified by the rise of sattva. 
Bhatta Nāyaka offered the process of Sādhāranikarana (universalization) 
of aesthetic experience. However, as regards the essential nature of the 
subjective and the objective aspects of the aesthetic experience he failed to 
explain them and had to admit of additional powers of Bhāvakatva and 
Bhojakatva. The complex of psychological analysis required for explaining the 
aesthetic experience was not afforded to him by Sāmkhya and Vedānta 
positions. Abhinavagupta could sort it out well on the basis of psychological 
analysis with the help of Kāśmira Śaivism. 
II.1.1 Abhinavagupta’s Analysis  
Abhinavagupta, being a commentator on Nātyaśāstra, explains terms, viz., 
nātya, anukarana, anukāra, and anukīrtana in his Abhinavabhāratī that were not 
elaborated by Bharata. To Abhinava, nātya (drama) is ‘laukikapadārtha 
vyatireka’ (completely different from worldly things) and is also different from 
worldly states of perception such as: 
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 Anukāra (imitation) 
 Pratibimba (reflection) 
 Ālekhya (picture or painting) 
 Sādharmya (resemblance) 
 Āropa (superimposition) 
 Adhyavasāya (determination) 
 Utpreksā (fancy) 
 Svapna (dream) 
 Māyā (a phantom or unreal apparent) 
 Indrajāla (jugglery) and the like. 
Rasānubhuti (experience of rasa) is cognized by samvedana (direct 
experience) in the form of āsvādana (aesthetic relish) which is different from 
samyag-jñāna (right knowledge), bhrānti (erroneous knowledge), samśaya 
(doubt), anavadhārana (non-ascertainment), anadhyavasāya (non-determination) 
and vijñāna (worldly knowledge). 
The terms anukarana, anukāra, and anukrti seem identical but have 
varying shades of meaning. Abhinava accepts the view of Bhatta Tauta as 
regards these terms. Anukarana is literally ‘imitation’. However, it is not 
sadrśakarana (imitating something which is like the original). For how come an 
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actor, who has never seen actual historical character, would imitate the 
emotion of that character? Anukarana then suggests that drama just represents 
the way people behave in this life. The term anukīrtana is made of anu (post; 
after) + √ kīrt, i.e., to relate an account in order, to narrate. Thus, it means ‘re-
telling’ or ‘re-narration’. 
Abhinava sees these terms in the light of philosophical perspective. He 
interprets anukarana and anukīrtana in the sense of anuvyavasāya or 
anuvyavasāyaviśesa (re-perception). In his view, anuvyavasāya is like pratyaksa-
kalpa (direct perception). It is not duplication of reality but aesthetic 
representation of the worldly facts. Therefore he states: 
‚Tenanuvyavasāyaviśesavisayikāryam nātyam |‛ (A.Bh.) Drama is a matter of 
cognition by a special form of re-perception. Hence, anukīrtana should not be 
mistakenly taken for anukāra. The experience of this re-perception which is 
alaukika (not of this world but also not supernatural) has aesthetic quality 
about it which is variously referred to as rasana (tasting), āsvādana (enjoying), 
camatkāra (joy), carvanā (aesthetic contemplation; lit. ‘chewing cud’), nirveśa 
(immersion), bhoga (enjoyment), ānanda (bliss), pramātraviśrānti (aesthetic 
repose of the self), etc. Each of these terms has bearing upon Śaivādvaita 
philosophy. This re-perception consists in prakāśa (light) and ānanda of one’s 
own cit (consciousness), and is rusita-vikalpa-samvedana (affected or coloured 
by various mental states). Experience of this re-perception is thus vicitra 
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(varied). That is, drama is manifestation of that which appears in this re-
perception. 
In the context of issuing forth of rasa, Abhinava, in fact, improves upon 
Bhatta Nāyaka’s postulation and agrees with him insofar as the 
universalization of aesthetic emotion is concerned. Abhinavagupta reworks 
mainly in the following areas.  
1. It is not the objective representation of the presented that accounts 
for aesthetic experience but the spectator’s identification with the 
situation of human interest. 
2. That the category of Bhāvakatva is redundant, as universalization of 
the presented can well be explained through psychological process. 
3. It is accepted that the cognition of the final aesthetic experience is 
different from that involved in ordinary perception, inference and 
remembrance. This again can well be shown through psychological 
analysis that makes the third category Bhojakatva redundant. 
Abhinavagupta subscribes to monistic Śaivism which offers Ābhāsavāda 
(doctrine of momentary appearance) for explanation of the phenomenal 
world. This darśana forwards ten tattva-s (categories) of monistic and dualistic 
Śaivism; one of Vedānta, and twenty-five tattva-s of Sāmkhya, thus making 
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the total of thirty-six tattva-s. The first eleven tattva-s in order are: Śiva, Śakti, 
Sadāśiva, Iśvara, Śuddha vidyā, Māyā, Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga, Kāla, and Niyati. Unlike 
Vedānta, monistic Śaivism does not posit māyā independently but considers it 
to be Svātrantrya (the excellent Free Will) of the Supreme. To Vedānta, cid, the 
real cause is existent and the phenomenal world is but mere appearance, false 
and so non-existent. Monistic Śaivism differs here in that māyā being the Free 
Will, the phenomenal world, the effect, too is existent, for all the sentient and 
non-sentient ultimately rest in Parama Śiva. 
In Ābhāsavāda, the Supreme has two aspects, viz. viśvottīrna 
(transcendental) and viśvamaya (immanent). The immanent aspect of the 
Supreme is of the nature of prakāśa (light; jñātrtva) and vimarśa (self-
consciousness of the Supreme; kriyā). The Free Will of the Supreme due to its 
nature of prakāśa and vimarśa gets actualized through the śaktipañcaka (fivefold 
power), viz., cit (consciousness), ānanda (bliss), icchā (will), jñāna (knowledge), 
and kriyā (creative power). These five powers pervade in all the divine and 
worldly actions. Śakti functions as citi, then the Absolute becomes the pure 
experience known as Śiva tattva. The ānanda of Śakti functions and brings 
about sentience. The second stage is of Śakti tattva. The third stage, Sadāśiva, is 
the will for self-expression. Then comes the fourth stage, Iśvara tattva with its 
power and will to create the world. It is the stage of Jñāna (conscious 
experience) of being. In the fifth stage, there is the knower and also the object 
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of knowledge. Kriyā (creative power) becomes operative now. This is the stage 
of Śuddha vidyā. Since all the existence and creative activities therein rest in the 
Śiva principle, the subjective and the objective existence has no relevance in 
Ābhāsavāda, for essential nature of ābhāsa is the same in both the cases, and so 
if the one is real, the other is equally real. 
Abhinavagupta puts the aesthetic experience at the level of Śakti, the 
second category that is of the nature of self-consciousness. He holds that the 
intrinsic nature of the aesthetic experience is nothing but the sthāyin bhāva 
(basic mental state) which prevails in consciousness free from all 
obstructions.18 And such consciousness free from all impediments can only be 
‘Camatkāra’. Camatkāra is the activity of the individual self that has steeped 
itself into ‘Spanda’, which is essentially a wonderful ‘Bhoga’.19 
The terms like camatkāra, bhoga, spanda are derived from Trika darśana 
(Kāśmira Śaivism). These terms are used with the same philosophical import 
in poetics by Abhinavagupta. Camatkāra in the worldly life stands for ānanda 
that is had on experiencing an enjoyable state. However, it is relied on subject-
object dualism with impediments and so imperfect. In this momentary state of 
ānanda, the beholder is in restful state that just partly reveals bliss which is the 
nature of ātman (Self). Technically, it is called ‘bhuñjana’. Abhinavagupta, says 
in Locana: ‚cārūrūpam viśrāntisthānam‛ (Beautiful is that which gives rise to 
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aesthetic repose). In the context of art experience, the beholder experiences the 
upsurge of sthāyin which is but the subconscious. It is simply evocation of 
vāsanā (latent desire) that was dormant. The beholder experiencing aesthetic 
relish becomes free from individuality for the time being.  
The aesthetic experience is thus marked by cessation of objective 
consciousness and is qualified with the predominance of vimarśa in 
continuous relation of citi (universalized consciousness) which is called 
rasanā, carvanā, nivrtti, pramātrviśrānti or camatkāra. Here, camatkāra is akin to 
rasa, ānanda, and parama bhoga. 
Bhoga for the limited individual self is the experience of pleasure, pain 
and insentience which are respectively forms of sattva, rajas and tamas. Owing 
to the ignorance, jīva is oblivious of his identity with Maheśvara (the 
Supreme) that is his essential nature. Bhoga is termed Maheśvara in the 
context of the Absolute. Maheśvara is the self-consciousness of all the animate 
entities. His experience is ‘Aham idam’ (I am This) where ‘This’ is not external 
to Himself but his own manifestation. It is the manifestation of all plurality 
within Himself that is referred to as ‘This’, and so it is perfect.20 Since the 
subject and the object being identical in the case of Maheśvara with no 
objective reference, Its bhoga is not of the nature of individual and therefore it 
is called parama bhoga. 
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Abhinava’s position here differs from that of Bhatta Nāyaka, for 
according to the latter; the aesthetic experience is the result of the 
predominance of sattva. The three guna-s in both Vedānta and Trika darśana-s 
come under the aegis of māyā. So Bhatta Nāyaka’s aesthetic experience is 
within the prevalence of māyā whereas Abhinava holds it to be a 
transcendental experience. The aesthetic experience is free from all the guna-s 
and thereby free from māyā. The aesthetic experience is the experience of itself 
by the Universal. This experience is viśrānti (state of repose) of one aspect of 
the Absolute in the other. Having been freed from all external references, citta 
(individual consciousness) rests in its inseparable aspect of ātman (self) which 
is ānanda. 
The term ‘spanda’ (lit. vibration) connotes the same level of Śakti. The 
Trika darśana variously refers to Svātrantya Śakti (Power of Free Will). It is 
called caitanya (active aspect of the self) that has power to unify, separate and 
act upon what is within in different ways.21 Other terms are spanda and 
sphurattā representing citi (universal consciousness) that is responsible for its 
apparent change from the state from the state of absolute oneness. It is called 
mahāsattā, for it is the substratum of this phenomenal world. This apart, the 
term parāvāk is also used that denotes śabdabrahma in the Trika system. 
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In the view of Abhinavagupta, the aesthetic experience, thus, pertains 
to the second level of spiritual experience, i.e., at the level of Śakti,  Spanda, 
Vimarśa, or Ānanda. 
II.1.2 Aesthetic Object and Its Experience  
As stated earlier, Abhinavagupta recognizes only two senses as aesthetic 
senses, viz., sight and hearing. Drama is one such art form that engages both 
the senses simultaneously. However, he treats the aesthetic object only as a 
medium and not as the object of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience 
does not involve feelings of pleasure and pain through subjective image of the 
object of aesthetic experience, but it would be mere cognitive fallacy in 
ascribing aesthetic experience to sense pleasure. In fact, the aesthetic 
experience of sahardaya (one with equal heart) is endowed with the presence 
of pure pratibhā (poetic genius).22 
Stimulation of aesthetic senses cannot be the aim of a genuine aesthetic 
object, for it facilitates imagination of the spectator through sense perception. 
Act of imagination further sets the kindred relationship between the subject 
and the aesthetic object; experience is deepened with involvement and makes 
one’s experience fulfilling. The beholder is now not concerned with what is 
perceived, but with what is imaginatively conceived. This constitutes 
imaginative level of the aesthetic experience. The beholder is no longer in the 
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day to day life and nor does he try to evaluate the artistic representation 
through specificities of time, space and causal relations of the phenomenal 
reality. The beholder’s personality becomes one with that of the protagonist 
and he reacts emotively to the situation in the manner of the protagonist. This 
forms the emotive level of the aesthetic experience. 
The affected beholder pitched at the same intensity of presented 
emotion forgets self-consciousness for a while and de-individualizes his self. 
It raises the beholder to the level of the universal. This is the level of 
sādhāranībhvana (universalization). Emotive experience is here completely 
freed from all objective reference that makes one conscious of individuality. 
The aesthete thus relishes the universalized emotion which is something other 
than the experience of pure emotion in daily life. The conducive agreement of 
vibhāva, anubhāva, and vyabhicārī helps bring about an equilibrium in response 
of heart and mind in the de-individualized beholder, making one have the 
unique relish which is rasa. 
Abhinavagupta so far explores the rasasūtra of Bharata. However, he 
furthers the scope of aesthetic experience to the highest level of unalloyed joy. 
Aesthetic experience in its pure and fully ripened form is identified with the 
experience of the self itself.23 Abhinava posits here a higher category of 
‘Mahārasa’. The types of rasa-s such as śrngāra, karuna, etc. are classified 
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variously, according to Abhinava, for convenience as the sthāyin, marked as 
ante-natal trace of vāsanā, is undifferentiated in the subconscious. At one 
point, Abhinava traces mahārasa in śāntarasa, which is the substratum of 
aesthetic experience in his view.  
Considering rasa to be of alaukika (non-worldly) in nature is mainly for 
the reason that aesthetic experience is free from gross subjectivity of the 
individual. It is awakening of subconscious sthāyin by an agreeable 
configuration of vibhāva-s, etc. in a contrived situation, i.e., artistic 
presentation. Hence, aesthetic experience is not just objective perception of 
pleasant objects in day to day life.  
Aesthetic experience at the universalized level is further developed 
into two levels. In one situation, comprehension of the universalized sthāyin 
takes place objectively. The sthāyin is awakened in the beholder from the 
subconscious (vāsanā-samskāra) by dramatic presentation. Here, the sahrdaya is 
emotively one with the hero. In another situation, the beholder traverses the 
subject-object duality through intense self absorption and utter nonchalance 
of the basic state. At this level the sthāyin recedes in to the subconscious. It is 
here, according to Abhinava, that the beholder experiences ānadnaghana (bliss 
of the self) that belongs to the level of Vyatireka Turyātīta (differentiated or 
negative Fourth state) wherein all objectivity merges in the subconscious and 
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the self illumines in its ānanda aspect. Aesthetic experience, as formulated by 
Abhinava, thus passes through five stages of experience from gross to subtle: 
sense level; imaginative level; emotive level; universalizing level; and 
transcendental level. 
This attribution of mysticism to aesthetic experience makes his position 
idealistic which has made Abhinava’s thesis questionable to some critics. 
II.1.3 Abhinavagupta’s Views on Kāvya    
Abhinava’s view on poetry is expounded in his Locanatīkā, a commentary on 
Dhvanyāloka. Ānandavardhana offered threefold dhvani: vastudhvani (subject 
matter; bare idea); alamkāradhvani (figure of speech); and rasabhāvādi (rasa, 
emotion and the like). Abhinava extends the concept of dhvani and asserts that 
in principle rasādi (rasa, emotion) is the soul of kāvya, for the first two types of 
dhvani end in rasa alone. Thus, it is rasa-dhvani which is quintessential. 
Both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta agree that mere 
pratīyamāna artha (suggested sense) does not confer aesthetic quality on kāvya. 
What is really essential to poetry is beauty. Ānandavardhana uses the term 
‘cārutva-pratīti’.24 To this, Abhinava further modifies the expression with a 
philosophic tint and offers ‘viśrānti sthāna’ as well as ‘viśrānti dhāma’, which is 
also in sync with Bharata’s posit ‘viśrānti janana’. Here, Abhinava critiques 
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Ānandavardhana and substitutes ‘cārutva pratīti’, which is akin to ‘saundarya 
pratīti’, with viśrānti for the reason that the former also implies perception of 
phenomenal beauty in the instances such as viewing a sunset, hearing a 
soothing song, pleasant fragrance of flower among others. However, when 
the issue of soul of poetry is concerned whereof exist only word and meaning, 
the question of direct sense-experiences has no place in it. Rasa-dhvani, in fact, 
is ensued in the wake of unique configuration of the constituents of kāvya. 
In nātya, rasa was configured by vibhāvādi which were objectified in the 
form of mise en scène, situation, characters, costumes, and gestures. Kāvya, on 
the other hand, is anabhineya (unenactable). Kāvya is made of word and 
meaning and is at the best beautified with literary devices such as alamkāra, 
guna, rīti, and kāku (intonation). The question then is, ‘how is rasa possible in 
kāvya? In support of his view, Abhinava resorts to Bhatta Tauta who says that 
rasa arises in a kāvya if one sees things as if they were happening before ones 
very eyes. When one reads or hears the description of a garden, a beautiful 
woman, the moon, etc. one imagines and visualizes them as if they were 
taking place before ones very eyes. Further, Abhinava sees practically no 
difference between kāvya and nātya, as the former belongs to the latter. In the 
experience of kāvya, aesthetic relish is facilitated by the formal qualities of 
kāvya and its power of suggestion. This explanation does not contradict his 
posit that rasa is found only in drama, not in the day-to-day life.25 The only 
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difference between nātya and kāvya is that in nātya, the experience is pratyaksa-
sāksātkāra (direct experience of vibhāvādi, etc.). Whereas in kāvya, vivid 
description of vibhāva-s, etc. by the poet stimulates the reader’s imagination 
who enacts them in his mental vista, which is pratyaksa- sāksātkāra-kalpa. 
In the light of the above discussion, the specificities of rasa may be 
enumerated as follows: 
1. Rasa issues forth out of a specific configuration of its constituents. 
2. Rasa pertains to artistic creation alone, not to nature. 
3. Rasa is actualized not by imitation of nature, but through re-
perception of poetic vision. 
4. Not historical reality, but artistic representation caters to rasa. 
5. ‘Rasa iti ka padārtha?’—it is a distinct aesthetic category. 
6. Rasa is psycho-neurotic and emotive response of sahardaya. 
7. Causality of the phenomenal world does not impact the production 
rasa: e.g. ‘ākāśa puśpa’ or ‘a sky flower’. It cannot be called illusory. 
Essentially, illusion is not in what it appears to be, for an aesthetic 
object is essentially and apparently what it appears to be. The 
question of depiction of reality is not an onus on art. Further, the 
constituents of rasa are termed vibhāva, anubhāva, and 
vyabhicāribhāva, which are technical terms. It is significant to note 
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that Bharata is not using terms like kārana (cause), kārya (effect), and 
sahacārī (invariable concomitance), for the whole process of issuing 
forth of rasa is not actualized by any causal relation. 
8. Rasa has potential for the transcendental signified, for a sahrdaya’s 
realization of rasa does not fall within the ordinarily recognized 
categories of knowledge, viz. 1) yathārtha jñāna (valid knowledge), 
2) mithyā jñāna (false knowledge), 3) samśaya (doubt), 4) 
anavadhārana (when the object appears for the first time), 5) 
anadhyavasāya (appearance of an object for the first time). The 
experience of rasa is none of these kinds; it is alaukika (not this 
worldly, not supernatural too). 
II.2 Modern Views 
Aesthetic concerns in Indian tradition are inalienably linked with poetics. The 
core was always the nature of aesthetic experience in the classical poetical 
tradition. However, aesthetics as an independent branch of philosophy never 
existed in Indian thought system. Indian tradition of philosophy was the 
tradition of darśana-s that sought answers to fundamental metaphysical 
questions of life in spiritual ways.  The darśana tradition summoned to its 
scrutiny the substratum; the one unifying principle in all phenomenal 
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diversity. It is the search for infinite in the finite. As Iśa Upanisada famously 
states: 
Iśāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kiñca jagatyāñ jagat | 
Tena tyaktena bhunjithā mā grdhah kasyasviddhanam ‖ (Iśa Upanisada, 1) 
(This (manifest) all (universe) is indwelling of the Supreme. All that exists in 
this world is but perishable. Hence, enjoy by renouncing; covet not. Whose is 
the wealth?) 
In the search for the transcendental one, Indian thinkers have rarely 
prioritized form over the substratum. What is tangible and seen is an external 
manifestation of name and form which is subject to birth, growth, sustenance, 
decay and extinction in time and space. Phenomenality of an object is 
inherently ever transformational and apparent in character. Thus, perception 
of such changing phenomenality should also be accepted with the fact that it 
cannot constitute a universal structure of experience for each instance of its 
sense perception in all and at all times. Aesthetics as a discipline studies the 
beautiful in all its aspects wherein perception of the beautiful (in the 
phenomenal world) is equally important. Indian mind was naturally not 
prone to the theorization of outward manifestation of beauty. So the absence 
of aesthetics in classical Sanskrit tradition has its metaphysical reasons which, 
339 
 
however, should not be misinterpreted as a lack as conceived of by critics 
such as RB Patankar. 
Amongst the modern thinkers, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy is a noted 
aesthetician. His study of the aesthetic is, however, largely based on Hindu 
and Buddhist iconography and paintings. Although he has spoken less about 
Indian poetics, he believed that the aesthetic principles based on art are 
equally applicable to Sanskrit literary writings. 
Coomaraswamy’s critical apparatus is informed of his definite view 
that no art flourishes in vacuum and that the factors such as historical 
conditions, religious beliefs, mystical tendencies, social and personal givens of 
the time among others must be accounted for in evaluation of any art work. 
His major thesis is that Indian art has its source in the religious and spiritual 
experiences. Indian art which is mostly expressive of this mystic tendency 
becomes intelligible only within such a framework, and the interpretation 
exercised in this light brings forth variable insights. Hence, the context is 
taken to be a part of the meaning. He says in his Philosophy of Art, ‚a thing can 
only be beautiful in the context for which it is designed.‛ (18-19) 
His views on the nature of Indian art and its experience can be clubbed 
together as follows: 
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1. Art does not deal in facts or particulars. Artistic presentation is a 
site of discovery of new meanings or truth through new relations 
set to factual experiences. 
2. All great art comes to deal with universal experiences, as 
imagination operates with the universals. 
3. Indian art is simultaneously hieratic and popular. 
4. The medium of such anagogic art is symbolism. For instance, 
mudrā-s used in Indian dance, sculpture and painting are 
suggestive of physical beauty, natural objects, emotive state of 
mind as well as religious sign of experience of bliss. Further, 
language of symbolism tends to be both conventional and arbitrary 
in Indian art. The Western art, on the other hand, largely inheres in 
representation. 
5. Because the Indian art is symbolic and suggestive of subjective 
truth, the idea of progress or evolution does not hold much 
relevance in Indian art tradition. The different schools of art are but 
different ways of creative expression. Moreover, all Indian art 
forms—dance, music, painting, sculpture, literature, etc.—tend to 
evoke emotion in the beholder which is their sui generis 
characteristic. The Western art, which puts premium on 
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representation of the phenomenal objects, tends to progress or 
decline in its art tradition. 
6. Traditional Indian art is closer to medieval European art, for these 
artistic expressions are guided by their respective philosophical 
doctrines. 
7. Art is a form of knowledge and its use of symbolic language is 
closer to ritual and myth. 
II.2.1.  Skeptical Views 
The tenets of Indian poetics have also been received with skepticism by 
Indian critics, particularly those who were trained in Western poetical 
framework. The contestants in this vogue have been Rakesh Gupta, who 
primarily studied rasa principle on the basis of IA Richards’s psychological 
approach, and RB Patankar, who essayed to evaluate overall Indian aesthetics 
in the context of Marathi creative and critical writings.  
Abhinava’s idealism or mystic interpretation is not always accepted by 
the critics.  Rakesh Gupta patently refutes Abhinava’s thesis in his 
Psychological Studies in Rasa (1950). He based his thesis on I.A. Richards’s 
views and revalued rasa. He holds that there is nothing spiritual or esoteric 
about aesthetic experience and it is of laukika (worldly) nature like other 
experiences of joy and sorrow. To him, rasa is not experiencing ānanda of the 
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self in viśrānti but just a ‘Concern’ that engages the beholder for a while. More 
so, the aesthetic emotion is not ‘universalized’ but ‘individualized’, which the 
beholder experiences with his subjective consciousness and identifies it with 
his past experiences through association. This calls for the individual 
response of art which differs in degree, and at times in kind, in all the 
viewers. Here, the continuous awareness of subject-object dualism and 
principle of association relegate the possibility of tanmayībhāva and make the 
whole process of aesthetic experience just a classified perception of pleasant 
objects. This view needs to be further assessed before its approval. 
Nonetheless, this antithesis to Abhinava does revitalize the robust tradition of 
rasa mimāmsā. 
RB Patankar’s take on Indian literary criticism and aesthetics forms a 
dismissive view of classical Indian thought. Being empirical and realist in his 
approach, Patankar takes into account the contemporary practice of critics 
known to him and rethinks claims of classical Indian poeticians. In his essay, 
‚Aesthetics: Some Important Problems‛, he raises some issues which, 
according to him, have failed to satisfactorily answer complexity of the 
content and the form of new age writings. His contention may be summarized 
thus: 
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1. By the end of the 12th century AD Sanskrit traditions in imaginative 
and critical writings dried up. 
2. There is not much practical criticism found in Sanskrit poetics. 
3. Sanskrit poetics does not tell how to discuss moral problems in 
contemporary novels. 
4. That a play affords an original and deep insight into life is what 
cannot be evaluated from within the framework of Sanskrit poetics. 
These questions are not present in Greco-Roman framework. 
5. ‚To ask us to use theories like that of rasa will be a form of cultural 
tyranny.‛ 
6. The posit, ‘brahmānanda sahodara’ experience is not valid. ‚As 
knowers, moral agents, and aesthetic appreciators, we are finite; and 
the object we deal with are also finite. It is therefore logically 
impossible to find in the human world a principle of 
organization/expression which will get completely absorbed in one 
work of art.‛ 
7. Tanmayībhāva (‘all-absorbing concentration) is not only possible in art 
work but also in day-to-day experiences. 
8. That rasa is alaukika is invalid. One cannot say so in regard of bibhatsa 
or bhayānaka rasa. 
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9. Concepts of sattvodreka and alaukika nature of rasa are not based on 
actual experience but on a particular metaphysical theory. 
10. It is very likely that ‘tamas’ rises in a reader while reading an 
escapist story as it takes one away from reality. 
11. ‚Characters in play have capacity to induce in us real-life emotions.‛ 
Patankar’s views on Indian poetics, particularly aesthetics, constitute what 
may be called a ‘colonized criticism’, or as Anandacoomarswamy famously 
expressed, the victims of the (modern) education system. Quite in a vogue of 
Anglo-American thought, there was a particular phase of criticism in Indian 
academics that without proper understanding of Indian literary reality or 
classical critical frameworks faithfully abided by nouveau critique of New 
Criticism, Modernism, Postmodernism, Feminist, Marxist, New Historical 
studies among others while imagining that the modern Western frameworks 
are a perfect fit to the Indian realities without any modification or adaptation. 
It became fashionable to condemn the classical Indian poetical principles as 
the rightist that do not offer proper justification for those marginals. 
Patankar’s most of the charges prove to be untenable if 
Abhinavagupta’s aesthetics is properly understood in the background of the 
philosophical givens of Kāśmir Śaivism. Besides this, Kapil Kapoor’s lecture 
‚Eleven Objections to Sanskrit Literary Theory: A Rejoinder‛ delivered at 
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Dhvanyaloka Institute on June 11, 2000 answer most of the charges. This 
lecture offered a rejoinder to John Oliver Perry who, like Patankar, had 
rejected classical Indian thought with fiercer opposition. In the rejoinder, 
however, all the contentions are nullified and the relevance, practical utility 
and theoretical significance of the classical Indian thought has been 
established. 
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Notes  
                                                          
1 R.A. Scott James, 186. 
2 Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Aesthetics, Introduction (p. VII) by JL 
Masson and MV Patwardhan, Bhandarkar Oriental Res. Institute, Poona, 1969. 
2   Abrams: 2007,  3. 
4 Woodruff remarks: ‚Aristotle takes on the same problem, using the same example, 
in the Topics. Though elements of the argument are probably borrowed from the 
Hippias Major, the result is more blatantly question-begging than is the Hippias 
argument.‛ (78) 
5 Russell says that the ultimate aim of education for Aristotle is virtue, not usefulness 
of art. He informs about Aristotle’s take on art forms in his chapter on Politics: 
‚Children should learn drawing, in order to appreciate the beauty of human form; 
and they should be taught to appreciate such paintings and sculpture as express 
moral ideas. They may learn to sing and play musical instrument enough to be able 
to enjoy music critically, but not enough to be skilled performers; for no freeman 
would play or sing unless drunk.‛ (204) In Politics, Aristotle holds that the aim of 
State is to produce cultured gentlemen who possess the aristocratic nature with love 
of learning and the arts. 
6 This term mathēsis used by Aristotle has a closer counterpart in ‘Epistemophelia’, a 
term used by Jonathan Culler in the context of narrative. By epistemophelia, he means 
‘a desire to know: we want to discover secrets, to know the end, to find the truth’. 
(Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford Uni. Press, 2000) p. 91) 
7 History of idea of catharsis vastly varies from Aristotle’s clinical sense of purgation 
to Christian sense of purification.  
8 This idea of generalization resembles the ancient Indian concept of 
‘Sādhāranikaran’ in aesthetic experience. Sādhāranikaran was posited by Bhatta 
Nāyaka at the tertiary level of Bhāvakatva, Sādhāranikaran and Bhojakatva. 
Sādhāranikaran is universalization of an aesthetic emotion. 
9 To the last point as regards kinds of beauty proper to various arts, one may elicit 
the point that BS Mardhekar made in his essay ‚Poetry & Aesthetic Theory‛: ‚<that  
artistic aim of all the arts, painting and poetry included, is the same, namely, the 
revelation of the beauty of their several mediums. The differences between the 
various arts are the differences of their mediums. (Devy 168) 
10  R.A. Scott James, 159. 
11 Kant’s thesis of disinterested aesthetic judgement was later contested by many 
thinkers, especially by Pierre Bourdieu, Barbara Herrstein Smith, and Terry Eagleton. 
12 This centrality of human rationality in gauging the phenomenal world again 
presents Kant as a staunch Enlightenment thinker. Derrida critiques this in his essay 
‚Parergon‛ and calls Kantian sublime an anthropomorphic concept. 
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13 It resembles the idea of ‚Sattvodreka‛ as propounded in Indian poetics by Bhatta 
Nayaka and later Abhinavagupta. 
14 Abhinavagupta recognizes the beginning of aesthetic experience through the direct 
perception of sight and hearing only. He avers: 
Draśyam śrāvyam ca iti ekavacanena sarvasādhāranatayā eva yadyogyam, 
Tacca spraśyādirūpam na bhavati. 
Draśyaśrāvyayostu bahutarasādhāranayopapttih. (Abhinavabhārati, 1. 10) 
15 ‚Krīdatām mrnmayair yadat bālānām dviradādibhih svotsāhah svadate tadvat 
śrotrnāmarjunādihih|‛        (Daśarūpaka) 
16 Krishna Rayan translates ālambanavibhāva as ‚attractants‛ and uddipanavibhāva as 
‚excitants‛ in his The Lamp and the Jar. 
17 ‚Saisā sarvatra vakroktirnayārtho vibhāvyate.‛ (Kāvyālamkāra, 1) 
18 ‚Vītavighnapratītigrāhyobhāva eva rasah‛ (Abhinavabhārati) 
19 ‚Bhuñjānasya adbhutabhogātmakaspandāvistasya‛ (Ibid) 
20 Eka eva cidātma svātantryena svātmani yato vaiśvarūpyam bhāsyati tato Maheśvaro 
antarnītām idantām krtvā para—anunmukha—svātmaviśrāntirūpa vimarśaparipūrnah |  
(Pratyabhijñāvrttivimarśinī) 
21 Caitanyamātmā | (Śivasūtra 1) 
22 ‚adhikāri cātra vimala pratibhānaśāli sahrdayah.‛ (Abhinavabhārati) 
23 ‚Asmanmate tu samvedanam eva ānandaghanam āsvādyate.‛ (Abhinavabhāratī) 
24 ‚Cārutva-pratītistharhi kāvyasyātmā syāt iti tadangikurma eva |‛ (Locana) 
25 ‚<tena nātya eva rasā na loka ityarthah | kāvyamca nātyameva | (Abhinavabhāratī) 
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CHAPTER  FOUR  
CONCLUSION   
 
Viśvam sphurati yatredam tarangā īva sāgare | 
Tattvameva na sandehcinmūrte vijvaro bhava ‖ 
‚You are indeed That in which the universe manifests itself like waves on the 
ocean. O you Intelligence, be you free from the fever of the mind.‛ 
(Astāvakra Samhitā, XV, 7) 
 
The study of knowledge cultures in the West and in India suggests that a few 
questions in the sphere of human knowledge regarding contents of 
knowledge, methods of cognition, propriety of their modalities, and 
cognizance itself have persistently called for new hypotheses and 
theorizations. The timeless relevance of such concerns owe their continuum to 
human growth in learning whereof divergent claims variously put premium 
on essences, reason, experience, evolutionary nature, language, human 
capacity to understand the good, or just happenstance of existence. And no 
system of thought has been accepted as affording a round explanation of its 
undertakings. No wonder these noetic wanderings will continue in future 
compelled by the advancement of learning and technology. In the present 
work, the issue of literature as knowledge is primarily an epistemological one 
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whilst that of knowledge of literature happens to be ontological. Both kinds of 
enquiries derive their tools and frameworks from epistemic philosophies that 
often supply them to literary theories in the study of literature. Therefore, this 
dynamic ever refashioning nexus of philosophical givens and literary theory 
precludes any possibility to write a conclusion about it. At the most, one can 
enjoy a sojourn; a caesura in the middle with a temporary satisfaction of 
respite, whilst being aware of its inherent incompleteness and improbability 
to ever come to a finis. 
I 
The enquiry into various knowledge theories behoves one to recognize that 
maiden knowledge of the external world of objects and the internal world of 
ideas cannot be positively constructed in that none can be shown to have 
uncontroverted, absolute and independent existence excepting that they may 
be granted mere logical premise to begin with. For both the external and the 
internal realities gain shape and cognizability only if their constitutive 
elements are set in correlations with one another. It is so because 
understanding of a phenomenon is the result of the interaction between the 
subject and the object. All forms of knowledge have a combination of 
subjectivity and objectivity as human knowledge is constrained by its limited 
faculties of sense and perception.  
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In the field of intellectual activities, however, domains such as 
philosophy, history and science have been traditionally favoured as serious 
and useful disciplines compared to literature and other art forms. It was an 
unexamined bias of objectivity that has stayed for so long with the Western 
intellectual world that even today they aspire to reclaim and reassert notions 
of objectivity and rationality in their day to day practices and discourses 
while forgetting that such beliefs have been already nullified and negated by 
their own thinkers. In the process the scapegoat became literature. And 
literary writing had been debased or doubted time and again by the 
champions of reason and objective truth. In literary criticism, recourse to 
history of ideas would help enlist such charges levied on poetry. 
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I.1 Objections to Literature 
Writers Contentions 
Aristophanes 
(448?-385 BC) 
(of tragedies) sentimentalism, unnatural, capricious, 
unethical, cowardly, illusory, magical worlds 
Plato (428?-327 
BC) 
‘copy of copy’—thrice removed from reality; born of 
false opinion, uses images of shadows, illusory and 
apparent as subject matter; weakens moral fiber; unfit to 
produce good citizens 
St. Augustine 
(354-430 AD) 
Condemned the physicality, materiality in arts, 
representation of basic instincts & emotions to be 
shunned; hailed the formless beauty; the summum bonum 
as beautiful. 
Stephen Gosson 
(1554-1624) 
Literature construed as ‘school of abuse’; immoral 
consequences of poetry 
John Locke 
(1632-1704) 
Figurative language serves only ‘to insinuate wrong 
ideas, move the passions, and there by mislead the 
judgement’.  
Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832) 
Literature as pastime unproductive activity. He writes, 
‚the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts 
and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-
pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than 
either.‛  
T. B. Macaulay 
(1800-1859) 
Literature not for wise man; a poet as one mentally 
imbalanced; literary truth as the truth of madness: 
‚Perhaps no person can be a poet, or can even enjoy 
poetry, without a certain unsoundness of mind‛; poetry 
is redundant in a scientific age. He called literature ‚the 
dust and silence of the upper shelf‛  
Thomas Love 
Peacock (1785-
1866) 
Poetry has been immature paeans on the past heroes; 
modern poet as barbaric and uncouth who lives in the 
past only  
C. P. Snow Literature is not objective as science; lacks the capacity 
of abstract thinking; poets live in retrospective 
complacency. 
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From the above charges with their common bias of objective/ pure/ rational 
knowledge, a few underlying beliefs may be gleaned as follows that have 
impelled a critical agon on poetic truth and truth of poetry: 
I.1.a Categorical Criteria for Contentions  
 Epistemological: that poetry deals in the appearances; the unreal; 
imaginative hence no correspondence to the causal world. 
 Logical: that it is not objective; primary concerns are inward 
thoughts; a matter of private taste. 
 Teleological: poetry has no meaningful purpose; it is an ideal of 
indolence. 
 Theosophical: literature portrays gods in poor light; it revels in the 
gross beauty; it results in worship of the mammon. 
 Rhetorical (Affective): that it affects better judgement adversely; 
weakens better emotions. 
 Utilitarian: that it is unprogressive; unproductive; retrospective. 
 Linguistic: that it has uncertainty of meaning, ornamental, 
paradoxical.  
The above charges are levied on literary discourse, for in root of all, 
there is something deviant in the genesis of creative thinking. As the logic of 
natural science has it, the effect necessarily inheres in some amount of 
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qualitative resemblance of the cause. Fons et origo mali (root and source of evil) 
is the means that go into allowing a creative thought. A diverse range of 
means of literature as well as fine arts has been arrived at in both the 
traditions of West and India. It may be listed as follows: 
I.2 Means of Creativity  
Means (hestu) Thinkers 
Muses (divine inspiration) Homer, Hesiod, Pindar  
False Opinion (doxa) (of shadowy 
images) 
Plato 
Mimēsis (imitative representation) 
due to mathēsis (which is not 
divine but natural human 
instinct) 
Aristotle 
Sublime—an echo of a great soul  Longinus 
3 factors: 1. Divine inspiration 
(external factor), 2. Poetic genius 
(internal factor), 3. Knowhow of 
arts (craftsmanship) 
Horace 
Poetic genius (pratibhā) Rājaśekhara, Abhinavagupta/ 
ST Coleridge, Matthew Arnold, 
Croce 
Poetic training  Rājaśekhara, Bhoja, etc. 
Striking intellect & Imagination John Dryden 
More comprehensive soul 
recollecting powerful emotion 
Wordsworth    
Imagination; knowledge of world 
and other disciplines 
Coleridge 
Divine inspiration PB Shelley 
Archetypal patterns Northrop Frye 
A fertile but depersonalized mind TS Eliot 
Unconscious association through Other Modernist views 
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random juxtaposition/ pastiche/ 
collage 
Epistemophelia (desire to know) Jonathan Culler 
Simulation Baudrillard 
 
Above is a heterogeneous pack of means that different thinkers/ writers have 
adopted according as their theoretical disposition. The poets and poeticians 
have gladly embraced one or more than one means that remain as substratum 
and source of creativity. However, all these means would appear unsound 
and untenable to a person committed to scientific methods, for knowledge 
born of such means would not have logical exactitude, communicative 
simplicity and purposiveness, and assurance of meaning. Such knowledge 
will not be and cannot be usefully applied to scientific, economic and political 
purposes, which form our world of common-sense. 
Almost all charges levied against literature hither have had their 
geneses in one or more of these criteria whilst holding the literary means 
responsible for this onus in the background of Western prejudice for the 
rational; the objective; and the good. In fact, further enquiry into the above 
conceptual criteria would have shown an uncritical haste in their judgements 
in that the justification of literature as knowledge and knowledge of literature 
stem from these criteria only. One may rather group three categorical 
justifications in relation to the criteria for this historical bias. 
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I.3 Figurative Language 
A large portion in history of literary criticism is full of attacks on and defences 
of literature. After the advent of post-structuralist philosophy in the 20th 
century, all human sciences and discourses inherently lacked in a complete or 
coherent system of thought in that the nature of language itself annuls a 
possibility of unitary meaning. It showed that almost all human intellectual 
constructs are made of floating signifiers sans any fixity of conclusive 
meaning. In a way, after post-structuralism the question of truthfulness in 
literature became redundant or at least less fruitful. Because the basic medium 
of constructing knowledge, after all, is language and there is no singular 
instance of mode of thinking or its expression that can break away from or 
Figurative 
Language 
Appearances  
Literary Telos 
Linguistic 
Rhetorical 
Epistemic  
Logical  
Theosophical  
Utilitarian  
R e s p o n s e s  to  
O b j e c ti o n s :  
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negate the very operationality of the medium. This section shall respond to 
‘Rhetorical (affective)’ and ‘Linguistic’ criteria of objection. 
Once approved notion that other non-literary disciplines do not resort 
to appearances or figurative language or that they unfailingly ensure against 
the free play of floating signifiers has been written off. For in every instance of 
verbal discourse the rhetoricity of language come to undo the logical; the 
rational in language. While relating a poststructuralist revelation to historical 
writings in general, an art historian Jeremy Begbie, like many other thinkers 
of his time, felt that there is no way of securing an a-cultural position to assess 
whether a text is being true to a purported ‘outside’ reality. The distinction 
between history and fiction is bound to evaporate, for texts do not direct 
attention to authors or things or events, they point to other texts, and within 
this intertextuality writing becomes a playful, ceaseless process in which 
writer is already reader and reader necessarily becomes writer. 
The reason perhaps literary writing consistently invited its intellectual 
condemnation can be that the literary discourse makes no bones about the fact 
of its fictive mould and figurative manner of construction. The poets were 
called mad, frenzied or possessed because they (successfully) exploited 
suggestive and figurative capacities of word and its meaning which the 
previous generation could not measure rationally. The figurativeness was 
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beyond the ken of philosophic rationality precisely because it was figurative 
and not rational; it was arational.  
Tropes and figures have been fundamental structure of language 
whereof metaphor holds a pride of place (at least in the West as simile is 
primary in Indian imaginative thinking). First of all, a metaphor is not causal, 
nor illogical but an associative cognitive principle which through indirect 
comparison approximates knowledge. Secondly, the juxtaposition of the two 
compared in a metaphor is not random and purely fantastic. Juxtaposition in 
a metaphor would be valid when it has its base in experience of similarities 
and differences in name, class, qualities and functions of concerned objects 
and a logical possibility of association. This whole process must take place in 
the light of imagination, for to come up with a new metaphor takes a genius 
who has mastered Jakobsonian paradigmatic level of signification or principle 
of choices. Therefore, the metaphoric validity must pass the muster of a 
decorous combination of a free play of experience and imaginative 
juxtaposition lest it may seem ludicrous or vulgar. Bhāmaha in this regard 
provides a beautiful example in his Kāvyālamkāra which elucidates the above 
point. He offers a case of indecorous simile as follows: 
Kvacidagre prasaratā kvacidāpatyanighnatā | 
Śuneva sāngakulam tvayā bhinnam dvisham balam ‖ (KL, II. 54) 
358 
 
(Just as a dog (worrying a herd of deer) sometimes runs in advance and 
sometimes turns back and assails, so your enemies’ army has been 
broken by you.) 
The purport of the verse is to foreground valour of a king who drives 
away his enemies successfully. The comparison is set to a dog who too 
successfully wards off a herd of deer. The common ground in association is a 
skilled and successful defence with inborn inclination to an adventurous 
spirit. Besides, knowledge of king’s valour is made known in relation to 
another situation. There is no absolute idea of king’s bravery, but one still has 
in an indirect way an approximate idea of the work done. The problem, 
however, lies in the comparison of a king to a dog which constitutes 
‘inferiority in the upamāna or ‘vehicle’—the tenor and the vehicle do not match. 
The problem was at the level of imaginative association; at paradigmatic level. 
The statement does communicate but cannot produce intended effect of awe 
and wonder but rather that of laughter and ridicule. On the contrary, the 
statement would be perfectly all right if it were employed in a farcical context. 
Interestingly enough, the added complexity here is that of context. Thus, 
figurative use of language certainly has its own mechanism of signification 
but it comes with too much liberty and free play which made the past 
thinkers suspect both the poet and poetry. 
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Poetic language foregrounds the unfamiliar, fictional, imaginative, and 
pleasing and it does so by using expressions charged with indeterminacy, 
symbols, tropes, figures, images, ellipsis, epithets, etc. Owing to such 
flexibility, malleablility in signification, a literary statement can 
simultaneously have a temporal context as well as a timeless implication. 
Literature therefore differs from other disciplines by using language 
differently.   
A figurative statement makes one pause, examine at the sentence again 
and at times altogether abandon the logical thinking. For instance, 
Wordsworth’s phrase: ‘the child is the father of the man’. This poetic 
statement makes a proposition that is squarely opposite of a normal day-to-
day experience; the falsehood of which prevails at the literal level of 
signification. The sentence presses hard on its readers a reverse thinking; for 
one encounters something out of habit; unusual to experience. One, in fact, 
tries to understand what kind of relation is the sentence suggesting; what it 
really means by being a child or a father in a relation which would ensure a 
genuine fatherlike and childlike behavior in reciprocation to each one. 
Something is awry which is not noticed with the passage of time whereof the 
child is dissuaded to grow out of his natural innocence and that the father 
forgot to grow in what he had in his childhood. In the process who has lost 
the most—the father or the child? Figuratively thus, the realization of this 
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error is effectively brought home in this metaphor—‘the child is the father of 
the man’. 
Making sense of what a word has in its store was never so straight 
forward and simple as the past masters believed happening in non-literary 
discourses. There was always a possibility of meaning something out-of-the-
blue which was either consciously suppressed or hushed away. What is play 
of language was misunderstood as the plight of language. There is a beautiful 
short poem ‚The Secret Sits‛ by Robert Frost which can be interpreted here to 
show how language ceaselessly encourages its own wonderful play of word 
and meaning. The poem reads: 
We dance round in a ring and suppose, 
But the Secret sits in the middle and knows. 
This short poem offers a titillating example of an ambiguous statement. 
The poem allows signification to operate through ellipsis, displacements, and 
absence of a context; somewhat like in medias res. The poem can be interpreted 
as a displaced statement on significative mechanism of language itself. Like 
an act of dance, deriving meaning is an act too. The reader plays his role. The 
reader turns out to be a homo ludens (man as player) who festively participates 
in the ritual of signification—a situation characterized by logopoeia (dance of 
meaning). The dance of meaning takes place in a ring, which in a synecdochic 
361 
 
relation, stands for the closed system of language. The homo ludens while 
dancing ecstatically in a ritual of producing the meaning, hopes his euphoric 
performance will make the true; the pure meaning manifest. In the process, 
however, the meaning derived remains one provisional, time-being, 
contextual and inadequate, for every new movement of dance—instance of 
deriving meaning—is replacing another of its ilk. Nonetheless, all human 
discourses cherish the epistemic faith in some transcendental signifier, the 
Western Logos, with a halo of mystery. These discourses aspire to have one 
unitary theme and logic which, like the authoritative ‘Secret’, assume the 
centrality. The presence of the ‘Secret’ reminds one of Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’ 
that can never be known but is thinkable perhaps. The dance, however, never 
stops; it goes on with every new movement—new supposition, for even the 
belief that the ‘Secret’ knows is no more than one supposition.  
I.4 Appearances 
Apart from the linguistic criterion, the reason why literary representation has 
been looked down is that it allows indulgences in the unreal, the fantastic, the 
apparent, and the unconventional. The question whether at all the external 
world can be known objectively had fascinated the Western intelligentsia for 
long which ultimately yielded an abject negation to their dismay. The 
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following discussion would attempt to answer ‘epistemic’ and ‘logical’ 
criteria of objection. 
In the wake of such philosophical progress, a curious phenomenon 
took place in its history called Fictionalism. A neo-Kantian German 
philosopher Hans Vaihinger in his work The Philosophy of ‘As If’ (1911) argued 
that it is never possible to know the underlying reality of the world, and that 
as a result we construct systems of thought and then assume that they match 
reality; we behave ‘as if’ the world matches our model. Vaihinger's notion of 
‘fictionalism’ or the ‘As-If’ is based on the Kantian assertion that the human 
mind tortures itself with insoluble problems, searching for truth where no 
possibility of achieving the truth exists. To him, fictionalism is an idea whose 
theoretical incorrectness, and thereby its falsity, is admitted. But for this 
reason the practicality and usefulness of such an idea are not denied. In spite 
of its theoretical nullity, such fictional untruths may have great practical 
importance. 
The ‘As-If’, for Vaihinger, is the necessary fiction of human thought, 
the assumption of truth even in the face of clearly false ideas, which, he 
postulated, made thought and indeed life itself possible. He stressed the value 
and usefulness of clearly false statements, and worked to unseat ‘the truth’ 
from its discursive prominence, claiming that certain aspects of the world are 
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inherently irrational and incomprehensible, that the ‘truth’ of these aspects, if 
it exists at all, cannot be grasped by the human mind.  
The curiosity of the phenomenon called ‘fictionalism’ is, despite this 
conviction, Vaihinger had nourished a thoroughly pessimistic worldview in 
his lifetime. It was curious because ‘fictionalism’ was still figured out as a loss 
of something real. On the contrary, it could have as well be celebrated and 
relished, for fiction which is the realm of literature is characterized by hyper-
reality. It is the possible reality irrespective of present or future. By dint of the 
logic of fictionalism, it cannot be said that Wordsworth erred in calling the 
child the father of the man, for it just grants the possibility of interpretation 
given above. A fictive statement from Macbeth, ‘Life is a poor player/That 
struts and frets his hour upon the stage and is heard no more’ cannot be 
accepted as the general truth and it does have interpretive utility for 
understanding human condition and valuable observation. One of the 
outcomes of fictionalism is it is hardly clear that an ontology of abstract 
representational entities (as in literature) is any more or less objectionable 
than the ontology of abstractionist theories of possible worlds (pertaining to 
real life). 
In the Indian poetics, the question of reliability of literary statement 
was also considered explicitly by a few poeticians. In the digest of Agnipurāna, 
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in its first adhyāya, it is asserted that any statement characterized by proper 
figures of speech or thought with literary merits; devoid of faults should be 
called poetic. The source of the kāvya (literary discourse) is either Vedas or 
world of common experiences. Nonetheless, as regards producing meanings 
and their validity, kāvya does not depend on its sources; it is independent and 
proof unto itself. Later on in the text a generic model of Sanskrit kāvya 
literature is forwarded. Here, the Agnipurāna recognized three domains of 
human intellectual engagement—the Vedic knowledge, world of daily 
experiences, and imaginative world of literature, functioning in tandem and 
benefitting from the other. Literary discourse enjoys freedom of using subject 
matters from philosophical speculations as well from common-sense 
experiences. But the validity of its meaning is not contingent on the 
interpretive or logical norms of its sources, for with a dash of imagination 
literature employs its subject matter for the purpose of delightful instruction.  
Bhāmaha in the fifth Chapter of his Kāvyālamkāra states that it is 
necessary for a poet to have knowledge of epistemological systems as both 
śāstra and kāvya co-opt each other’s modalities and contents. The poet’s 
responsibility is greater in that he must be aware of and in some degree 
possess knowledge of grammar, semantics, logic and arts. 
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In the first half of the chapter, Bhāmaha discusses pramānas (means of 
cognition), primarily patyaksa (direct perception) and anumāna (inference) 
from the viewpoint of the Buddhist logic and later he counters their positions 
one by one. This discussion pertains to śāstrāśrita kāvya or technical works of 
philosophies.  The second part of his chapter deals with lokāśrita kāvya or non-
technical works.  
The second kind of discourse, lokāśrita kāvya, considers the apparent; 
what passes as accepted in general conversation, which the first kind of 
discourse may not approve of. For instance, a poet might describe the sky 
with blue or azure colour whilst the fact is the sky has no colour. Or that a 
poet can talk about a river full of lotuses which is contrary to experience.  
The point is that in epistemological thinking, elements such as nāma 
(name), rūpa (form), guna (quality), kriyā (action) remain contingent on their 
dravya (underlying substance). However, in imaginative discourse of 
literature it is not so. The qualities, form, action may be found different from 
the substance in which they inhere. In this regard, the technical and the 
literary discourses differ from each other in their subjects and descriptions. 
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I.4.a Logical Inference, Figurative Analogy & Illustration 
As regards anumāna (inference), it retains its significative importance in both 
śāstrāśrita kāvya and lokāśrita kāvya, however, the latter does not necessarily 
process through hetus (means) in the same way as the former does. In logic, 
for example, hetu is a means that proves the object: viz. ‘there is smoke on the 
hill’. Here smoke is the means that proves fire.  
A literary statement, on the other hand, is not constrained by the 
logicality of inference and causal relations. One exception to such inferential 
logic can be seen in WB Yeats’s line, ‚Surely the Second Coming is at hand‛. It 
is a statement that follows scenic description of anarchy and disorder in the 
first stanza. The first part of the poem is descriptive and the latter speculative. 
The word ‘Surely’ is but a supposition in the poem. Here, the speculation of the 
‚rough beast‛/saviour/anti-Christ is not causally related with the description 
of anarchy. Nonetheless, poetic effect is produced and the idea is 
emphatically made. Hence, Yeats’s inference of Second Coming retains 
plausibility even in the absence of proper hetus (means) and inferential logic. 
Regarding as description of causal relations, Bhāmaha gives an 
interesting example: ‘dīpradīpā niśā jajne vyapavrttadivākarā’ (KL, V, 51) (Night 
became devoid of the Sun because of its brilliant lamps). This imaginative 
proposition is an absolute reversal of the causal relation postulated in 
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epistemological thought, for here the shining lamps are shown as the cause of 
the sunset. However, the statement produces a strange poetic effect which is a 
literary technique called defamiliarization. In a way, the purport of the 
statement is to draw attention to the nightfall.  
In another way literary writing highlights a key idea through its 
illustrative mode. Drstānata (illustration) provides with a simulative 
analogous statement which shows what could otherwise be not told 
effectively. In a way illustration posits something in a different way that has a 
purport equal to the main idea. At times it involves the process of anvaya 
(agreement) and vyatireka (difference) like logical inference. 
Bhāmaha’s clarification concerning drstānata (illustration), upamā 
(simile), and anumāna (inference) is that all involve the process of anvaya-
vyatireka and thereby achieve a semblance between two different things. The 
case of anumāna differs from that of upamā, especially because an act of 
inference necessitates hetus (instruments or means that share causal relation 
with the sādhya (referent), whereas there is no necessity of hetus in upamā. For 
instance, JE Flecker’s poem ‚The Old Ships‛ begins, ‘I have seen old ships sail 
like swans asleep’. Here, the statement has no sādhana (causal means) and 
sādhya (end) relation as the ‘old ships’ are likened to ‘sleeping swans’. What is 
suggested though is only the silent movement of sailing, for the comparison 
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suffices to convey the idea. In this example, the comparison is based on the 
apparent semblance in action. In a simile or analogy the direct causal relation 
between the two objects remains absent, whilst in inference it prevails. 
Therefore, a figurative analogy differs from a logical inference in its 
functioning. 
In an illustration, unlike figurative analogy, there is a possibility of 
admitting relation of means and ends. Example: ‘Because you accept that you 
know nothing like the wise man of ancient Greece, you verily become so of 
our time.’ Here, wisdom of the man is sādhya, claim to possessing no 
knowledge is sādhana/hetu, and the wise man of ancient Greece is a drstānta 
(illustration). Besides this, it is equally justifiable to have the case of pure 
illustration. Example: ‘You are Bharata. You are Dilīpa. Ila and Purūrava. You 
alone are Pradyumna and Narvāhana. How could one describe your qualities 
in a single word?’ (KL,V, 59) In this example, sādhana-sādhya relation in a verse 
is dropped and the sense is suggested only by using illustrations. In addition 
to what Bhāmaha has to offer one can say in this particular instance 
Airstotle’s S (Subject) acts as P (Predicate) which is possible in a literary 
statement only: ‘He is the Socrates of our society’. Here the S ‘Socrates’ is in 
the position of P. 
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The three poetic expressions exemplified earlier require to be seen in 
the light of the epistemological givens in the Indian context. 
Rājaśekhara in his Kāvyamīmāmsā also reckons with the issue of literary 
discourse as a valid source of knowledge. His defence of literary discourse is 
constituted by his concerns over four major areas:  
 Use of hyperbolic language 
 Description of the apparent or the unreal 
 Indecent or obscene descriptions 
 Poetic conventions  
Kāvya does have exaggeration and for which it is charged with 
describing the improbables. However, use of atiśayokti does not render the 
poetic matter truthless or unsubstantial. Hyperbole, in fact, is a kind of 
arthvāda. It is one of many means of highlighting the meaning or it is often 
used for the purpose of praising. Even in the Vedas, śāstras and other human 
discourses meanings are often emphasised this way.  
The second issue is of passing prātibhāsika (apparent) for vyāvahārika 
(real) as a fallacy in literature. It is about impression of the world around, 
and scientific reality. His argument is what we consider real or apparent is 
something not present naturally in a thing, but that they are modes of our 
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perception. A moon is not so small as it so appears to bare eyes; 
nonetheless the moon perceived with smallness like that of a human fist 
too cannot be denied. The reality of the object cannot negate its different 
appearance, for both depend on perception. The solution is, in 
Rājaśekhara’s view, one should describe a thing according to one’s 
perception. 
The difference between what is apparent and what is real is caused 
by one’s perception. The understanding of this hiatus does not lure one to 
take things for just what they appear. Thus, laws of the phenomenal world 
should not be literally applied to the poetic world which would otherwise 
cause a breach in aesthetic relish. 
As regards indecent representation, there is no denying that certain 
instances which when looked in isolation may appear problematic. Given 
the fact, it becomes all the more necessary to regard such signification with 
discretion. For the allegation that kāvya sends wrong message, what is 
suggested is to adopt proper interpretation. When something is shown 
contrary to the civilised ways of the world, people should understand that 
this is what they should not approve in their life. Here, meanings are 
certainly not to be drawn in a facile manner. Further, instances with direct 
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or indirect sexual implications in kāvya are regarded indecent. There is no 
denying of this fact; however, such occurrences in kāvya should be gauged 
by the purpose they serve in their given space. That is, meaning of bold 
expressions fit in the overall scheme of the work when it is seen in its 
proper context. If there is a part of srngāra rasa in a work, then descriptions 
of sambhoga rasa or vipralambha rasa would be acceptable. Even in the Vedas 
and śāstras instances of this kind figure. Hence, it behoves one to interpret 
bold descriptions in their proper context. This notwithstanding, if a poet 
uses such descriptions merely for the lowly purpose of exciting his 
readers, then it is indeed beneath his office. 
The fourth problem pertains to a deliberate reference to an 
impossible referent in a work. Poets often talk about things that do not 
exist. For example, the lines in John Donne ‘Teach me to hear mermaid 
singing’; and in TS Eliot ‘I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each/ 
I do not think that they will sing to me’—they refer to something—a 
beautiful half-woman-half-fish—which has no existence in real life. This 
Rājaśekhara calls kavi samaya or a poetic convention. The poetic 
conventions are such meanings as cannot be verified in the world for their 
authenticity as they indicate at what is normally deviant from the 
observable facts or the śāstras. Poetic conventions include archetypal 
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patterns in the form of mythical figures, creatures or things which have 
sought wider social acceptance independent of literary practices as much 
as they are at times conventional beliefs among poet communities of a 
culture. For instance, ancient Sanskrit poets conventionally described 
rivers full of lotuses in order to produce scenic atmosphere which is 
contrary to real life experience. Such meanings, though logically 
untenable, get acceptance over a period of time. For the poet, then, it 
becomes a given time honoured belief to which he can unhesitatingly 
resort, as it often carries regional and cultural flair. 
The above discussions pertained to the nature of literary statement 
and its veracity. In literary discourse, however, one important justification 
for itself is its own ontological status. According to empirical logic, any 
matter in order to be known must be recognized with its nāma (name), jāti 
(generic attributes), guna (property), dravya (substance) and kriyā (action). 
When the same logic is applied to a terra-episteme viz. literature, the ontic 
proof of the discipline is realized in the form of its rich taxonomy. A study 
of genre involves the mechanism of classification. Classifying a literary 
form requires, first of all, knowing the kinds—nāma; their kinds founded 
on the basis of certain abstract universal features—jāti; which are the 
elements that qualify given generic class to be so and so—guna; qualities 
373 
 
and substance share concomitance, and the substance in here would be a 
concrete form of any genre—dravya; and their epistemic and teleological 
functions—kriyā. So when one talks of ‘lyric’, ‘epic’ or ‘drama’, one fulfils 
an epistemic precondition of identifying name, class, properties, etc. and 
thereby refers to the taxonomy: a class, sub-class or infra-class. The vastly 
ramified taxonomy of forms, in both the Western and Indian literary 
traditions with numerous classificatory models as shown earlier, offers a 
proper ontological justification of the domain of literature and its 
knowledge. 
I.5 Literary Telos  
The explanations on the nature of figurative language used in literary 
writing and their epistemic viability by themselves do not offer a round 
justification for an unbounded free-play of creative impulse insofar as a 
creative act must account for the repercussions of its public expression. 
Charges had been made on poetry for producing weakening and 
pernicious effects on the experiencer. The question, in principle, pertained 
to the purpose; the telos of literature. If the very purpose or end is vile, 
naturally in the process untoward effects will surface. To avoid this 
chagrin, literary thinkers have availed with their teleological posits in their 
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observations. Referring to this aspect of contention shall answer 
‘utilitarian’ and ‘theosophical’ criteria of objections.  
The famous posits offered as telos are as follows: 
 Ideal homo-politikos 
 Catharsis 
 Transport (ēkstasis) 
 Rasa or aesthetic relish 
 Expression of self 
 Delight and instruction 
 L’art pour l’art 
  Literary fame and wealth 
 Jouissance  
 Ideological  
History of literary theory in India and the West records 
heterogeneous postulates on literary telos. The posits range diversely from 
mundane concerns for literary fame and wealth for a poet; personal 
delight; ecstasy; psychosomatic restoration; art for art’s sake; social 
function of improving a citizen or ideological; to an abstract and mystical 
concept of rasa. All the claims have been made and sufficiently deliberated 
upon by the thinkers on account of their different theoretical persuasions. 
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One can notice here that most of these posits refer to a perspectival, 
subjective, and ripened emotional condition of being rather than cerebral 
objective formula. And in no stage at all—figurative use of language, 
epistemic constitution, and literary telos—does this discipline exhibit a sort 
of fixation for the objective and the universal.  
The other purpose attached to the function of literature is 
ideological (this term, however, is not used here in the Marxist sense of 
‘false consciousness’ but in the sense of commitment to certain 
worldview). Literature is seen as an instrument to interpret human action 
representing a class with tacit commitment to ideologies. Strictly speaking, 
enquiring such a function of literature falls within the purview of critical 
theory. From this vantage point, critical theorists argue whether literature 
is the vehicle of ideology or that literature is an instrument for its undoing. 
Moreover, it is not that all these theoretical positions on literary telos 
came into existence because the previous one was insufficient or lacking. 
These varying claims, unlike other theoretical posits, are not held in 
antagonism or differences with one another, for their import and reach is 
specific to that theoretical framework only in which it is made. And more 
so they together represent the culmination of a given theory that attempts 
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to justify a literary act. Each telos is apotheosis of the system in which it is 
conceived. In a way they become ideals to be realized through literature. 
After the previous disquisition made through the vantage points of 
epistemology, taxonomy and aesthetics, one can arrive at an 
understanding with formulaic givens as to why a literary statement is not 
untrue and how it is different from a referential statement as follows: 1) 
Literary statement is processed first for its charm, and second for its 
meaning. 2) Literary statement can use S (Subject) in the position of P 
(Predicate). 3) Literary statement is not to be judged by the rules of logic. 4) 
It is different from a referential statement, for its purpose is different; it has 
primarily an affective purpose. 5) As regards adverse effects on morality, 
the questions of indecency must seek justifications in the given context. 6) 
Literary statement is perceptional. ‘Appearance’ and ‘reality’ are but 
modes of perception. 7) Imagination enables ‘complex idea’ in a creative 
work which is not to be confused with empirical perception for 
signification. 8) Literary statement processes meaning in possibilities. The 
paradigmatic or ‘principle of choice’ is explored through figures of speech 
and thought. 9) Literary statement validates Poetic Conventions as time-
honoured beliefs. 10) Literary telos acts as the apotheosis in each creative 
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act. 11) Poetic performances often contribute to language by affecting 
linguistic ‘tools’. 
Having looked at the nature of poetic statement, it becomes evident 
to note that literary discourse does not deal in singularity of purport and 
import as are valued in scientific and philosophical discourses, for a poetic 
statement aims at generating plurality of meaning. An important function 
of the poetic statement is to emote and produce a state of being that is 
affected by the aesthetic and a sense of wonder. The truth of poetry aims at 
addressing inner facts of emotions, values, and desire for happiness rather 
than scientific truths which are outwardly oriented. A scientific approach 
of understanding something is primarily led by the conviction that the 
solution of some problem in tangible terms would alleviate the pains of life 
and make it more comfortable. Literary knowledge, on the other hand, 
does not and cannot have such demonstrability of its truth in terms of its 
utilitarian benefits. A good scientific truth is one that removes shrouds of 
mystery over an issue and overcomes the surprise element whereas a good 
literary truth, functioning quite the opposite way, enhances the element of 
wonder and tries to retain it through the maze of meanings.  Literary truth, 
in fact, remains in the intangible realm of subjective/spiritual realization of 
thought and feeling allowing humanity a passage to wisdom. 
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The preceding arguments strive to justify why and how literary 
discourse, although embracing elements of non-literary discourses, tend to 
be different, despite inherent similarities, in the use of the medium. 
However, the fact remains that kāvya and poetry have gone beyond the 
source meaning in which they were used by Sanskrit and Greek thinkers 
and writers. In the 20th century, the scope of the meaning of the term 
‘literature’ further extended to discourse or vimarśa similarly with the 
exponential expansion of human knowledge. The term ‘knowledge’ is no 
longer a singular term. As ‘knowledges’ proliferate around us in the 21st 
century, there is a need to reconsider taxonomies of knowledge and 
different domains of knowledge. Since that remains to be attempted 
outside the ambit of this endeavour, I have, in the obtaining sphere of 
knowledge, proposed towards a model for integral knowledge, especially 
of kāvya and its śāstra. Ironical it may sound, yet the present conclusion 
goes beyond its brim and finds an alternative proposal in the appendix. 
Alternative proposal is a proposition towards a creation of knowledge 
irrespective of knowledge domains. 
Appendix 
Towards a Model for Integral Knowledge 
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Literary discourse by its very nature inheres in the character of polymorphus 
corpus. A possible argument follows that if literature thrives on a vast 
diversity of sources of meaning, why should then the study of literature 
remain only literary? More so, it is a common experience of all academics 
whereof literary reading at its advance level branches off into disparate 
systems of thought. In English studies of our time, particularly poetics, it is 
high time that our courses at post-graduate level incorporated new fields of 
study. This academic liberalism will be well nigh helpful to intensify study 
and research practices of critical discourse. 
The study of poetics can be said to have its functions at the following 
three levels: 
1. Pragmatic level—a chronological study that surveys and postulates 
the units of study ontologically. This is more useful within a 
canonical purview of one critical tradition. It is matter-of-fact and 
historical in character 
2. Theoretic level—a synchronic study of ideas and its application on 
literary instances. This allows comparative as well as parallelistic 
study of history of ideas in more than one critical tradition. It is 
speculative and creative in character. 
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3. Systemic level—a non-chronological, diffusive and acentred mode 
of study that simultaneously allows diverse terra epistēmē 
(knowledge fields) from different time and space. More than 
comparative, it is synthetic in essence with an aim to provide with a 
holistic conceptual framework. It is non-exclusive and indefinite in 
character. 
Poetics has been most explored at the first level and then at the second 
one. A rich background prepared at both these levels should be now put to 
actualizing the third systemic level. At this third stage, it will require an 
ensemble of different aesthetic traditions, epistemological systems, taxonomic 
systems, philosophies of language, and theory and practice of other forms of 
fine arts. The list is not exhausted though; these above knowledge fields 
together constitute an integral understanding of age old literary issues. 
Selection of these knowledge fields, however, bears self justification. 
Epistemological categories help us know the means of cognition and validity 
of knowledge. The validity of knowledge would subsequently lead to the 
limbs of logic that help in cognizance which also touch upon the issues of 
analogy and inference. This in turn deals with what is apparent and real and 
how language affects representation of the apparent and the real while 
beautifying the expression with its rhetorical devices. This consequently 
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approaches the final aesthetic end of what is thought and known artistically. 
Hence, in some distant way though, knowing subtle elements of 
epistemological categories is going to impress our literary reception or 
aesthetic experience of other arts. 
These correlate knowledge fields are further expanded when their 
respective Western and Indian traditions are set together. The work becomes 
overwhelmingly ambitious for a single life time. However, in order for a 
researcher and teacher to benefit, a model course may be prepared on the 
ideal of integral knowledge in symbiotic environs with a qualified 
reductionism. 
To wit, the following select units of idea may be proposed for a 
composite course in each domain: 
 Aesthetic traditions: 1) Gk. idea of kalokagatheia (kalos + aghatheia), 
i.e., beautiful and goodness fused into one; affective principle of 
catharsis; the binary of the useful and non-useful arts; Scholastics’, 
particularly Aquinas’s idea of beauty; the sublime; the beautiful in 
existentialist and Modernist contexts. 2) Bharata’s affective principle 
of rasa; concepts of camatkāra, cārutva, vicitra, bhoga, carvanā, 
saundarya, ramanīya among others. 
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 Epistemological categories: 1) Plato’s anamnesis (theory of 
recollection); Aristotle’s 10 categories; Kant’s 12 categories, 2) 16 and 
7 padārtha-s (categories) of Nyāya-Vaiśesika respectively; 25 tattva-s 
of Sāmkhya; 36 tattva-s of Kāśaida; and theories of causal doctrines. 
The above epistemological categories vary from being perceptual, 
material, empirical, a priori beliefs to even mystical and 
metaphysical. Since modern philosophers usually consider scientific 
method to be a reliable way of acquiring knowledge, the elemental 
categories from molecular physics should as well be included here 
with their electron configurations, isotopes and mass and atomic 
numbers. 
It will be opportune to note that the above study on the comparative 
or parallel grounds must be attended with the awareness of basic 
metaphysical difference that exists in the Western and Indian 
worldviews. PT Raju in his Introduction to Comparative Philosophy 
(1992) elucidates this issue. 
 Taxonomic systems: 1) song, poetry and common speech in early 
Greek literature; generic classification as in Aristotle’s Poetics; 
Northrop Frye’s literary classification, 2) the Agnipurāna’s model of 
genres; Bhāmaha’s fivefold criteria for classification; Rājaśekhara’s 
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system divisions; other taxonomic models by Viśvanātha, Ācārya 
Mammata among others; and modern forms of writing in Western 
and Indian literary traditions. 
 Philosophies of language: semantic concerns as in 1) Wittgenstein; 
Saussure; JL Austin, 2) Bhartrhari; Nāgārjuna; Kumārila Bhatt and 
Prabhākara; Dhvani and Symbolism.  
 Forms of fine arts: theories and practice of classical dance, music 
and paintings in Western and Indian traditions. The folk variants of 
fine arts may be incorporated according as the scope and depth of 
the course work. 
This model of study with selective entries is a step in the direction of 
holistic approach to knowledge fields which not only intersect but transect 
with one another. The objectives of this approach are clear:  
 to construct a holistic framework that not only distinguishes but 
juxtaposes closely the so called defined boundaries of concerned 
knowledge fields, 
 to provide a background to aspiring research scholars and teachers 
for developing further literary and critical theories, 
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 to avail the students of history of ideas and related bibliographical 
data. 
Methodologies of the study here involve postulation of major critical 
concepts; method of analysis and synthesis (anvaya-vyatireka); comparison of 
critical processes; text or author based study with possible case-study; 
tabulations, and enlisting differences or similarities along with pictorial 
presentations. While carrying the study on these lines, it must be clarified that 
divisions, categories and abstracts drawn from the work are absolutes only 
for the concerned work with certain reductionism involved therein and in no 
way offer universal posits in their conclusions. 
Such a model of study is the very symbiosis proposed hereby for 
making integral knowledge possible for the peregrinating knower amidst the 
clouds of ideas.  
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